README: update
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README.md
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README.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ This is WIP. Please test and report issues, comments or missing components on ht
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## Goals
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- secure boot to the login screen
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- immutable /usr and maybe /etc
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- immutable base OS
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- ensured integrity to the login screen
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- encrypted volatile data
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- A/B boot switching for updates
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@ -26,8 +26,17 @@ This is WIP. Please test and report issues, comments or missing components on ht
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- optional: frequent reencryption of the data partition
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## Non-Goals
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- can't secure against someone writing anything to disk
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- can't secure against someone scraping secret keys from the kernel
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- can't secure against a remote attacker writing anything to disk
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- can't secure against a remote attacker scraping secret keys from the kernel
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## FAQ
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### Isn't encrypting everything enough?
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If a remote attacker modifies your binaries in /usr/bin, you cannot be sure of a secure boot
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to the login screen anymore.
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### Why readonly /etc?
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A remote attacker modifying /etc can completely change your boot sequence and you cannot be sure of a
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secure boot to the login screen anymore.
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## TODO
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- merge mkimage.sh and clonedisk
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@ -66,60 +75,119 @@ This is WIP. Please test and report issues, comments or missing components on ht
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## Create
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### Export your GPG Key
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```bash
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$ gpg2 --export --export-options export-minimal <KEYNAME> > FedoraBook.gpg
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```
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### Prepare the Image
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```bash
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$ sudo ./prepare-root.sh \
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--releasever 29 \
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--pkglist pkglist.txt \
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--excludelist excludelist.txt \
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--logo logo.bmp --name FEDORABOOK \
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--outdir <IMGDIR>
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--name FedoraBook \
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--logo logo.bmp
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```
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This will create the following files and directories:
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- ```FedoraBook``` - keep this directory around for updates (includes needed passwd/group history)
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- ```FedoraBook-29.<datetime>``` - the resulting <IMGDIR>
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- ```FedoraBook-latest.json``` - a metadata file for the update server
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or download a prebuilt [image](https://harald.fedorapeople.org/downloads/fedorabook.tgz),
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unpack and use this as ```<IMGDIR>```.
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## Sign the release
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Get [efitools](https://github.com/haraldh/efitools.git). Compile and create your keys.
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Copy ```LockDown.efi``` ```DB.key``` ```DB.crt``` from efitools to the fedorabook directory.
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Optionally copy ```Shell.efi``` (might be ```/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/Shell.efi```) to the fedorabook directory.
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```bash
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$ sudo ./mkrelease.sh FedoraBook-latest.json
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```
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then upload to your update server:
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```bash
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$ TARBALL="$(jq -r '.name' FedoraBook-latest.json)-$(jq -r '.version' FedoraBook-latest.json)".tgz
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$ scp "$TARBALL" FedoraBook-latest.json <DESTINATION>
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```
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## QEMU disk image
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```bash
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$ sudo ./mkimage.sh <IMGDIR> image.raw
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```
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or with the json file:
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```bash
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$ sudo ./mkimage.sh FedoraBook-latest.json image.raw
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```
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## USB stick
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```bash
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$ sudo ./mkimage.sh <IMGDIR> /dev/disk/by-path/pci-…-usb…
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```
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or with the json file:
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```bash
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$ sudo ./mkimage.sh FedoraBook-latest.json /dev/disk/by-path/pci-…-usb…
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```
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## Install from USB stick
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**Warning**: This will wipe the entire target disk
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### Preparation
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- Enter BIOS
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* turn on UEFI boot
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* turn on TPM2
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* set a BIOS admin password
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- Enter BIOS boot menu
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- Select USB stick
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- Login (user: admin, pw: admin)
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- Start gnome-terminal
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- ```$ sudo clonedisk <usb stick device> <harddisk device>```
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### Installation
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If you can encrypt your disk via the BIOS, do so.
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If you cannot:
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- use the option ```--crypttpm2```, if you have a TPM2 chip
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- use the option ```--crypt``` otherwise
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```$ sudo clonedisk <options> <usb stick device> <harddisk device>```
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### Post
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- reboot
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- remove stick
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The first boot takes longer as the system tries to bind the LUKS to the TPM2 on the machine. It also populates /var with the missing directories.
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The first boot takes longer as the system tries to bind the LUKS to the TPM2 on the machine.
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It also populates ```/var``` with the missing directories.
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You can always clear the data partition via:
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```
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# wipefs --all --force /dev/<disk partition 7>
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# wipefs --all --force /dev/<disk partition 5>
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```
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and then either make a xfs
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```
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# mkfs.xfs -L data /dev/<disk partition 7>
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# mkfs.xfs -L data /dev/<disk partition 5>
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```
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or luks
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or LUKS
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```
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# echo -n "zero key" | cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 /dev/<disk partition 7> /dev/stdin
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# echo -n "zero key" | cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 /dev/<disk partition 4> /dev/stdin
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# echo -n "zero key" | cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 /dev/<disk partition 5> /dev/stdin
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```
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On the media created with mkimage.sh, this is partition number *4*.
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On the media created with mkimage.sh, this is partition number *3*.
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## Post Boot
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```
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### LUKS
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Set a new luks password. Initial password is 'zero key'
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Set a new LUKS password, if you installed with ```--crypt``` or ```--crypttpm2```.
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The initial password is ```zero key```.
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## Updating
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```bash
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# systemd-inhibit update <UPDATE-URL>
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```
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## Secure Boot
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**Warning**: This will wipe all the secure boot keys.
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Make sure the BIOS contains an option to restore the default keys.
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- Enter BIOS
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* turn on Secure Boot
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* turn on Setup Mode
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- Boot from stick with Shell.efi and LockDown.efi
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- Execute LockDown.efi
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- reset
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- Secure Boot into signed FedoraBook release
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