feat: initial commit

Signed-off-by: Harald Hoyer <harald@matterlabs.dev>
2025-07-20 22:53:57 +02:00 · 2024-02-09 10:10:53 +01:00 · 2024-02-09 10:10:53 +01:00 · 89ffbd35a8
commit 89ffbd35a8
parent aff4dd30bd
123 changed files with 16508 additions and 0 deletions
--- a/.dockerignore
+++ b/.dockerignore
@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+**/Dockerfile*
+target/
--- a/.github/CODEOWNERS
+++ b/.github/CODEOWNERS
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Each line is a file pattern followed by one or more owners.
+# Owners will be automatically notified about new PRs and
+# an owner's approval is required to merge to protected branches.
+* @matter-labs/tee
--- a/.github/renovate.json
+++ b/.github/renovate.json
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json",
+  "extends": [
+    "config:base"
+  ]
+}
--- a/.github/workflows/container.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/container.yml
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+name: Container
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ "main" ]
+  pull_request:
+
+jobs:
+  push_to_registry:
+    permissions:
+      packages: write
+      contents: read
+    name: Build and push containers image to GitHub Packages
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    concurrency:
+      group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}-${{ matrix.config.dockerfile }}
+      cancel-in-progress: true
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        config:
+          - { dockerfile: 'vault/Dockerfile', tag: 'vault:latest', repository: 'teepot-vault' }
+          - { dockerfile: 'bin/tee-vault-unseal/Dockerfile-azure', tag: 'tvu:latest', repository: 'teepot-tvu' }
+          - { dockerfile: 'bin/tee-vault-admin/Dockerfile-azure', tag: 'tva:latest', repository: 'teepot-tva' }
+    steps:
+      - name: Check out the repo
+        uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
+      - name: Log in to Docker Hub
+        uses: docker/login-action@v3
+        with:
+          username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USER }}
+          password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
+        uses: docker/login-action@v3
+        with:
+          registry: ghcr.io
+          username: ${{ github.actor }}
+          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Set up env
+        run: echo "repository_owner=${GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER,,}" >>${GITHUB_ENV}
+      - name: Build and Push Container
+        uses: docker/build-push-action@v5
+        with:
+          file: ${{ matrix.config.dockerfile }}
+          tags: |
+            ghcr.io/${{env.repository_owner}}/${{ github.event.repository.name }}-${{ matrix.config.tag }}
+            matterlabsrobot/${{ matrix.config.repository }}:latest
+          cache-from: type=gha
+          cache-to: type=gha,mode=max,ignore-error=true
+          push: ${{ github.event_name == 'push' ||  github.event_name == 'schedule' }}
+
--- a/.github/workflows/lint.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/lint.yml
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+name: lint
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ "main" ]
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [ "main" ]
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  fmt:
+    name: cargo fmt
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+      - name: Setup Rust toolchain
+        run: rustup show
+      - run: cargo fmt --all -- --check
+
+  deny:
+    name: cargo deny
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+      - uses: EmbarkStudios/cargo-deny-action@v1
+        with:
+          arguments: --workspace
+
+  check-spdx-headers:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+      - uses: enarx/spdx@master
+        with:
+          licenses: Apache-2.0 BSD-3-Clause MIT
+
+  taplo:
+    name: taplo
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    container: tamasfe/taplo:latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+      - run: taplo fmt --check
--- a/.github/workflows/nix.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/nix.yml
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+name: nix
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [ "main" ]
+  push:
+    branches: [ "main" ]
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  check:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+    - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@6004951b182f8860210c8d6f0d808ec5b1a33d28 # v25
+      with:
+        extra_nix_config: |
+          access-tokens = github.com=${{ github.token }}
+    - run: nix flake check -L --show-trace --keep-going
+
+  fmt:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+    - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@6004951b182f8860210c8d6f0d808ec5b1a33d28 # v25
+      with:
+        extra_nix_config: |
+          access-tokens = github.com=${{ github.token }}
+    - run: nix fmt
+
+  clippy:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+    - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@6004951b182f8860210c8d6f0d808ec5b1a33d28 # v25
+      with:
+        extra_nix_config: |
+          access-tokens = github.com=${{ github.token }}
+    - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v14
+      continue-on-error: true
+      with:
+        name: teepot
+        authToken: '${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}'
+        extraPullNames: nixsgx
+    - name: cargo clippy
+      run: nix develop -L --ignore-environment -c cargo clippy --all --locked
+
+  build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+      - uses: cachix/install-nix-action@6004951b182f8860210c8d6f0d808ec5b1a33d28 # v25
+        with:
+          extra_nix_config: |
+            access-tokens = github.com=${{ github.token }}
+      - uses: cachix/cachix-action@v14
+        continue-on-error: true
+        with:
+          name: teepot
+          authToken: '${{ secrets.CACHIX_AUTH_TOKEN }}'
+          extraPullNames: nixsgx
+      - name: nix build
+        run: nix run nixpkgs#nixci
--- a/.github/workflows/secrets_scanner.yaml
+++ b/.github/workflows/secrets_scanner.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+name: Leaked Secrets Scan
+on: [pull_request]
+jobs:
+  TruffleHog:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout code
+        uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+      - name: TruffleHog OSS
+        uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@4db20e29f8568502b8d69ca2be6ce47a533925d3 # v3.63.3
+        with:
+          path: ./
+          base: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}
+          head: HEAD
+          extra_args: --debug --only-verified
+
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Generated by Cargo
+# will have compiled files and executables
+debug/
+target/
+
+# These are backup files generated by rustfmt
+**/*.rs.bk
+
+# MSVC Windows builds of rustc generate these, which store debugging information
+*.pdb
+
+# Intellij
+/.idea
+/.fleet
+
+/.envrc
+/.direnv
+/result
--- a/Cargo.lock
+++ b/Cargo.lock
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+[package]
+name = "teepot"
+description = "TEE secret manager"
+# no MIT license, because of copied code from:
+# * https://github.com/enarx/enarx
+# * https://github.com/enarx/sgx
+license = "Apache-2.0"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-http.workspace = true
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+awc.workspace = true
+bitflags.workspace = true
+bytemuck.workspace = true
+bytes.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+const-oid.workspace = true
+enumset.workspace = true
+futures-core.workspace = true
+getrandom.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+intel-tee-quote-verification-rs.workspace = true
+num-integer.workspace = true
+num-traits.workspace = true
+pgp.workspace = true
+pkcs8.workspace = true
+rand.workspace = true
+ring.workspace = true
+rsa.workspace = true
+rustls.workspace = true
+sec1.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+serde_with.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
+x509-cert.workspace = true
+zeroize.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+base64.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+testaso.workspace = true
+
+[workspace]
+members = ["crates/*", "bin/*"]
+
+[workspace.package]
+version = "0.1.0"
+edition = "2021"
+authors = ["Harald Hoyer <hh@matterlabs.dev>"]
+# rest of the workspace, if not specified in the package section
+# has the standard Apache-2.0 OR MIT license
+license = "Apache-2.0 OR MIT"
+repository = "https://github.com/matter-labs/teepot"
+
+[workspace.dependencies]
+actix-http = "3"
+actix-tls = "3"
+actix-web = { version = "4.5", features = ["rustls-0_22"] }
+anyhow = "1.0.79"
+awc = { version = "3.4", features = ["rustls-0_22-webpki-roots"] }
+base64 = "0.21.7"
+bindgen = "0.69.4"
+bitflags = "2.4"
+bytemuck = { version = "1.14.2", features = ["derive", "min_const_generics", "extern_crate_std"] }
+bytes = "1"
+clap = { version = "4.4", features = ["std", "derive", "env", "error-context", "help", "usage", "wrap_help"], default-features = false }
+const-oid = { version = "0.9", default-features = false }
+der = "0.7.8"
+enumset = { version = "1.1", features = ["serde", "std"] }
+futures-core = { version = "0.3.30", features = ["alloc"], default-features = false }
+getrandom = "0.2.12"
+hex = { version = "0.4.3", features = ["std"], default-features = false }
+intel-tee-quote-verification-rs = { path = "crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-rs", version = "0.2.1" }
+intel-tee-quote-verification-sys = { path = "crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys", version = "0.2.0" }
+k256 = "0.13"
+log = "0.4"
+mio = "0.8.10"
+num-integer = "0.1.46"
+num-traits = "0.2.18"
+pgp = "0.10"
+pkcs8 = { version = "0.10" }
+rand = "0.8"
+ring = { version = "0.17.7", features = ["std"], default-features = false }
+rsa = { version = "0.9.6", features = ["sha2"] }
+rustls = { version = "0.22" }
+rustls-pemfile = "1"
+sec1 = { version = "0.7.3", features = ["der"], default-features = false }
+serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive", "rc"] }
+serde_json = "1"
+serde_with = { version = "3.6", features = ["base64", "hex"] }
+sha2 = "0.10.8"
+teepot = { path = "." }
+testaso = "0.1.0"
+thiserror = "1.0.56"
+tokio = { version = "1", features = ["sync", "macros", "rt-multi-thread", "fs", "time"] }
+tracing = "0.1"
+tracing-actix-web = "0.7"
+tracing-log = "0.2"
+tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
+x509 = { version = "0.2", package = "x509-cert", default-features = false }
+x509-cert = "0.2.5"
+zeroize = { version = "1.7.0", features = ["serde"] }
--- a/176
+++ b/176
@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+                                 Apache License
+                           Version 2.0, January 2004
+                        http://www.apache.org/licenses/
+
+   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
+
+   1. Definitions.
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+      any Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the Work
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+      the terms of any separate license agreement you may have executed
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+   8. Limitation of Liability. In no event and under no legal theory,
+      whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise,
+      unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly
+      negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall any Contributor be
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+
+   END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
--- a/21
+++ b/21
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2019 Matter Labs
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@ -1,2 +1,19 @@
 # teepot
 Key Value store in a TEE with Remote Attestation for Authentication
+
+## Introduction
+
+This project is a key-value store that runs in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) and uses Remote Attestation for Authentication.
+The key-value store is implemented using Hashicorp Vault running in an Intel SGX enclave via the Gramine runtime.
+
+## Parts of this project
+
+- `teepot`: The main rust crate that abstracts TEEs and key-value stores.
+- `tee-vault-unseal`: An enclave that uses the Vault API to unseal a vault as a proxy.
+- `vault-unseal`: A client utility, that talks to `tee-vault-unseal` to unseal a vault.
+- `tee-vault-admin`: An enclave that uses the Vault API to administer a vault as a proxy.
+- `vault-admin`: A client utility, that talks to `tee-vault-admin` to administer a vault.
+- `teepot-read` : A pre-exec utility that reads from the key-value store and passes the key-value pairs as environment variables to the enclave.
+- `teepot-write` : A pre-exec utility that reads key-values from the environment variables and writes them to the key-value store.
+- `verify-attestation`: A client utility that verifies the attestation of an enclave.
+- `tee-key-preexec`: A pre-exec utility that generates a p256 secret key and passes it as an environment variable to the enclave along with the attestation quote containing the hash of the public key.
--- a/assets/Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+++ b/assets/Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+diff --git a/src/dcap_provider.cpp b/src/dcap_provider.cpp
+index d23c250..34c4d9d 100644
+--- a/src/dcap_provider.cpp
+++ b/src/dcap_provider.cpp
+@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ static std::string build_tcb_info_url(
+         tcb_info_url << base_url;
+     }
+     else
+-        tcb_info_url << get_base_url();
+        tcb_info_url << "https://api.trustedservices.intel.com/sgx/certification";
+ 
+     if (!version.empty())
+     {
+@@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ static std::string build_enclave_id_url(
+         qe_id_url << base_url;
+     }
+     else
+-        qe_id_url << get_base_url();
+        qe_id_url << "https://api.trustedservices.intel.com/sgx/certification/";
+ 
+     // Select the correct issuer header name
+     if (!version.empty())
+@@ -1521,6 +1521,7 @@ static quote3_error_t get_collateral(
+                 "Successfully fetched %s from URL: '%s'.",
+                 friendly_name.c_str(),
+                 url.c_str());
+/*
+             std::string cache_control;
+             auto get_cache_header_operation = get_unescape_header(*curl_operation, headers::CACHE_CONTROL, &cache_control);
+             retval = convert_to_intel_error(get_cache_header_operation);
+@@ -1534,6 +1535,7 @@ static quote3_error_t get_collateral(
+                     local_cache_add(issuer_chain_cache_name, expiry, issuer_chain.size(), issuer_chain.c_str());
+                 }
+             }
+*/
+         }
+ 
+         return retval;
--- a/assets/extract-sig.sh
+++ b/assets/extract-sig.sh
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# This script is used to extract the signature of a gramine docker image.
+#
+# Usage: ./extract-sig.sh <image-name> <tee-name> <output-file>
+# Example: ./extract-sig.sh tva tee-vault-admin
+
+id=$(docker create $1)
+trap 'docker rm -v $id' EXIT
+docker cp "$id:/app/$2.sig" "$3"
--- a/assets/replace-sig.sh
+++ b/assets/replace-sig.sh
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# This script is used to replace the signature of a gramine docker image with a new one.
+#
+# Usage: ./replace-sig.sh <image> <new-signature-file> <old-signature-file>
+# Example: ./replace-sig.sh tva tee-vault-admin.sig /app/tee-vault-admin.sig
+
+DOCKERFILE="Dockerfile-tmp-$$"
+
+trap 'rm -f $DOCKERFILE' EXIT
+
+cat > "$DOCKERFILE" <<EOF
+FROM $1
+COPY $2 $3
+EOF
+
+docker build -f "$DOCKERFILE" -t "$1" .
--- a/assets/sgx_default_qcnl.conf.json
+++ b/assets/sgx_default_qcnl.conf.json
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "pccs_url": "https://host.containers.internal:8081/sgx/certification/v4/",
+  "use_secure_cert": false,
+  "collateral_service": "https://api.trustedservices.intel.com/sgx/certification/v4/",
+  "retry_times": 6,
+  "retry_delay": 10,
+  "pck_cache_expire_hours": 168,
+  "verify_collateral_cache_expire_hours": 168,
+  "local_cache_only": false
+}
--- a/assets/vault-auth-tee.sha256
+++ b/assets/vault-auth-tee.sha256
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+7e417b65b9a4fa46dfcc72feb0f0c2e5fa4391c3f6b668cb2c5ba7174b95c43b
--- a/bin/tee-key-preexec/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/tee-key-preexec/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[package]
+name = "tee-key-preexec"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+k256.workspace = true
+rand.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
--- a/bin/tee-key-preexec/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-key-preexec/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2024 Matter Labs
+
+//! Pre-exec for binary running in a TEE needing attestation of a secret signing key
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use hex::ToHex;
+use k256::ecdsa::SigningKey;
+use sha2::Digest;
+use sha2::Sha256;
+use std::env;
+use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt;
+use std::process::Command;
+use teepot::quote::get_quote;
+use tracing::error;
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter, Registry};
+
+const TEE_QUOTE_FILE: &str = "/tmp/tee_quote";
+
+fn main_with_error() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr));
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let args = env::args_os().collect::<Box<_>>();
+
+    if args.len() < 2 {
+        return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
+            "Usage: {} <command> [args...]",
+            args[0].to_string_lossy()
+        ));
+    }
+
+    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+    let signing_key = SigningKey::random(&mut rng);
+    let verifying_key_bytes = signing_key.verifying_key().to_sec1_bytes();
+    let hash_verifying_key = Sha256::digest(verifying_key_bytes);
+    let signing_key_string = signing_key.to_bytes().encode_hex::<String>();
+    let tee_type = match get_quote(&hash_verifying_key) {
+        Ok(quote) => {
+            // save quote to file
+            std::fs::write(TEE_QUOTE_FILE, quote)?;
+            "sgx"
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!("Failed to get quote: {}", e);
+            std::fs::write(TEE_QUOTE_FILE, [])?;
+            "none"
+        }
+    };
+
+    let err = Command::new(&args[1])
+        .args(&args[2..])
+        .env("TEE_SIGNING_KEY", signing_key_string)
+        .env("TEE_QUOTE_FILE", TEE_QUOTE_FILE)
+        .env("TEE_TYPE", tee_type)
+        .exec();
+
+    Err(err).with_context(|| format!("exec of `{cmd}` failed", cmd = args[1].to_string_lossy()))
+}
+
+fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    let ret = main_with_error();
+    if let Err(e) = &ret {
+        error!("Error: {}", e);
+    }
+    ret
+}
--- a/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[package]
+name = "tee-self-attestation-test"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
--- a/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/Dockerfile-azure
+++ b/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/Dockerfile-azure
@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+FROM docker.io/ubuntu:20.04 AS azuredcap
+WORKDIR /build
+ADD https://github.com/microsoft/Azure-DCAP-Client/archive/refs/tags/1.12.0.tar.gz ./Azure-DCAP-Client.tar.gz
+RUN tar -xvf Azure-DCAP-Client.tar.gz
+COPY assets/Azure-DCAP-Client.patch ./Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+RUN set -eux; \
+    apt-get update; \
+    apt-get install -y software-properties-common; \
+    add-apt-repository ppa:team-xbmc/ppa -y; \
+    apt-get update; \
+    apt-get install -y \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        pkg-config \
+        nlohmann-json3-dev \
+        wget \
+        dos2unix \
+        ;
+
+WORKDIR /build/Azure-DCAP-Client-1.12.0
+RUN dos2unix src/dcap_provider.cpp && patch -p1 < ../Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+WORKDIR /build/Azure-DCAP-Client-1.12.0/src/Linux
+RUN ./configure && make && make install
+
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-self-attestation-test.manifest.template.toml' -av /data/ ./
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p tee-self-attestation-test --bin tee-self-attestation-test \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/tee-self-attestation-test ./
+
+FROM docker.io/gramineproject/gramine:v1.5
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/microsoft.asc https://packages.microsoft.com/keys/microsoft.asc \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/microsoft.asc] https://packages.microsoft.com/ubuntu/20.04/prod focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/msprod.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt purge -y libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+    && apt-get install -y az-dcap-client
+
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+#    libsgx-urts
+
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# So we only have to use one gramine template
+RUN touch /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/tee-self-attestation-test .
+COPY ./bin/tee-self-attestation-test/tee-self-attestation-test.manifest.template.toml .
+COPY vault/enclave-key.pem .
+
+# The original Azure library is still delivering expired collateral, so we have to use a patched version
+COPY --from=azuredcap /usr/local/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so /usr/lib/
+
+RUN gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu -Dexecdir=/usr/bin -Dlog_level=warning tee-self-attestation-test.manifest.template.toml tee-self-attestation-test.manifest \
+    && gramine-sgx-sign --manifest tee-self-attestation-test.manifest --output tee-self-attestation-test.manifest.sgx --key enclave-key.pem \
+    && rm enclave-key.pem
+
+EXPOSE 8443
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "/restart_aesm.sh ; exec gramine-sgx tee-self-attestation-test" ]
--- a/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/Dockerfile-intel
+++ b/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/Dockerfile-intel
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-vault-admin.manifest.template' -av /data/ ./
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p tee-self-attestation-test --bin tee-self-attestation-test \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/tee-self-attestation-test ./
+
+FROM docker.io/gramineproject/gramine:v1.5
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+        libsgx-urts \
+        libsgx-enclave-common \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# So we only have to use one gramine template
+RUN touch /lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/tee-self-attestation-test .
+COPY ./bin/tee-self-attestation-test/tee-self-attestation-test.template.toml .
+COPY vault/enclave-key.pem .
+
+COPY assets/sgx_default_qcnl.conf.json /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf
+
+RUN gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu -Dexecdir=/usr/bin -Dlog_level=warning tee-self-attestation-test.template.toml tee-self-attestation-test.manifest \
+    && gramine-sgx-sign --manifest tee-self-attestation-test.manifest --output tee-self-attestation-test.manifest.sgx --key enclave-key.pem \
+    && rm enclave-key.pem
+
+EXPOSE 8443
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "exec gramine-sgx tee-self-attestation-test" ]
--- a/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Simple TEE self-attestation test
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use teepot::server::attestation::get_quote_and_collateral;
+use tracing::error;
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter, Registry};
+
+#[actix_web::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr));
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).unwrap();
+
+    let report_data = [0u8; 64];
+    if let Err(e) = get_quote_and_collateral(None, &report_data) {
+        error!("failed to get quote and collateral: {e:?}");
+        return Err(e);
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
--- a/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/tee-self-attestation-test.template.toml
+++ b/bin/tee-self-attestation-test/tee-self-attestation-test.template.toml
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+libos.entrypoint = "/app/tee-self-attestation-test"
+
+[loader]
+argv = ["/app/tee-self-attestation-test"]
+entrypoint = "file:{{ gramine.libos }}"
+env.LD_LIBRARY_PATH = "/lib:{{ arch_libdir }}:/usr{{ arch_libdir }}:/lib"
+env.HOME = "/app"
+env.MALLOC_ARENA_MAX = "1"
+env.AZDCAP_DEBUG_LOG_LEVEL = "ignore"
+env.AZDCAP_COLLATERAL_VERSION = "v4"
+
+### DEBUG ###
+env.RUST_BACKTRACE = "1"
+env.RUST_LOG = "info"
+
+[fs]
+root.uri = "file:/"
+start_dir = "/app"
+mounts = [
+  { path = "{{ execdir }}", uri = "file:{{ execdir }}" },
+  { path = "/lib", uri = "file:{{ gramine.runtimedir() }}" },
+  { path = "{{ arch_libdir }}", uri = "file:{{ arch_libdir }}" },
+  { path = "/etc", uri = "file:/etc" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/var/tmp" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/tmp" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/app/.dcap-qcnl" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/app/.az-dcap-client" },
+  { path = "/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so", uri = "file:/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so" },
+]
+
+[sgx]
+trusted_files = [
+  "file:/etc/ld.so.cache",
+  "file:/app/",
+  "file:{{ execdir }}/",
+  "file:{{ arch_libdir }}/",
+  "file:/usr/{{ arch_libdir }}/",
+  "file:{{ gramine.libos }}",
+  "file:{{ gramine.runtimedir() }}/",
+  "file:/usr/lib/ssl/openssl.cnf",
+  "file:/etc/ssl/",
+  "file:/etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf",
+  "file:/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so",
+]
+remote_attestation = "dcap"
+max_threads = 64
+edmm_enable = false
+## max enclave size
+enclave_size = "1G"
+
+[sys]
+enable_extra_runtime_domain_names_conf = true
+enable_sigterm_injection = true
+
+# possible tweak option, if problems with mio
+# currently mio is compiled with `mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe`
+# insecure__allow_eventfd = true
--- a/bin/tee-stress-client/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/tee-stress-client/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[package]
+name = "tee-stress-client"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+awc.workspace = true
+base64.workspace = true
+bytemuck.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+mio.workspace = true
+rustls.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+tracing-actix-web.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
--- a/bin/tee-stress-client/Dockerfile-azure
+++ b/bin/tee-stress-client/Dockerfile-azure
@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+FROM docker.io/ubuntu:20.04 AS azuredcap
+WORKDIR /build
+ADD https://github.com/microsoft/Azure-DCAP-Client/archive/refs/tags/1.12.0.tar.gz ./Azure-DCAP-Client.tar.gz
+RUN tar -xvf Azure-DCAP-Client.tar.gz
+COPY assets/Azure-DCAP-Client.patch ./Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+RUN set -eux; \
+    apt-get update; \
+    apt-get install -y software-properties-common; \
+    add-apt-repository ppa:team-xbmc/ppa -y; \
+    apt-get update; \
+    apt-get install -y \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        pkg-config \
+        nlohmann-json3-dev \
+        wget \
+        dos2unix \
+        ;
+
+WORKDIR /build/Azure-DCAP-Client-1.12.0
+RUN dos2unix src/dcap_provider.cpp && patch -p1 < ../Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+WORKDIR /build/Azure-DCAP-Client-1.12.0/src/Linux
+RUN ./configure && make && make install
+
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-stress-client.manifest.template' -av /data/ ./
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p tee-stress-client --bin tee-stress-client \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/tee-stress-client ./
+
+FROM docker.io/gramineproject/gramine:v1.5
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/microsoft.asc https://packages.microsoft.com/keys/microsoft.asc \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/microsoft.asc] https://packages.microsoft.com/ubuntu/20.04/prod focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/msprod.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt purge -y libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+    && apt-get install -y az-dcap-client
+
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+#    libsgx-urts
+
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# So we only have to use one gramine template
+RUN touch /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/tee-stress-client .
+COPY ./bin/tee-stress-client/tee-stress-client.manifest.template .
+COPY vault/enclave-key.pem .
+
+# The original Azure library is still delivering expired collateral, so we have to use a patched version
+COPY --from=azuredcap /usr/local/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so /usr/lib/
+
+RUN gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu -Dexecdir=/usr/bin -Dlog_level=warning tee-stress-client.manifest.template tee-stress-client.manifest \
+    && gramine-sgx-sign --manifest tee-stress-client.manifest --output tee-stress-client.manifest.sgx --key enclave-key.pem \
+    && rm enclave-key.pem
+
+EXPOSE 8443
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "/restart_aesm.sh ; exec gramine-sgx tee-stress-client" ]
--- a/bin/tee-stress-client/Dockerfile-intel
+++ b/bin/tee-stress-client/Dockerfile-intel
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-stress-client.manifest.template' -av /data/ ./
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p tee-stress-client --bin tee-stress-client \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/tee-stress-client ./
+
+FROM docker.io/gramineproject/gramine:v1.5
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+        libsgx-urts \
+        libsgx-enclave-common \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# So we only have to use one gramine template
+RUN touch /lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/tee-stress-client .
+COPY ./bin/tee-stress-client/tee-stress-client.manifest.template .
+COPY vault/enclave-key.pem .
+
+COPY assets/sgx_default_qcnl.conf.json /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf
+
+RUN gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu -Dexecdir=/usr/bin -Dlog_level=warning tee-stress-client.manifest.template tee-stress-client.manifest \
+    && gramine-sgx-sign --manifest tee-stress-client.manifest --output tee-stress-client.manifest.sgx --key enclave-key.pem \
+    && rm enclave-key.pem
+
+EXPOSE 8443
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "/restart_aesm.sh ; exec gramine-sgx tee-stress-client" ]
--- a/bin/tee-stress-client/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-stress-client/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+//! Server to handle requests to the Vault TEE
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+use actix_web::rt::time::sleep;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use clap::Parser;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::time::Duration;
+use teepot::client::vault::VaultConnection;
+use teepot::server::attestation::{get_quote_and_collateral, VaultAttestationArgs};
+use teepot::server::pki::make_self_signed_cert;
+use teepot::sgx::{parse_tcb_levels, EnumSet, TcbLevel};
+use tracing::{error, trace};
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::Registry;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter};
+
+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+#[command(author, version, about, long_about = None)]
+struct Arguments {
+    /// allowed TCB levels, comma separated
+    #[arg(long, value_parser = parse_tcb_levels, env = "ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS", default_value = "Ok")]
+    my_sgx_allowed_tcb_levels: EnumSet<TcbLevel>,
+    #[clap(flatten)]
+    pub attestation: VaultAttestationArgs,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct MySecret {
+    val: usize,
+}
+
+#[actix_web::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr));
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).unwrap();
+
+    let args = Arguments::parse();
+
+    let (report_data, _cert_chain, _priv_key) = make_self_signed_cert()?;
+    if let Err(e) = get_quote_and_collateral(Some(args.my_sgx_allowed_tcb_levels), &report_data) {
+        error!("failed to get quote and collateral: {e:?}");
+        // don't return for now, we can still serve requests but we won't be able to attest
+    }
+
+    let mut vault_1 = args.attestation.clone();
+    let mut vault_2 = args.attestation.clone();
+    let mut vault_3 = args.attestation.clone();
+
+    vault_1.vault_addr = "https://vault-1:8210".to_string();
+    vault_2.vault_addr = "https://vault-2:8210".to_string();
+    vault_3.vault_addr = "https://vault-3:8210".to_string();
+
+    let servers = vec![vault_1.clone(), vault_2.clone(), vault_3.clone()];
+
+    let mut val: usize = 1;
+
+    loop {
+        let mut conns = Vec::new();
+        for server in &servers {
+            match VaultConnection::new(&server.into(), "stress".to_string()).await {
+                Ok(conn) => conns.push(conn),
+                Err(e) => {
+                    error!("connecting to {}: {}", server.vault_addr, e);
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if conns.is_empty() {
+            error!("no connections");
+            sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        let i = val % conns.len();
+        trace!("storing secret");
+        conns[i]
+            .store_secret(MySecret { val }, "val")
+            .await
+            .context("storing secret")?;
+        for conn in conns {
+            let got: MySecret = conn
+                .load_secret("val")
+                .await
+                .context("loading secret")?
+                .context("loading secret")?;
+            assert_eq!(got.val, val,);
+        }
+        val += 1;
+        sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+    }
+}
--- a/bin/tee-stress-client/tee-stress-client.manifest.template
+++ b/bin/tee-stress-client/tee-stress-client.manifest.template
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+libos.entrypoint = "/app/tee-stress-client"
+
+[loader]
+argv = [ "/app/tee-stress-client" ]
+entrypoint = "file:{{ gramine.libos }}"
+env.LD_LIBRARY_PATH = "/lib:{{ arch_libdir }}:/usr{{ arch_libdir }}:/lib"
+env.HOME = "/app"
+env.MALLOC_ARENA_MAX = "1"
+env.AZDCAP_DEBUG_LOG_LEVEL = "ignore"
+env.AZDCAP_COLLATERAL_VERSION = "v4"
+
+### Admin Config ###
+env.PORT  = { passthrough = true }
+
+### VAULT attestation ###
+env.VAULT_ADDR = { passthrough = true }
+env.VAULT_SGX_MRENCLAVE = { passthrough = true }
+env.VAULT_SGX_MRSIGNER = { passthrough = true }
+env.VAULT_SGX_ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS = { passthrough = true }
+
+### DEBUG ###
+env.RUST_BACKTRACE = "1"
+env.RUST_LOG="info"
+
+[fs]
+root.uri = "file:/"
+start_dir = "/app"
+mounts = [
+  { path = "{{ execdir }}", uri = "file:{{ execdir }}" },
+  { path = "/lib", uri = "file:{{ gramine.runtimedir() }}" },
+  { path = "{{ arch_libdir }}", uri = "file:{{ arch_libdir }}" },
+  { path = "/etc", uri = "file:/etc" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/var/tmp" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/tmp" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/app/.dcap-qcnl" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/app/.az-dcap-client" },
+  { path = "/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so", uri = "file:/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so" },
+]
+
+[sgx]
+trusted_files = [
+  "file:/etc/ld.so.cache",
+  "file:/app/",
+  "file:{{ execdir }}/",
+  "file:{{ arch_libdir }}/",
+  "file:/usr/{{ arch_libdir }}/",
+  "file:{{ gramine.libos }}",
+  "file:{{ gramine.runtimedir() }}/",
+  "file:/usr/lib/ssl/openssl.cnf",
+  "file:/etc/ssl/",
+  "file:/etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf",
+  "file:/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so",
+]
+remote_attestation = "dcap"
+max_threads = 64
+edmm_enable = false
+## max enclave size
+enclave_size = "8G"
+
+[sys]
+enable_extra_runtime_domain_names_conf = true
+enable_sigterm_injection = true
+
+# possible tweak option, if problems with mio
+# currently mio is compiled with `mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe`
+# insecure__allow_eventfd = true
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+[package]
+name = "tee-vault-admin"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+awc.workspace = true
+base64.workspace = true
+bytemuck.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+mio.workspace = true
+rustls.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+tracing-actix-web.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/Dockerfile-azure
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/Dockerfile-azure
@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+FROM docker.io/ubuntu:20.04 AS azuredcap
+WORKDIR /build
+ADD https://github.com/microsoft/Azure-DCAP-Client/archive/refs/tags/1.12.0.tar.gz ./Azure-DCAP-Client.tar.gz
+RUN tar -xvf Azure-DCAP-Client.tar.gz
+COPY assets/Azure-DCAP-Client.patch ./Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+RUN set -eux; \
+    apt-get update; \
+    apt-get install -y software-properties-common; \
+    add-apt-repository ppa:team-xbmc/ppa -y; \
+    apt-get update; \
+    apt-get install -y \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        pkg-config \
+        nlohmann-json3-dev \
+        wget \
+        dos2unix \
+        ;
+
+WORKDIR /build/Azure-DCAP-Client-1.12.0
+RUN dos2unix src/dcap_provider.cpp && patch -p1 < ../Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+WORKDIR /build/Azure-DCAP-Client-1.12.0/src/Linux
+RUN ./configure && make && make install
+
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-vault-admin.manifest.template' -av /data/ ./
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p tee-vault-admin --bin tee-vault-admin \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/tee-vault-admin ./
+
+FROM docker.io/gramineproject/gramine:v1.5
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/microsoft.asc https://packages.microsoft.com/keys/microsoft.asc \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/microsoft.asc] https://packages.microsoft.com/ubuntu/20.04/prod focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/msprod.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt purge -y libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+    && apt-get install -y az-dcap-client
+
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+#    libsgx-urts
+
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# So we only have to use one gramine template
+RUN touch /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/tee-vault-admin .
+COPY ./bin/tee-vault-admin/tee-vault-admin.manifest.template .
+COPY vault/enclave-key.pem .
+
+# The original Azure library is still delivering expired collateral, so we have to use a patched version
+COPY --from=azuredcap /usr/local/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so /usr/lib/
+
+RUN gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu -Dexecdir=/usr/bin -Dlog_level=warning tee-vault-admin.manifest.template tee-vault-admin.manifest \
+    && gramine-sgx-sign --manifest tee-vault-admin.manifest --output tee-vault-admin.manifest.sgx --key enclave-key.pem \
+    && rm enclave-key.pem
+
+EXPOSE 8443
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "/restart_aesm.sh ; exec gramine-sgx tee-vault-admin" ]
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/Dockerfile-intel
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/Dockerfile-intel
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-vault-admin.manifest.template' -av /data/ ./
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p tee-vault-admin --bin tee-vault-admin \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/tee-vault-admin ./
+
+FROM docker.io/gramineproject/gramine:v1.5
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+        libsgx-urts \
+        libsgx-enclave-common \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# So we only have to use one gramine template
+RUN touch /lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/tee-vault-admin .
+COPY ./bin/tee-vault-admin/tee-vault-admin.manifest.template .
+COPY vault/enclave-key.pem .
+
+COPY assets/sgx_default_qcnl.conf.json /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf
+
+RUN gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu -Dexecdir=/usr/bin -Dlog_level=warning tee-vault-admin.manifest.template tee-vault-admin.manifest \
+    && gramine-sgx-sign --manifest tee-vault-admin.manifest --output tee-vault-admin.manifest.sgx --key enclave-key.pem \
+    && rm enclave-key.pem
+
+EXPOSE 8443
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "/restart_aesm.sh ; exec gramine-sgx tee-vault-admin" ]
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/attestation.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/attestation.rs
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! attestation
+
+use crate::ServerState;
+use actix_web::http::StatusCode;
+use actix_web::web::{Data, Json};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use teepot::json::http::AttestationResponse;
+use teepot::server::attestation::get_quote_and_collateral;
+use teepot::server::{HttpResponseError, Status};
+use tracing::instrument;
+
+/// Get attestation
+#[instrument(level = "info", name = "/v1/sys/attestation", skip_all)]
+pub async fn get_attestation(
+    worker: Data<Arc<ServerState>>,
+) -> Result<Json<AttestationResponse>, HttpResponseError> {
+    get_quote_and_collateral(None, &worker.report_data)
+        .context("Error getting attestation")
+        .map(Json)
+        .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/command.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/command.rs
@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! post commands
+
+use crate::ServerState;
+use actix_web::web;
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use awc::http::StatusCode;
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use teepot::client::vault::VaultConnection;
+use teepot::json::http::{
+    VaultCommandRequest, VaultCommandResponse, VaultCommands, VaultCommandsResponse,
+};
+use teepot::json::secrets::{AdminConfig, AdminState};
+use teepot::server::{signatures::VerifySig, HttpResponseError, Status};
+use tracing::instrument;
+
+/// Post command
+#[instrument(level = "info", name = "/v1/command", skip_all)]
+pub async fn post_command(
+    state: web::Data<Arc<ServerState>>,
+    item: web::Json<VaultCommandRequest>,
+) -> Result<web::Json<VaultCommandsResponse>, HttpResponseError> {
+    let conn = VaultConnection::new(&state.vault_attestation.clone().into(), "admin".to_string())
+        .await
+        .context("connecting to vault")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    let mut admin_state: AdminState = conn
+        .load_secret("state")
+        .await?
+        .context("empty admin state")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    let commands: VaultCommands = serde_json::from_str(&item.commands)
+        .context("parsing commands")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
+
+    if admin_state.last_digest.to_ascii_lowercase() != commands.last_digest {
+        return Err(anyhow!(
+            "last digest does not match {} != {}",
+            admin_state.last_digest.to_ascii_lowercase(),
+            commands.last_digest
+        ))
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+
+    let admin_config: AdminConfig = conn
+        .load_secret("config")
+        .await?
+        .context("empty admin config")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+    admin_config.check_sigs(&item.signatures, item.commands.as_bytes())?;
+
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(item.commands.as_bytes());
+    let hash = hasher.finalize();
+    let digest = hex::encode(hash);
+    admin_state.last_digest = digest.clone();
+    conn.store_secret(admin_state, "state").await?;
+
+    let mut responds = VaultCommandsResponse {
+        digest,
+        results: vec![],
+    };
+
+    for (pos, command) in commands.commands.iter().enumerate() {
+        let resp = conn
+            .vault_put(
+                &format!("Executing command {pos}"),
+                &command.url,
+                &command.data,
+            )
+            .await?;
+
+        let vcr = VaultCommandResponse {
+            status_code: resp.0.as_u16(),
+            value: resp.1,
+        };
+
+        responds.results.push(vcr);
+    }
+
+    let _ = conn.revoke_token().await;
+
+    Ok(web::Json(responds))
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/digest.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/digest.rs
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! digest
+
+use crate::ServerState;
+use actix_web::{web, HttpResponse};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use awc::http::StatusCode;
+use serde_json::json;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use teepot::client::vault::VaultConnection;
+use teepot::json::secrets::AdminState;
+use teepot::server::{HttpResponseError, Status};
+use tracing::instrument;
+
+/// Get last digest
+#[instrument(level = "info", name = "/v1/digest", skip_all)]
+pub async fn get_digest(
+    state: web::Data<Arc<ServerState>>,
+) -> Result<HttpResponse, HttpResponseError> {
+    let conn = VaultConnection::new(&state.vault_attestation.clone().into(), "admin".to_string())
+        .await
+        .context("connecting to vault")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    let admin_state: AdminState = conn
+        .load_secret("state")
+        .await?
+        .context("empty admin state")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(json!({"last_digest": admin_state.last_digest })))
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Server to handle requests to the Vault TEE
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+mod attestation;
+mod command;
+mod digest;
+mod sign;
+
+use actix_web::web::Data;
+use actix_web::{web, App, HttpServer};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use attestation::get_attestation;
+use clap::Parser;
+use command::post_command;
+use digest::get_digest;
+use rustls::ServerConfig;
+use sign::post_sign;
+use std::net::Ipv6Addr;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use teepot::json::http::{SignRequest, VaultCommandRequest, ATTESTATION_URL, DIGEST_URL};
+use teepot::server::attestation::{get_quote_and_collateral, VaultAttestationArgs};
+use teepot::server::new_json_cfg;
+use teepot::server::pki::make_self_signed_cert;
+use teepot::sgx::{parse_tcb_levels, EnumSet, TcbLevel};
+use tracing::{error, info};
+use tracing_actix_web::TracingLogger;
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::Registry;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter};
+
+/// Server state
+pub struct ServerState {
+    /// Server TLS public key hash
+    pub report_data: [u8; 64],
+    /// Vault attestation args
+    pub vault_attestation: VaultAttestationArgs,
+}
+
+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+#[command(author, version, about, long_about = None)]
+struct Arguments {
+    /// allowed TCB levels, comma separated
+    #[arg(long, value_parser = parse_tcb_levels, env = "ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS", default_value = "Ok")]
+    server_sgx_allowed_tcb_levels: EnumSet<TcbLevel>,
+    /// port to listen on
+    #[arg(long, env = "PORT", default_value = "8444")]
+    port: u16,
+    #[clap(flatten)]
+    pub attestation: VaultAttestationArgs,
+}
+
+#[actix_web::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr));
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).unwrap();
+
+    let args = Arguments::parse();
+
+    let (report_data, cert_chain, priv_key) = make_self_signed_cert()?;
+
+    if let Err(e) = get_quote_and_collateral(Some(args.server_sgx_allowed_tcb_levels), &report_data)
+    {
+        error!("failed to get quote and collateral: {e:?}");
+        // don't return for now, we can still serve requests but we won't be able to attest
+    }
+
+    // init server config builder with safe defaults
+    let config = ServerConfig::builder()
+        .with_no_client_auth()
+        .with_single_cert([cert_chain].into(), priv_key)
+        .context("Failed to load TLS key/cert files")?;
+
+    info!("Starting HTTPS server at port {}", args.port);
+
+    info!("Quote verified! Connection secure!");
+
+    let server_state = Arc::new(ServerState {
+        report_data,
+        vault_attestation: args.attestation,
+    });
+
+    let server = match HttpServer::new(move || {
+        App::new()
+            // enable logger
+            .wrap(TracingLogger::default())
+            .app_data(new_json_cfg())
+            .app_data(Data::new(server_state.clone()))
+            .service(web::resource(ATTESTATION_URL).route(web::get().to(get_attestation)))
+            .service(web::resource(VaultCommandRequest::URL).route(web::post().to(post_command)))
+            .service(web::resource(SignRequest::URL).route(web::post().to(post_sign)))
+            .service(web::resource(DIGEST_URL).route(web::get().to(get_digest)))
+    })
+    .bind_rustls_0_22((Ipv6Addr::UNSPECIFIED, args.port), config)
+    {
+        Ok(c) => c,
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!("Failed to bind to port {}: {e:?}", args.port);
+            return Err(e).context(format!("Failed to bind to port {}", args.port));
+        }
+    };
+
+    if let Err(e) = server.worker_max_blocking_threads(2).workers(8).run().await {
+        error!("failed to start HTTPS server: {e:?}");
+        return Err(e).context("Failed to start HTTPS server");
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use serde_json::json;
+    use teepot::json::http::{VaultCommand, VaultCommands};
+
+    const TEST_DATA: &str = include_str!("../../../tests/data/test.json");
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_vault_commands() {
+        let cmd = VaultCommand {
+            url: "/v1/auth/tee/tees/test".to_string(),
+            data: json!({
+                "lease": "1000",
+                "name": "test",
+                "types": "sgx",
+                "sgx_allowed_tcb_levels": "Ok,SwHardeningNeeded",
+                "sgx_mrsigner": "c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d",
+                "token_policies": "test"
+            }),
+        };
+        let cmds = VaultCommands {
+            commands: vec![cmd],
+            last_digest: "".into(),
+        };
+
+        let test_data_cmds: VaultCommands = serde_json::from_str(TEST_DATA).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(cmds, test_data_cmds);
+    }
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/sign.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/src/sign.rs
@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! post signing request
+
+use crate::ServerState;
+use actix_web::http::StatusCode;
+use actix_web::web;
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use teepot::client::vault::VaultConnection;
+use teepot::json::http::{SignRequest, SignRequestData, SignResponse};
+use teepot::json::secrets::{AdminConfig, AdminState, SGXSigningKey};
+use teepot::server::signatures::VerifySig as _;
+use teepot::server::{HttpResponseError, Status};
+use teepot::sgx::sign::PrivateKey as _;
+use teepot::sgx::sign::{Author, Signature};
+use teepot::sgx::sign::{Body, RS256PrivateKey};
+use tracing::instrument;
+
+/// Sign command
+#[instrument(level = "info", name = "/v1/sign", skip_all)]
+pub async fn post_sign(
+    state: web::Data<Arc<ServerState>>,
+    item: web::Json<SignRequest>,
+) -> Result<web::Json<SignResponse>, HttpResponseError> {
+    let conn = VaultConnection::new(&state.vault_attestation.clone().into(), "admin".to_string())
+        .await
+        .context("connecting to vault")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    let mut admin_state: AdminState = conn
+        .load_secret("state")
+        .await?
+        .context("empty admin state")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    let sign_request: SignRequestData = serde_json::from_str(&item.sign_request_data)
+        .context("parsing sign request data")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST)?;
+
+    // Sanity checks
+    if sign_request.tee_type != "sgx" {
+        return Err(anyhow!("tee_type not supported")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+
+    let tee_name = sign_request.tee_name;
+
+    if !tee_name.is_ascii() {
+        return Err(anyhow!("tee_name is not ascii")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+
+    // check if tee_name is alphanumeric
+    if !tee_name.chars().all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric()) {
+        return Err(anyhow!("tee_name is not alphanumeric")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+
+    // check if tee_name starts with an alphabetic char
+    if !tee_name.chars().next().unwrap().is_alphabetic() {
+        return Err(anyhow!("tee_name does not start with an alphabetic char"))
+            .status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+
+    if admin_state.last_digest != sign_request.last_digest {
+        return Err(anyhow!(
+            "last digest does not match {} != {}",
+            admin_state.last_digest.to_ascii_lowercase(),
+            sign_request.last_digest
+        ))
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+
+    let admin_config: AdminConfig = conn
+        .load_secret("config")
+        .await?
+        .context("empty admin config")
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+    admin_config.check_sigs(&item.signatures, item.sign_request_data.as_bytes())?;
+
+    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+    hasher.update(item.sign_request_data.as_bytes());
+    let hash = hasher.finalize();
+    let digest = hex::encode(hash);
+    admin_state.last_digest = digest.clone();
+    conn.store_secret(admin_state, "state").await?;
+
+    // Sign SGX enclave
+    let key_path = format!("signing_keys/{}", tee_name);
+
+    let sgx_key = match conn
+        .load_secret::<SGXSigningKey>(&key_path)
+        .await
+        .context("Error loading signing key")
+        .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?
+    {
+        Some(key) => RS256PrivateKey::from_pem(&key.pem_pk)
+            .context("Failed to parse private key")
+            .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?,
+        None => {
+            let private_key = RS256PrivateKey::generate(3)
+                .context("Failed to generate private key")
+                .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+            let pem_pk = private_key
+                .to_pem()
+                .context("Failed to convert private key to pem")
+                .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+            let key = SGXSigningKey { pem_pk };
+
+            conn.store_secret(key.clone(), &key_path)
+                .await
+                .context("Error storing generated private key")
+                .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+            private_key
+        }
+    };
+
+    let signed_data = sign_sgx(&sign_request.data, &sgx_key)?;
+    let respond = SignResponse {
+        digest,
+        signed_data,
+    };
+
+    let _ = conn.revoke_token().await;
+
+    Ok(web::Json(respond))
+}
+
+fn sign_sgx(body_bytes: &[u8], sgx_key: &RS256PrivateKey) -> Result<Vec<u8>, HttpResponseError> {
+    let body: Body = bytemuck::try_pod_read_unaligned(body_bytes)
+        .context("Invalid SGX input data")
+        .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+    if body.can_set_debug() {
+        return Err(anyhow!("Not signing SGX enclave with debug flag"))
+            .status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+
+    // FIXME: do we need the date and sw defined value?
+    let author = Author::new(0, 0);
+    let sig = Signature::new(sgx_key, author, body)
+        .context("Failed to create RSA signature")
+        .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+    Ok(bytemuck::bytes_of(&sig).to_vec())
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-admin/tee-vault-admin.manifest.template
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-admin/tee-vault-admin.manifest.template
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+libos.entrypoint = "/app/tee-vault-admin"
+
+[loader]
+argv = [ "/app/tee-vault-admin" ]
+entrypoint = "file:{{ gramine.libos }}"
+env.LD_LIBRARY_PATH = "/lib:{{ arch_libdir }}:/usr{{ arch_libdir }}:/lib"
+env.HOME = "/app"
+env.MALLOC_ARENA_MAX = "1"
+env.AZDCAP_DEBUG_LOG_LEVEL = "ignore"
+env.AZDCAP_COLLATERAL_VERSION = "v4"
+
+### Admin Config ###
+env.PORT  = { passthrough = true }
+
+### VAULT attestation ###
+env.VAULT_ADDR = { passthrough = true }
+env.VAULT_SGX_MRENCLAVE = { passthrough = true }
+env.VAULT_SGX_MRSIGNER = { passthrough = true }
+env.VAULT_SGX_ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS = { passthrough = true }
+
+### DEBUG ###
+env.RUST_BACKTRACE = "1"
+env.RUST_LOG="info,tee_vault_admin=trace,teepot=trace,vault_tee_client=trace,tee_client=trace,awc=debug"
+
+[fs]
+root.uri = "file:/"
+start_dir = "/app"
+mounts = [
+  { path = "{{ execdir }}", uri = "file:{{ execdir }}" },
+  { path = "/lib", uri = "file:{{ gramine.runtimedir() }}" },
+  { path = "{{ arch_libdir }}", uri = "file:{{ arch_libdir }}" },
+  { path = "/etc", uri = "file:/etc" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/var/tmp" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/tmp" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/app/.dcap-qcnl" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/app/.az-dcap-client" },
+  { path = "/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so", uri = "file:/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so" },
+]
+
+[sgx]
+trusted_files = [
+  "file:/etc/ld.so.cache",
+  "file:/app/",
+  "file:{{ execdir }}/",
+  "file:{{ arch_libdir }}/",
+  "file:/usr/{{ arch_libdir }}/",
+  "file:{{ gramine.libos }}",
+  "file:{{ gramine.runtimedir() }}/",
+  "file:/usr/lib/ssl/openssl.cnf",
+  "file:/etc/ssl/",
+  "file:/etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf",
+  "file:/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so",
+]
+remote_attestation = "dcap"
+max_threads = 64
+edmm_enable = false
+## max enclave size
+enclave_size = "8G"
+
+[sys]
+enable_extra_runtime_domain_names_conf = true
+enable_sigterm_injection = true
+
+# possible tweak option, if problems with mio
+# currently mio is compiled with `mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe`
+# insecure__allow_eventfd = true
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+[package]
+name = "tee-vault-unseal"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-tls.workspace = true
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+awc.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+mio.workspace = true
+rustls-pemfile.workspace = true
+rustls.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+thiserror.workspace = true
+tokio.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
+x509-cert.workspace = true
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/Dockerfile-azure
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/Dockerfile-azure
@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+FROM ghcr.io/matter-labs/vault-auth-tee:latest AS vault-auth-tee
+
+FROM docker.io/ubuntu:20.04 AS azuredcap
+WORKDIR /build
+ADD https://github.com/microsoft/Azure-DCAP-Client/archive/refs/tags/1.12.0.tar.gz ./Azure-DCAP-Client.tar.gz
+RUN tar -xvf Azure-DCAP-Client.tar.gz
+COPY assets/Azure-DCAP-Client.patch ./Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+RUN set -eux; \
+    apt-get update; \
+    apt-get install -y software-properties-common; \
+    add-apt-repository ppa:team-xbmc/ppa -y; \
+    apt-get update; \
+    apt-get install -y \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        pkg-config \
+        nlohmann-json3-dev \
+        wget \
+        dos2unix \
+        ;
+
+WORKDIR /build/Azure-DCAP-Client-1.12.0
+RUN dos2unix src/dcap_provider.cpp && patch -p1 < ../Azure-DCAP-Client.patch
+WORKDIR /build/Azure-DCAP-Client-1.12.0/src/Linux
+RUN ./configure && make && make install
+
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+COPY --from=vault-auth-tee /opt/vault/plugins/vault-auth-tee ./
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-vault-unseal.manifest.template' -av /data/ ./
+RUN sha256sum /opt/vault/plugins/vault-auth-tee | ( read a _ ; echo -n $a ) | tee assets/vault-auth-tee.sha256
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p tee-vault-unseal --bin tee-vault-unseal \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/tee-vault-unseal ./
+
+FROM docker.io/gramineproject/gramine:v1.5
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/microsoft.asc https://packages.microsoft.com/keys/microsoft.asc \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/microsoft.asc] https://packages.microsoft.com/ubuntu/20.04/prod focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/msprod.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt purge -y libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+    && apt-get install -y az-dcap-client
+
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+#    libsgx-urts
+
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# So we only have to use one gramine template
+RUN touch /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/tee-vault-unseal .
+COPY ./bin/tee-vault-unseal/tee-vault-unseal.manifest.template .
+COPY vault/enclave-key.pem .
+RUN mkdir -p /opt/vault/tls && rm -rf /opt/vault/tls/*
+
+# The original Azure library is still delivering expired collateral, so we have to use a patched version
+COPY --from=azuredcap /usr/local/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so /usr/lib/
+
+RUN gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu -Dexecdir=/usr/bin -Dlog_level=warning tee-vault-unseal.manifest.template tee-vault-unseal.manifest \
+    && gramine-sgx-sign --manifest tee-vault-unseal.manifest --output tee-vault-unseal.manifest.sgx --key enclave-key.pem \
+    && rm enclave-key.pem
+
+VOLUME /opt/vault/tls
+
+EXPOSE 8443
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "/restart_aesm.sh ; exec gramine-sgx tee-vault-unseal" ]
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/Dockerfile-intel
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/Dockerfile-intel
@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+FROM ghcr.io/matter-labs/vault-auth-tee:latest AS vault-auth-tee
+
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+COPY --from=vault-auth-tee /opt/vault/plugins/vault-auth-tee ./
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-vault-unseal.manifest.template' -av /data/ ./
+RUN sha256sum /opt/vault/plugins/vault-auth-tee | ( read a _ ; echo -n $a ) | tee assets/vault-auth-tee.sha256
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p tee-vault-unseal --bin tee-vault-unseal \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/tee-vault-unseal ./
+
+FROM docker.io/gramineproject/gramine:v1.5
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+        libsgx-urts \
+        libsgx-enclave-common \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# So we only have to use one gramine template
+RUN touch /lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so
+
+WORKDIR /app
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/tee-vault-unseal .
+COPY ./bin/tee-vault-unseal/tee-vault-unseal.manifest.template .
+COPY vault/enclave-key.pem .
+RUN mkdir -p /opt/vault/tls && rm -rf /opt/vault/tls/*
+
+COPY assets/sgx_default_qcnl.conf.json /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf
+
+RUN gramine-manifest -Darch_libdir=/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu -Dexecdir=/usr/bin -Dlog_level=warning tee-vault-unseal.manifest.template tee-vault-unseal.manifest \
+    && gramine-sgx-sign --manifest tee-vault-unseal.manifest --output tee-vault-unseal.manifest.sgx --key enclave-key.pem \
+    && rm enclave-key.pem
+
+VOLUME /opt/vault/tls
+
+EXPOSE 8443
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "/restart_aesm.sh ; exec gramine-sgx tee-vault-unseal" ]
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/admin-policy.hcl
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/admin-policy.hcl
@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Read system health check
+path "sys/health"
+{
+  capabilities = ["read", "sudo"]
+}
+
+# Create and manage ACL policies broadly across Vault
+
+# List existing policies
+path "sys/policies/acl"
+{
+  capabilities = ["list"]
+}
+
+# Create and manage ACL policies
+path "sys/policies/acl/*"
+{
+  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo"]
+}
+
+# Enable and manage authentication methods broadly across Vault
+
+# Manage auth methods broadly across Vault
+path "auth/*"
+{
+  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo"]
+}
+
+# Create, update, and delete auth methods
+path "sys/auth/*"
+{
+  capabilities = ["create", "update", "delete", "sudo"]
+}
+
+# List auth methods
+path "sys/auth"
+{
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+# Enable and manage the key/value secrets engine at `secret/` path
+
+# List, create, update, and delete key/value secrets
+path "secret/*"
+{
+  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo"]
+}
+
+# Manage secrets engines
+path "sys/mounts/*"
+{
+  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo"]
+}
+
+# List existing secrets engines.
+path "sys/mounts"
+{
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+
+# Manage plugins
+# https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/api-docs/system/plugins-catalog
+path "sys/plugins/catalog/*"
+{
+  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo"]
+}
+
+# List existing plugins
+# https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/api-docs/system/plugins-catalog
+path "sys/plugins/catalog"
+{
+  capabilities = ["list"]
+}
+
+# Reload plugins
+# https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/api-docs/system/plugins-reload-backend
+path "sys/plugins/reload/backend"
+{
+  capabilities = ["create", "update", "sudo"]
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/attestation.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/attestation.rs
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+use crate::Worker;
+use actix_web::http::StatusCode;
+use actix_web::web::{Data, Json};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use teepot::json::http::AttestationResponse;
+use teepot::server::attestation::get_quote_and_collateral;
+use teepot::server::{HttpResponseError, Status};
+use tracing::instrument;
+
+#[instrument(level = "info", name = "/v1/sys/attestation", skip_all)]
+pub async fn get_attestation(
+    worker: Data<Worker>,
+) -> Result<Json<AttestationResponse>, HttpResponseError> {
+    let report_data: [u8; 64] = worker
+        .config
+        .report_data
+        .clone()
+        .try_into()
+        .map_err(|_| "Error getting attestation")?;
+    get_quote_and_collateral(None, &report_data)
+        .context("Error getting attestation")
+        .map(Json)
+        .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/init.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/init.rs
@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+use crate::{create_https_client, get_vault_status, UnsealServerState, Worker};
+use actix_web::error::ErrorBadRequest;
+use actix_web::{web, HttpResponse};
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use awc::http::StatusCode;
+use serde_json::json;
+use teepot::json::http::{Init, InitResponse, VaultInitRequest};
+use teepot::json::secrets::AdminConfig;
+use teepot::server::{HttpResponseError, Status};
+use tracing::{debug, error, info, instrument, trace};
+
+#[instrument(level = "info", name = "/v1/sys/init", skip_all)]
+pub async fn post_init(
+    worker: web::Data<Worker>,
+    init: web::Json<Init>,
+) -> Result<HttpResponse, HttpResponseError> {
+    let Init {
+        pgp_keys,
+        secret_shares,
+        secret_threshold,
+        admin_pgp_keys,
+        admin_threshold,
+        admin_tee_mrenclave,
+    } = init.into_inner();
+    let client = create_https_client(worker.client_tls_config.clone());
+    let vault_url = &worker.config.vault_url;
+
+    let vault_init = VaultInitRequest {
+        pgp_keys,
+        secret_shares,
+        secret_threshold,
+    };
+
+    if admin_threshold < 1 {
+        return Ok(HttpResponse::from_error(ErrorBadRequest(
+            json!({"error": "admin_threshold must be at least 1"}),
+        )));
+    }
+
+    if admin_threshold > admin_pgp_keys.len() {
+        return Ok(HttpResponse::from_error(ErrorBadRequest(
+            json!({"error": "admin_threshold must be less than or equal to the number of admin_pgp_keys"}),
+        )));
+    }
+
+    loop {
+        let current_state = worker.state.read().unwrap().clone();
+        match current_state {
+            UnsealServerState::VaultUninitialized => {
+                break;
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultUnsealed => {
+                return Err(anyhow!("Vault already unsealed")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultInitialized { .. } => {
+                return Err(anyhow!("Vault already initialized")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultInitializedAndConfigured => {
+                return Err(anyhow!("Vault already initialized")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::Undefined => {
+                let state = get_vault_status(vault_url, client.clone()).await;
+                *worker.state.write().unwrap() = state;
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    trace!(
+        "Sending init request to Vault {}",
+        serde_json::to_string(&vault_init).unwrap()
+    );
+    let mut response = client
+        .post(format!("{}/v1/sys/init", vault_url))
+        .send_json(&vault_init)
+        .await?;
+
+    let status_code = response.status();
+    if !status_code.is_success() {
+        error!("Vault returned server error: {}", status_code);
+        return Err(HttpResponseError::from_proxy(response).await);
+    }
+
+    let response = response
+        .json::<serde_json::Value>()
+        .await
+        .context("Failed to convert to json")
+        .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+    info!("Vault initialized");
+    trace!("response {}", response);
+
+    let root_token = response["root_token"]
+        .as_str()
+        .ok_or(anyhow!("No `root_token` field"))
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?
+        .to_string();
+
+    debug!("Root token: {root_token}");
+
+    let unseal_keys = response["keys_base64"]
+        .as_array()
+        .ok_or(anyhow!("No `keys_base64` field"))
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?
+        .iter()
+        .map(|v| v.as_str().unwrap().to_string())
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+    debug!("Unseal keys: {}", unseal_keys.join(", "));
+
+    /*
+    FIXME: use unseal keys to create new token
+        let mut output = File::create("/opt/vault/data/root_token")
+            .context("Failed to create `/opt/vault/data/root_token`")?;
+        output
+            .write_all(root_token.as_bytes())
+            .context("Failed to write root_token")?;
+    */
+
+    *worker.state.write().unwrap() = UnsealServerState::VaultInitialized {
+        admin_config: AdminConfig {
+            admin_pgp_keys,
+            admin_threshold,
+        },
+        admin_tee_mrenclave,
+        root_token,
+    };
+
+    let response = InitResponse { unseal_keys };
+
+    Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(response)) // <- send response
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Server to initialize and unseal the Vault TEE.
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+mod attestation;
+mod init;
+mod unseal;
+
+use actix_web::http::header;
+use actix_web::rt::time::sleep;
+use actix_web::web::Data;
+use actix_web::{web, App, HttpServer};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use attestation::get_attestation;
+use awc::{Client, Connector};
+use clap::Parser;
+use init::post_init;
+use rustls::client::danger::{HandshakeSignatureValid, ServerCertVerified, ServerCertVerifier};
+use rustls::client::WebPkiServerVerifier;
+use rustls::pki_types::{CertificateDer, ServerName, UnixTime};
+use rustls::{ClientConfig, DigitallySignedStruct, Error, ServerConfig, SignatureScheme};
+use rustls_pemfile::{certs, read_one};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::fmt::Debug;
+use std::net::Ipv6Addr;
+use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
+use std::time::Duration;
+use std::{fs::File, io::BufReader};
+use teepot::json::http::{Init, Unseal, ATTESTATION_URL};
+use teepot::json::secrets::AdminConfig;
+use teepot::server::attestation::get_quote_and_collateral;
+use teepot::server::new_json_cfg;
+use teepot::sgx::{parse_tcb_levels, EnumSet, TcbLevel};
+use tracing::{error, info, trace};
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter, Registry};
+use unseal::post_unseal;
+use x509_cert::der::Decode as _;
+use x509_cert::der::Encode as _;
+use x509_cert::Certificate;
+
+const VAULT_AUTH_TEE_SHA256: &str = include_str!("../../../assets/vault-auth-tee.sha256");
+const VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER: &str = "X-Vault-Token";
+
+/// Worker thread state and data
+pub struct Worker {
+    /// TLS config for the HTTPS client
+    pub client_tls_config: Arc<ClientConfig>,
+    /// Server config
+    pub config: Arc<UnsealServerConfig>,
+    /// Server state
+    pub state: Arc<RwLock<UnsealServerState>>,
+}
+
+/// Global Server config
+#[derive(Debug, Default)]
+pub struct UnsealServerConfig {
+    /// Vault URL
+    pub vault_url: String,
+    /// The expected report_data for the Vault TEE
+    pub report_data: Vec<u8>,
+    /// allowed TCB levels
+    pub allowed_tcb_levels: Option<EnumSet<TcbLevel>>,
+}
+
+/// Server state
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum UnsealServerState {
+    /// Undefined
+    Undefined,
+    /// Vault is not yet initialized
+    VaultUninitialized,
+    /// Vault is initialized but not unsealed
+    VaultInitialized {
+        /// config for the admin TEE
+        admin_config: AdminConfig,
+        /// initial admin TEE mrenclave
+        admin_tee_mrenclave: String,
+        /// Vault root token
+        root_token: String,
+    },
+    /// Vault is already initialized but not unsealed
+    /// and should already be configured
+    VaultInitializedAndConfigured,
+    /// Vault is unsealed
+    VaultUnsealed,
+}
+
+impl UnsealServerConfig {
+    /// Create a new ServerState
+    pub fn new(
+        vault_url: String,
+        report_data: [u8; 64],
+        allowed_tcb_levels: Option<EnumSet<TcbLevel>>,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            report_data: report_data.to_vec(),
+            vault_url,
+            allowed_tcb_levels,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+#[command(author, version, about, long_about = None)]
+struct Args {
+    /// allowed TCB levels, comma separated
+    #[arg(long, value_parser = parse_tcb_levels, env = "ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS", default_value = "Ok")]
+    allowed_tcb_levels: EnumSet<TcbLevel>,
+    /// port to listen on
+    #[arg(long, env = "PORT", default_value = "8443")]
+    port: u16,
+    /// vault url
+    #[arg(long, env = "VAULT_ADDR", default_value = "https://vault:8210")]
+    vault_url: String,
+}
+
+#[actix_web::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(
+            fmt::layer()
+                .with_span_events(fmt::format::FmtSpan::NEW)
+                .with_writer(std::io::stderr),
+        );
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).unwrap();
+
+    let args = Args::parse();
+
+    let tls_ok = std::path::Path::new("/opt/vault/tls/tls.ok");
+    loop {
+        info!("Waiting for TLS key/cert files to be generated");
+
+        // Wait for the file `data/tls.key` to exist
+        if tls_ok.exists() {
+            break;
+        }
+        sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+    }
+
+    info!("Starting up");
+
+    let (config, client_tls_config, report_data) = load_rustls_config().or_else(|e| {
+        error!("failed to load rustls config: {e:?}");
+        Err(e).context("Failed to load rustls config")
+    })?;
+
+    if let Err(e) = get_quote_and_collateral(Some(args.allowed_tcb_levels), &report_data) {
+        error!("failed to get quote and collateral: {e:?}");
+        // don't return for now, we can still serve requests but we won't be able to attest
+    }
+
+    let client = create_https_client(client_tls_config.clone());
+
+    let server_state = get_vault_status(&args.vault_url, client).await;
+
+    info!("Starting HTTPS server at port {}", args.port);
+    let server_config = Arc::new(UnsealServerConfig::new(
+        args.vault_url,
+        report_data,
+        Some(args.allowed_tcb_levels),
+    ));
+
+    let server_state = Arc::new(RwLock::new(server_state));
+
+    let server = match HttpServer::new(move || {
+        let worker = Worker {
+            client_tls_config: client_tls_config.clone(),
+            config: server_config.clone(),
+            state: server_state.clone(),
+        };
+
+        App::new()
+            // enable logger
+            //.wrap(TracingLogger::default())
+            .app_data(new_json_cfg())
+            .app_data(Data::new(worker))
+            .service(web::resource(ATTESTATION_URL).route(web::get().to(get_attestation)))
+            .service(web::resource(Init::URL).route(web::post().to(post_init)))
+            .service(web::resource(Unseal::URL).route(web::post().to(post_unseal)))
+    })
+    .bind_rustls_0_22((Ipv6Addr::UNSPECIFIED, args.port), config)
+    {
+        Ok(c) => c,
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!("Failed to bind to port {}: {e:?}", args.port);
+            return Err(e).context(format!("Failed to bind to port {}", args.port));
+        }
+    };
+
+    if let Err(e) = server.worker_max_blocking_threads(2).workers(8).run().await {
+        error!("failed to start HTTPS server: {e:?}");
+        return Err(e).context("Failed to start HTTPS server");
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn get_vault_status(vault_url: &str, client: Client) -> UnsealServerState {
+    loop {
+        let r = client
+            .get(format!("{}/v1/sys/health", vault_url))
+            .send()
+            .await;
+
+        if let Ok(r) = r {
+            // https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/api-docs/system/health
+            match r.status().as_u16() {
+                200 | 429 | 472 | 473 => {
+                    info!("Vault is initialized and unsealed");
+                    break UnsealServerState::VaultUnsealed;
+                }
+                501 => {
+                    info!("Vault is not initialized");
+                    break UnsealServerState::VaultUninitialized;
+                }
+                503 => {
+                    info!("Vault is initialized but not unsealed");
+                    break UnsealServerState::VaultInitializedAndConfigured;
+                }
+                s => {
+                    error!("Vault is not ready: status code {s}");
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        info!("Waiting for vault to be ready");
+        sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+    }
+}
+
+// Save the hash of the public server key to `REPORT_DATA` to check
+// the attestations against it and it does not change on reconnect.
+fn make_verifier(server_cert: Box<[u8]>) -> impl ServerCertVerifier {
+    #[derive(Debug)]
+    struct V {
+        server_cert: Box<[u8]>,
+        server_verifier: Arc<WebPkiServerVerifier>,
+    }
+    impl ServerCertVerifier for V {
+        fn verify_server_cert(
+            &self,
+            end_entity: &CertificateDer,
+            _intermediates: &[CertificateDer],
+            _server_name: &ServerName,
+            _ocsp_response: &[u8],
+            _now: UnixTime,
+        ) -> std::result::Result<ServerCertVerified, Error> {
+            let data = &self.server_cert;
+
+            if data.as_ref() == end_entity.as_ref() {
+                info!("Server certificate matches expected certificate");
+                Ok(ServerCertVerified::assertion())
+            } else {
+                error!("Server certificate does not match expected certificate");
+                Err(rustls::Error::General(
+                    "Server certificate does not match expected certificate".to_string(),
+                ))
+            }
+        }
+        fn verify_tls12_signature(
+            &self,
+            message: &[u8],
+            cert: &CertificateDer<'_>,
+            dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
+        ) -> std::result::Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
+            self.server_verifier
+                .verify_tls12_signature(message, cert, dss)
+        }
+
+        fn verify_tls13_signature(
+            &self,
+            message: &[u8],
+            cert: &CertificateDer<'_>,
+            dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
+        ) -> std::result::Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
+            self.server_verifier
+                .verify_tls13_signature(message, cert, dss)
+        }
+
+        fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<SignatureScheme> {
+            self.server_verifier.supported_verify_schemes()
+        }
+    }
+    let root_store = Arc::new(rustls::RootCertStore::empty());
+    let server_verifier = WebPkiServerVerifier::builder(root_store).build().unwrap();
+    V {
+        server_cert,
+        server_verifier,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Load TLS key/cert files
+pub fn load_rustls_config() -> Result<(ServerConfig, Arc<ClientConfig>, [u8; 64])> {
+    // init server config builder with safe defaults
+    let config = ServerConfig::builder().with_no_client_auth();
+
+    // load TLS key/cert files
+    let cert_file = &mut BufReader::new(
+        File::open("/opt/vault/tls/tls.crt").context("Failed to open TLS cert file")?,
+    );
+    let key_file = &mut BufReader::new(
+        File::open("/opt/vault/tls/tls.key").context("Failed to open TLS key file")?,
+    );
+
+    // convert files to key/cert objects
+    let cert_chain: Vec<_> = certs(cert_file)
+        .unwrap()
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from)
+        .collect();
+    let priv_key: rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer = match read_one(key_file).unwrap() {
+        Some(rustls_pemfile::Item::RSAKey(key)) => {
+            rustls::pki_types::PrivatePkcs1KeyDer::from(key).into()
+        }
+        Some(rustls_pemfile::Item::PKCS8Key(key)) => {
+            rustls::pki_types::PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(key).into()
+        }
+        _ => panic!("no keys found"),
+    };
+
+    let tls_config = Arc::new(
+        rustls::ClientConfig::builder()
+            .dangerous()
+            .with_custom_certificate_verifier(Arc::new(make_verifier(
+                cert_chain[0].as_ref().into(),
+            )))
+            .with_no_client_auth(),
+    );
+
+    let cert = Certificate::from_der(cert_chain[0].as_ref()).unwrap();
+    let pub_key = cert
+        .tbs_certificate
+        .subject_public_key_info
+        .to_der()
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let hash = Sha256::digest(pub_key);
+    let mut report_data = [0u8; 64];
+    report_data[..32].copy_from_slice(&hash[..32]);
+
+    let report_data_hex = hex::encode(report_data);
+    trace!(report_data_hex);
+
+    let config = config
+        .with_single_cert(cert_chain, priv_key)
+        .context("Failed to load TLS key/cert files")?;
+
+    Ok((config, tls_config, report_data))
+}
+
+/// Create an HTTPS client with the default headers and config
+pub fn create_https_client(client_tls_config: Arc<ClientConfig>) -> Client {
+    Client::builder()
+        .add_default_header((header::USER_AGENT, "teepot/1.0"))
+        // a "connector" wraps the stream into an encrypted connection
+        .connector(Connector::new().rustls_0_22(client_tls_config))
+        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(12000))
+        .finish()
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/unseal.rs
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/src/unseal.rs
@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+use crate::{
+    create_https_client, get_vault_status, UnsealServerConfig, UnsealServerState, Worker,
+    VAULT_AUTH_TEE_SHA256, VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER,
+};
+use actix_web::http::StatusCode;
+use actix_web::rt::time::sleep;
+use actix_web::{web, HttpResponse};
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use awc::{Client, ClientRequest, SendClientRequest};
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::fs::File;
+use std::future::Future;
+use std::io::Read;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use teepot::client::vault::VaultConnection;
+use teepot::json::http::Unseal;
+use teepot::json::secrets::{AdminConfig, AdminState};
+use teepot::server::{HttpResponseError, Status};
+use tracing::{debug, error, info, instrument, trace};
+
+#[instrument(level = "info", name = "/v1/sys/unseal", skip_all)]
+pub async fn post_unseal(
+    worker: web::Data<Worker>,
+    item: web::Json<Unseal>,
+) -> Result<HttpResponse, HttpResponseError> {
+    let client = create_https_client(worker.client_tls_config.clone());
+    let app = &worker.config;
+    let vault_url = &app.vault_url;
+
+    loop {
+        let current_state = worker.state.read().unwrap().clone();
+        match current_state {
+            UnsealServerState::VaultUninitialized => {
+                return Err(anyhow!("Vault not yet initialized")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultUnsealed => {
+                return Err(anyhow!("Vault already unsealed")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultInitialized { .. } => {
+                break;
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultInitializedAndConfigured => {
+                break;
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::Undefined => {
+                let state = get_vault_status(vault_url, client.clone()).await;
+                *worker.state.write().unwrap() = state;
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut response = client
+        .post(format!("{}/v1/sys/unseal", vault_url))
+        .send_json(&item.0)
+        .await?;
+
+    let status_code = response.status();
+    if !status_code.is_success() {
+        error!("Vault returned server error: {}", status_code);
+        let mut client_resp = HttpResponse::build(status_code);
+        for (header_name, header_value) in response.headers().iter() {
+            client_resp.insert_header((header_name.clone(), header_value.clone()));
+        }
+        return Ok(client_resp.streaming(response));
+    }
+
+    let response: Value = response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("parsing unseal response")
+        .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+    debug!("unseal: {:?}", response);
+
+    if response.get("errors").is_some() {
+        return Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(response));
+    }
+
+    let sealed = response
+        .get("sealed")
+        .map(|v| v.as_bool().unwrap_or(true))
+        .unwrap_or(true);
+
+    debug!(sealed);
+
+    // if unsealed
+    if !sealed {
+        let mut state = UnsealServerState::VaultUnsealed;
+        std::mem::swap(&mut *worker.state.write().unwrap(), &mut state);
+
+        match state {
+            UnsealServerState::VaultUninitialized => {
+                return Err(anyhow!("Invalid internal state")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultUnsealed => {
+                return Err(anyhow!("Invalid internal state")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultInitialized {
+                admin_config,
+                admin_tee_mrenclave,
+                root_token,
+            } => {
+                debug!(root_token);
+                info!("Vault is unsealed");
+                let app = &worker.config;
+                let client = create_https_client(worker.client_tls_config.clone());
+
+                vault_configure_unsealed(
+                    app,
+                    &admin_config,
+                    &root_token,
+                    &admin_tee_mrenclave,
+                    &client,
+                )
+                .await
+                .context("Failed to configure unsealed vault")
+                .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+                // destroy root token
+                let _response = client
+                    .post(format!("{}/v1/auth/token/revoke-self", app.vault_url))
+                    .insert_header((VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER, root_token.to_string()))
+                    .send()
+                    .await;
+
+                info!("Vault unsealed and configured!");
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::VaultInitializedAndConfigured => {
+                info!("Vault is unsealed and hopefully configured!");
+                info!("Initiating raft join");
+                // load TLS cert chain
+                let mut cert_file = File::open("/opt/vault/tls/cacert.pem")
+                    .context("Failed to open TLS cert chain")
+                    .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+                let mut cert_buf = Vec::new();
+                cert_file
+                    .read_to_end(&mut cert_buf)
+                    .context("Failed to read TLS cert chain")
+                    .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+                let cert_chain = std::str::from_utf8(&cert_buf)
+                    .context("Failed to parse TLS cert chain as UTF-8")
+                    .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?
+                    .to_string();
+
+                let payload = json!({"leader_ca_cert": cert_chain, "retry": true });
+
+                let mut response = client
+                    .post(format!("{}/v1/sys/storage/raft/join", vault_url))
+                    .send_json(&payload)
+                    .await?;
+
+                let status_code = response.status();
+                if !status_code.is_success() {
+                    error!("Vault returned server error: {}", status_code);
+                    let mut client_resp = HttpResponse::build(status_code);
+                    for (header_name, header_value) in response.headers().iter() {
+                        client_resp.insert_header((header_name.clone(), header_value.clone()));
+                    }
+                    return Ok(client_resp.streaming(response));
+                }
+
+                let response: Value = response
+                    .json()
+                    .await
+                    .context("parsing raft join response")
+                    .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+                debug!("raft join: {:?}", response);
+
+                if response.get("errors").is_some() {
+                    return Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(response));
+                }
+            }
+            UnsealServerState::Undefined => {
+                unreachable!("Invalid internal state");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(HttpResponse::Accepted().json(response)) // <- send response
+}
+
+pub async fn vault_configure_unsealed(
+    app: &UnsealServerConfig,
+    admin_config: &AdminConfig,
+    root_token: &str,
+    admin_tee_mrenclave: &str,
+    c: &Client,
+) -> Result<(), HttpResponseError> {
+    wait_for_plugins_catalog(app, root_token, c).await;
+
+    if !plugin_is_already_running(app, root_token, c).await? {
+        let r = vault(
+            "Installing vault-auth-tee plugin",
+            c.put(format!(
+                "{}/v1/sys/plugins/catalog/auth/vault-auth-tee",
+                app.vault_url
+            )),
+            root_token,
+            json!({
+                "sha256": VAULT_AUTH_TEE_SHA256,
+                "command": "vault-auth-tee",
+                "version": "0.1.0+dev"
+            }),
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("{:?}", e))
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+        if !r.status().is_success() {
+            let err = HttpResponseError::from_proxy(r).await;
+            return Err(err);
+        }
+    } else {
+        info!("vault-auth-tee plugin already installed");
+    }
+
+    if !plugin_is_already_running(app, root_token, c).await? {
+        let r = vault(
+            "Activating vault-auth-tee plugin",
+            c.post(format!("{}/v1/sys/auth/tee", app.vault_url)),
+            root_token,
+            json!({"type": "vault-auth-tee"}),
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("{:?}", e))
+        .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+        if !r.status().is_success() {
+            let err = HttpResponseError::from_proxy(r).await;
+            return Err(err);
+        }
+    } else {
+        info!("vault-auth-tee plugin already activated");
+    }
+
+    if let Ok(mut r) = c
+        .get(format!("{}/v1/auth/tee/tees?list=true", app.vault_url))
+        .insert_header((VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER, root_token))
+        .send()
+        .await
+    {
+        let r: Value = r
+            .json()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow!("{:?}", e))
+            .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+        trace!("{:?}", r);
+        if let Some(tees) = r.get("data").and_then(|v| v.get("keys")) {
+            if let Some(tees) = tees.as_array() {
+                if tees.contains(&json!("root")) {
+                    info!("root TEE already installed");
+                    return Ok(());
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    vault(
+        "Installing root TEE",
+        c.put(format!("{}/v1/auth/tee/tees/admin", app.vault_url)),
+        root_token,
+        json!({
+            "lease": "1000",
+            "name": "admin",
+            "types": "sgx",
+            "sgx_allowed_tcb_levels": "Ok,SwHardeningNeeded",
+            "sgx_mrenclave": &admin_tee_mrenclave,
+            "token_policies": "admin"
+        }),
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| anyhow!("{:?}", e))
+    .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    // Install admin policies
+    let admin_policy = include_str!("admin-policy.hcl");
+    vault(
+        "Installing admin policy",
+        c.put(format!("{}/v1/sys/policies/acl/admin", app.vault_url)),
+        root_token,
+        json!({ "policy": admin_policy }),
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| anyhow!("{:?}", e))
+    .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    vault(
+        "Enable the key/value secrets engine v1 at secret/.",
+        c.put(format!("{}/v1/sys/mounts/secret", app.vault_url)),
+        root_token,
+        json!({ "type": "kv", "description": "K/V v1" } ),
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| anyhow!("{:?}", e))
+    .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+
+    // Create a `VaultConnection` for the `admin` tee to initialize the secrets for it.
+    // Safety: the connection was already attested
+    let admin_vcon = unsafe {
+        VaultConnection::new_from_client_without_attestation(
+            app.vault_url.clone(),
+            c.clone(),
+            "admin".into(),
+            root_token.to_string(),
+        )
+    };
+
+    // initialize the admin config
+    admin_vcon.store_secret(admin_config, "config").await?;
+    admin_vcon
+        .store_secret(AdminState::default(), "state")
+        .await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn wait_for_plugins_catalog(app: &UnsealServerConfig, root_token: &str, c: &Client) {
+    info!("Waiting for plugins to be loaded");
+    loop {
+        let r = c
+            .get(format!("{}/v1/sys/plugins/catalog", app.vault_url))
+            .insert_header((VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER, root_token))
+            .send()
+            .await;
+
+        match r {
+            Ok(r) => {
+                if r.status().is_success() {
+                    break;
+                } else {
+                    debug!("/v1/sys/plugins/catalog status: {:#?}", r)
+                }
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                debug!("/v1/sys/plugins/catalog error: {}", e)
+            }
+        }
+
+        info!("Waiting for plugins to be loaded");
+        sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
+    }
+}
+
+async fn plugin_is_already_running(
+    app: &UnsealServerConfig,
+    root_token: &str,
+    c: &Client,
+) -> std::result::Result<bool, HttpResponseError> {
+    if let Ok(mut r) = c
+        .get(format!("{}/v1/sys/auth", app.vault_url))
+        .insert_header((VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER, root_token))
+        .send()
+        .await
+    {
+        if !r.status().is_success() {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+        let r: Value = r
+            .json()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow!("{:?}", e))
+            .status(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY)?;
+        trace!("{}", r.to_string());
+
+        let is_running = r
+            .get("data")
+            .and_then(|v| v.get("tee/"))
+            .and_then(|v| v.get("running_sha256"))
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+            .and_then(|v| if v.is_empty() { None } else { Some(v) })
+            .and_then(|v| {
+                if v == VAULT_AUTH_TEE_SHA256 {
+                    Some(v)
+                } else {
+                    None
+                }
+            })
+            .is_some();
+        Ok(is_running)
+    } else {
+        Ok(false)
+    }
+}
+
+async fn vault(
+    action: &str,
+    req: ClientRequest,
+    token: &str,
+    json: Value,
+) -> <SendClientRequest as Future>::Output {
+    info!("{}", action);
+    debug!("json: {:?}", json);
+    match req
+        .insert_header((VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER, token))
+        .send_json(&json)
+        .await
+    {
+        Ok(r) => {
+            debug!("response {:?}", r);
+            Ok(r)
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            error!("{}: {}", action, e);
+            Err(e)
+        }
+    }
+}
--- a/bin/tee-vault-unseal/tee-vault-unseal.manifest.template
+++ b/bin/tee-vault-unseal/tee-vault-unseal.manifest.template
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+libos.entrypoint = "/app/tee-vault-unseal"
+
+[loader]
+argv = [ "/app/tee-vault-unseal" ]
+entrypoint = "file:{{ gramine.libos }}"
+env.LD_LIBRARY_PATH = "/lib:{{ arch_libdir }}:/usr{{ arch_libdir }}:/lib"
+env.HOME = "/app"
+env.MALLOC_ARENA_MAX = "1"
+env.AZDCAP_DEBUG_LOG_LEVEL = "ignore"
+env.AZDCAP_COLLATERAL_VERSION = "v4"
+
+### Required configuration ###
+env.ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS = { passthrough = true }
+env.VAULT_ADDR = { passthrough = true }
+
+### DEBUG ###
+env.RUST_BACKTRACE = "1"
+env.RUST_LOG="info,tee_vault_unseal=trace,teepot=trace,awc=debug"
+
+[fs]
+root.uri = "file:/"
+start_dir = "/app"
+mounts = [
+  { path = "{{ execdir }}", uri = "file:{{ execdir }}" },
+  { path = "/lib", uri = "file:{{ gramine.runtimedir() }}" },
+  { path = "{{ arch_libdir }}", uri = "file:{{ arch_libdir }}" },
+  { path = "/etc", uri = "file:/etc" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/var/tmp" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/tmp" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/app/.dcap-qcnl" },
+  { type = "tmpfs", path = "/app/.az-dcap-client" },
+  { type = "encrypted", path = "/opt/vault/tls", uri = "file:/opt/vault/tls", key_name = "_sgx_mrsigner" },
+  { path = "/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so", uri = "file:/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so" },
+]
+
+[sgx]
+trusted_files = [
+  "file:/etc/ld.so.cache",
+  "file:/app/",
+  "file:{{ execdir }}/",
+  "file:{{ arch_libdir }}/",
+  "file:/usr/{{ arch_libdir }}/",
+  "file:{{ gramine.libos }}",
+  "file:{{ gramine.runtimedir() }}/",
+  "file:/usr/lib/ssl/openssl.cnf",
+  "file:/etc/ssl/",
+  "file:/etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf",
+  "file:/lib/libdcap_quoteprov.so",
+]
+remote_attestation = "dcap"
+max_threads = 64
+edmm_enable = false
+## max enclave size
+enclave_size = "2G"
+
+[sys]
+enable_extra_runtime_domain_names_conf = true
+enable_sigterm_injection = true
+
+# possible tweak option, if problems with mio
+# currently mio is compiled with `mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe`
+# insecure__allow_eventfd = true
--- a/bin/teepot-read/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/teepot-read/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+[package]
+name = "teepot-read"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+awc.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+tracing-actix-web.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
--- a/bin/teepot-read/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/teepot-read/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Get the secrets from a Vault TEE and pass them as environment variables to a command
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use clap::Parser;
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt;
+use std::process::Command;
+use teepot::client::vault::VaultConnection;
+use teepot::server::attestation::VaultAttestationArgs;
+use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter, Registry};
+
+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+#[command(author, version, about, long_about = None)]
+struct Arguments {
+    /// turn on test mode
+    #[arg(long, hide = true)]
+    pub test: bool,
+    /// vault token
+    #[arg(long, env = "VAULT_TOKEN", hide = true)]
+    pub vault_token: String,
+    #[clap(flatten)]
+    pub attestation: VaultAttestationArgs,
+    /// name of this TEE to login to vault
+    #[arg(long, required = true)]
+    pub name: String,
+    /// secrets to get from vault and pass as environment variables
+    #[arg(long, required = true)]
+    pub secrets: Vec<String>,
+    /// command to run
+    pub command: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+#[actix_web::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr));
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).unwrap();
+
+    let args = Arguments::parse();
+
+    // Split every string with a ',' into a vector of strings, flatten them and collect them.
+    let secrets = args
+        .secrets
+        .iter()
+        .flat_map(|s| s.split(','))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+    info!("args: {:?}", args);
+
+    let conn = if args.test {
+        warn!("TEST MODE");
+        let client = awc::Client::builder()
+            .add_default_header((actix_web::http::header::USER_AGENT, "teepot/1.0"))
+            .finish();
+        // SAFETY: TEST MODE
+        unsafe {
+            VaultConnection::new_from_client_without_attestation(
+                args.attestation.vault_addr.clone(),
+                client,
+                args.name.clone(),
+                args.vault_token.clone(),
+            )
+        }
+    } else {
+        VaultConnection::new(&args.attestation.clone().into(), args.name.clone())
+            .await
+            .expect("connecting to vault")
+    };
+
+    let mut env: HashMap<String, String> = HashMap::new();
+
+    for secret_name in secrets {
+        debug!("getting secret {secret_name}");
+        let secret_val: serde_json::Value = match conn.load_secret(secret_name).await? {
+            Some(val) => val,
+            None => {
+                debug!("secret {secret_name} not found");
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+
+        debug!("got secret {secret_name}: {secret_val}");
+
+        // Plain strings can be converted to strings.
+        let env_val = match secret_val {
+            Value::String(s) => s,
+            _ => secret_val.to_string(),
+        };
+
+        env.insert(secret_name.to_string(), env_val);
+    }
+
+    let err = Command::new(&args.command[0])
+        .args(&args.command[1..])
+        .envs(env)
+        .exec();
+
+    Err(err).context("exec failed")
+}
--- a/bin/teepot-write/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/teepot-write/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+[package]
+name = "teepot-write"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+awc.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+tracing-actix-web.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
--- a/bin/teepot-write/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/teepot-write/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Write secrets to a Vault TEE from environment variables
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use clap::Parser;
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::env;
+use teepot::client::vault::VaultConnection;
+use teepot::server::attestation::VaultAttestationArgs;
+use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter, Registry};
+
+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+#[command(author, version, about, long_about = None)]
+struct Arguments {
+    /// turn on test mode
+    #[arg(long, hide = true)]
+    pub test: bool,
+    /// vault token
+    #[arg(long, env = "VAULT_TOKEN", hide = true)]
+    pub vault_token: String,
+    #[clap(flatten)]
+    pub attestation: VaultAttestationArgs,
+    /// name of this TEE to login to vault
+    #[arg(long, required = true)]
+    pub name: String,
+    /// name of this TEE to login to vault
+    #[arg(long)]
+    pub store_name: Option<String>,
+    /// secrets to write to vault with the value of the environment variables
+    #[arg(long, required = true)]
+    pub secrets: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+#[actix_web::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr));
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).unwrap();
+
+    let args = Arguments::parse();
+
+    // Split every string with a ',' into a vector of strings, flatten them and collect them.
+    let secrets = args
+        .secrets
+        .iter()
+        .flat_map(|s| s.split(','))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+    info!("args: {:?}", args);
+
+    let conn = if args.test {
+        warn!("TEST MODE");
+        let client = awc::Client::builder()
+            .add_default_header((actix_web::http::header::USER_AGENT, "teepot/1.0"))
+            .finish();
+        // SAFETY: TEST MODE
+        unsafe {
+            VaultConnection::new_from_client_without_attestation(
+                args.attestation.vault_addr.clone(),
+                client,
+                args.name.clone(),
+                args.vault_token.clone(),
+            )
+        }
+    } else {
+        VaultConnection::new(&args.attestation.clone().into(), args.name.clone())
+            .await
+            .expect("connecting to vault")
+    };
+
+    let tee_name = args.store_name.unwrap_or(args.name.clone());
+
+    let env = env::vars()
+        .filter(|(k, _)| secrets.contains(&k.as_str()))
+        .collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();
+
+    for (secret_name, secret_val) in env {
+        debug!("storing secret {secret_name}: {secret_val}");
+        let secret_val = Value::String(secret_val);
+        conn.store_secret_for_tee(&tee_name, &secret_val, &secret_name)
+            .await
+            .expect("storing secret");
+        info!("stored secret {secret_name}");
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
--- a/bin/vault-admin/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/vault-admin/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+[package]
+name = "vault-admin"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+awc.workspace = true
+bytemuck.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+pgp.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
--- a/bin/vault-admin/README.md
+++ b/bin/vault-admin/README.md
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+```bash
+❯ idents=( tests/data/pub*.asc )
+❯ cargo run --bin vault-admin -p vault-admin -- \
+  verify \
+    ${idents[@]/#/-i } \
+    tests/data/test.json \
+    tests/data/test.json.asc
+
+Verified signature for `81A312C59D679D930FA9E8B06D728F29A2DBABF8`
+
+❯ RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-admin -- \
+  send \
+   --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d \
+   --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded \
+   --server https://127.0.0.1:8444 \
+  bin/tee-vault-admin/tests/data/test.json \
+  bin/tee-vault-admin/tests/data/test.json.asc
+
+2023-08-04T10:51:14.919941Z  INFO vault_admin: Quote verified! Connection secure!
+2023-08-04T10:51:14.920430Z  INFO tee_client: Getting attestation report
+2023-08-04T10:51:15.020459Z  INFO tee_client: Checked or set server certificate public key hash `f6dc06b9f2a14fa16a94c076a85eab8513f99ec0091801cc62c8761e42908fc1`
+2023-08-04T10:51:15.024310Z  INFO tee_client: Verifying attestation report
+2023-08-04T10:51:15.052712Z  INFO tee_client: TcbLevel is allowed: SwHardeningNeeded: Software hardening is needed
+2023-08-04T10:51:15.054508Z  WARN tee_client: Info: Advisory ID: INTEL-SA-00615
+2023-08-04T10:51:15.054572Z  INFO tee_client: Report data matches `f6dc06b9f2a14fa16a94c076a85eab8513f99ec0091801cc62c8761e42908fc1`
+2023-08-04T10:51:15.054602Z  INFO tee_client: mrsigner `c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d` matches
+[
+  {
+    "request": {
+      "data": {
+        "lease": "1000",
+        "name": "test",
+        "sgx_allowed_tcb_levels": "Ok,SwHardeningNeeded",
+        "sgx_mrsigner": "c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d",
+        "token_policies": "test",
+        "types": "sgx"
+      },
+      "url": "/v1/auth/tee/tees/test"
+    },
+    "response": {
+      "status_code": 204,
+      "value": null
+    }
+  }
+]
+```
--- a/bin/vault-admin/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/vault-admin/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use clap::{Args, Parser, Subcommand};
+use pgp::types::KeyTrait;
+use pgp::{Deserializable, SignedPublicKey};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::default::Default;
+use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions};
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use teepot::client::{AttestationArgs, TeeConnection};
+use teepot::json::http::{
+    SignRequest, SignRequestData, SignResponse, VaultCommandRequest, VaultCommands,
+    VaultCommandsResponse, ATTESTATION_URL, DIGEST_URL,
+};
+use teepot::server::signatures::verify_sig;
+use teepot::sgx::sign::Signature;
+use tracing::{error, info};
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::Registry;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter};
+
+#[derive(Args, Debug)]
+struct SendArgs {
+    #[clap(flatten)]
+    pub attestation: AttestationArgs,
+    /// Vault command file
+    #[arg(required = true)]
+    pub command_file: PathBuf,
+    /// GPG signature files
+    #[arg(required = true)]
+    pub sigs: Vec<PathBuf>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Args, Debug)]
+struct SignTeeArgs {
+    #[clap(flatten)]
+    pub attestation: AttestationArgs,
+    /// output file
+    #[arg(short, long, required = true)]
+    pub out: PathBuf,
+    /// signature request file
+    #[arg(required = true)]
+    pub sig_request_file: PathBuf,
+    /// GPG signature files
+    #[arg(required = true)]
+    pub sigs: Vec<PathBuf>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Args, Debug)]
+struct DigestArgs {
+    #[clap(flatten)]
+    pub attestation: AttestationArgs,
+}
+
+#[derive(Args, Debug)]
+struct VerifyArgs {
+    /// GPG identity files
+    #[arg(short, long, required = true)]
+    pub idents: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// Vault command file
+    #[arg(required = true)]
+    pub command_file: PathBuf,
+    /// GPG signature files
+    #[arg(required = true)]
+    pub sigs: Vec<PathBuf>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Args, Debug)]
+struct CreateSignRequestArgs {
+    /// Last digest
+    #[arg(long)]
+    pub last_digest: Option<String>,
+    /// TEE name
+    #[arg(long)]
+    pub tee_name: Option<String>,
+    /// Vault command file
+    #[arg(required = true)]
+    pub sig_file: PathBuf,
+}
+
+#[derive(Subcommand, Debug)]
+enum SubCommands {
+    /// Send the signed commands to execute to the vault
+    Command(SendArgs),
+    /// Verify the signature(s) for the commands to send
+    Verify(VerifyArgs),
+    /// Get the digest of the last executed commands
+    Digest(DigestArgs),
+    /// Send the signed commands to execute to the vault
+    SignTee(SignTeeArgs),
+    /// Create a sign request
+    CreateSignRequest(CreateSignRequestArgs),
+}
+
+/// Admin tool for the vault
+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+#[command(author, version, about, long_about = None)]
+struct Arguments {
+    #[clap(subcommand)]
+    cmd: SubCommands,
+}
+
+#[actix_web::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr));
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).unwrap();
+
+    let args = Arguments::parse();
+    info!("Quote verified! Connection secure!");
+
+    match args.cmd {
+        SubCommands::Command(args) => send_commands(args).await?,
+        SubCommands::SignTee(args) => send_sig_request(args).await?,
+        SubCommands::Verify(args) => {
+            verify(args.command_file, args.idents.iter(), args.sigs.iter())?
+        }
+        SubCommands::Digest(args) => digest(args).await?,
+        SubCommands::CreateSignRequest(args) => create_sign_request(args)?,
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn create_sign_request(args: CreateSignRequestArgs) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut sigstruct_file = File::open(&args.sig_file)?;
+    let mut sigstruct_bytes = Vec::new();
+    sigstruct_file.read_to_end(&mut sigstruct_bytes)?;
+
+    let sigstruct = bytemuck::try_from_bytes::<Signature>(&sigstruct_bytes)
+        .context(format!("parsing signature file {:?}", &args.sig_file))?;
+
+    let body = sigstruct.body();
+    let data = bytemuck::bytes_of(&body).to_vec();
+
+    let sign_request_data = SignRequestData {
+        data,
+        last_digest: args.last_digest.unwrap_or_default(),
+        tee_name: args.tee_name.unwrap_or_default(),
+        tee_type: "sgx".to_string(),
+        ..Default::default()
+    };
+
+    println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&sign_request_data)?);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn verify(
+    msg: impl AsRef<Path>,
+    idents_file_paths: impl Iterator<Item = impl AsRef<Path>>,
+    sig_paths: impl Iterator<Item = impl AsRef<Path>>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let mut cmd_file = File::open(msg.as_ref())?;
+    let mut cmd_buf = Vec::new();
+    cmd_file
+        .read_to_end(&mut cmd_buf)
+        .context(format!("reading command file {:?}", &cmd_file))?;
+
+    let mut idents = Vec::new();
+    for ident_file_path in idents_file_paths {
+        let ident_file = File::open(ident_file_path.as_ref()).context(format!(
+            "reading identity file {:?}",
+            ident_file_path.as_ref()
+        ))?;
+        idents.push(
+            SignedPublicKey::from_armor_single(ident_file)
+                .context(format!(
+                    "reading identity file {:?}",
+                    ident_file_path.as_ref()
+                ))?
+                .0,
+        );
+    }
+
+    for sig_path in sig_paths {
+        let mut sig_file = File::open(&sig_path)
+            .context(format!("reading signature file {:?}", sig_path.as_ref()))?;
+        let mut sig = String::new();
+        sig_file
+            .read_to_string(&mut sig)
+            .context(format!("reading signature file {:?}", sig_path.as_ref()))?;
+        let ident_pos = verify_sig(&sig, &cmd_buf, &idents)?;
+        println!(
+            "Verified signature for `{}`",
+            hex::encode_upper(idents.get(ident_pos).unwrap().fingerprint())
+        );
+        // Remove the identity from the list of identities to verify
+        idents.remove(ident_pos);
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn send_commands(args: SendArgs) -> Result<()> {
+    // Read the command file into a string
+    let mut cmd_file = File::open(&args.command_file)?;
+    let mut commands = String::new();
+    cmd_file.read_to_string(&mut commands)?;
+
+    // Check that the command file is valid JSON
+    let vault_commands: VaultCommands = serde_json::from_str(&commands)
+        .context(format!("parsing command file {:?}", &args.command_file))?;
+
+    let mut signatures = Vec::new();
+
+    for sig in args.sigs {
+        let mut sig_file = File::open(sig)?;
+        let mut sig = String::new();
+        sig_file.read_to_string(&mut sig)?;
+        signatures.push(sig);
+    }
+
+    let send_req = VaultCommandRequest {
+        commands,
+        signatures,
+    };
+
+    let conn = TeeConnection::new(&args.attestation, ATTESTATION_URL).await?;
+
+    let mut response = conn
+        .client()
+        .post(&format!(
+            "{server}{url}",
+            server = conn.server(),
+            url = VaultCommandRequest::URL
+        ))
+        .send_json(&send_req)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("sending command request: {}", e))?;
+
+    let status_code = response.status();
+    if !status_code.is_success() {
+        error!("sending command request: {}", status_code);
+        if let Ok(r) = response.json::<Value>().await {
+            eprintln!(
+                "Error sending command request: {}",
+                serde_json::to_string(&r).unwrap_or_default()
+            );
+        }
+        bail!("sending command request: {}", status_code);
+    }
+
+    let cmd_responses: VaultCommandsResponse = response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed parsing command response")?;
+
+    println!("digest: {}", &cmd_responses.digest);
+
+    let pairs = cmd_responses
+        .results
+        .iter()
+        .zip(vault_commands.commands.iter())
+        .map(|(resp, cmd)| {
+            let mut pair = serde_json::Map::new();
+            pair.insert("request".to_string(), serde_json::to_value(cmd).unwrap());
+            pair.insert("response".to_string(), serde_json::to_value(resp).unwrap());
+            pair
+        })
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+
+    println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&pairs)?);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn send_sig_request(args: SignTeeArgs) -> Result<()> {
+    // Read the command file into a string
+    let mut cmd_file = File::open(&args.sig_request_file)?;
+    let mut sign_request_data_str = String::new();
+    cmd_file.read_to_string(&mut sign_request_data_str)?;
+
+    // Check that the command file is valid JSON
+    let _sign_request_data: SignRequestData = serde_json::from_str(&sign_request_data_str)
+        .context(format!("parsing command file {:?}", &args.sig_request_file))?;
+
+    let mut signatures = Vec::new();
+
+    for sig in args.sigs {
+        let mut sig_file = File::open(sig)?;
+        let mut sig = String::new();
+        sig_file.read_to_string(&mut sig)?;
+        signatures.push(sig);
+    }
+
+    // open out_file early to fail fast if it is not writable
+    let mut out_file = OpenOptions::new()
+        .create(true)
+        .write(true)
+        .open(&args.out)?;
+
+    let send_req = SignRequest {
+        sign_request_data: sign_request_data_str,
+        signatures,
+    };
+
+    let conn = TeeConnection::new(&args.attestation, ATTESTATION_URL).await?;
+
+    let mut response = conn
+        .client()
+        .post(&format!(
+            "{server}{url}",
+            server = conn.server(),
+            url = SignRequest::URL
+        ))
+        .send_json(&send_req)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("sending sign request: {}", e))?;
+
+    let status_code = response.status();
+    if !status_code.is_success() {
+        error!("sending sign request: {}", status_code);
+        if let Ok(r) = response.json::<Value>().await {
+            eprintln!(
+                "Error sending sign request: {}",
+                serde_json::to_string(&r).unwrap_or_default()
+            );
+        }
+        bail!("sending sign request: {}", status_code);
+    }
+
+    let sign_response: SignResponse = response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed parsing sign response")?;
+
+    println!("digest: {}", &sign_response.digest);
+
+    out_file.write_all(&sign_response.signed_data)?;
+
+    println!("{{ \"digest\": \"{}\" }}", sign_response.digest);
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn digest(args: DigestArgs) -> Result<()> {
+    let conn = TeeConnection::new(&args.attestation, ATTESTATION_URL).await?;
+
+    let mut response = conn
+        .client()
+        .get(&format!("{server}{DIGEST_URL}", server = conn.server()))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("sending digest request: {}", e))?;
+
+    let status_code = response.status();
+    if !status_code.is_success() {
+        error!("sending digest request: {}", status_code);
+        if let Ok(r) = response.json::<Value>().await {
+            eprintln!("Error sending digest request: {}", r);
+        }
+        bail!("sending digest request: {}", status_code);
+    }
+
+    let digest_response: Value = response
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("failed parsing digest response")?;
+
+    println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&digest_response)?);
+    Ok(())
+}
--- a/bin/vault-unseal/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/vault-unseal/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+[package]
+name = "vault-unseal"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+actix-web.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+awc.workspace = true
+base64.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
+tracing-log.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
--- a/bin/vault-unseal/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/vault-unseal/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use base64::{engine::general_purpose, Engine as _};
+use clap::{Args, Parser, Subcommand};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use std::fs::File;
+use std::io::Read;
+use teepot::client::{AttestationArgs, TeeConnection};
+use teepot::json::http::{Init, InitResponse, Unseal, ATTESTATION_URL};
+use tracing::{error, info, trace, warn};
+use tracing_log::LogTracer;
+use tracing_subscriber::Registry;
+use tracing_subscriber::{fmt, prelude::*, EnvFilter};
+
+#[derive(Args, Debug)]
+pub struct InitArgs {
+    /// admin threshold
+    #[arg(long)]
+    admin_threshold: usize,
+    /// PGP keys to sign commands for the admin tee
+    #[arg(short, long)]
+    admin_pgp_key_file: Vec<String>,
+    /// admin TEE mrenclave
+    #[arg(long)]
+    admin_tee_mrenclave: String,
+    /// secret threshold
+    #[arg(long)]
+    unseal_threshold: usize,
+    /// PGP keys to encrypt the unseal keys with
+    #[arg(short, long)]
+    unseal_pgp_key_file: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+/// subcommands and their options/arguments.
+#[derive(Subcommand, Debug)]
+enum SubCommands {
+    Init(InitArgs),
+    Unseal,
+}
+
+#[derive(Parser, Debug)]
+#[command(author, version, about, long_about = None)]
+struct Arguments {
+    #[clap(flatten)]
+    pub attestation: AttestationArgs,
+    /// Subcommands (with their own options)
+    #[clap(subcommand)]
+    cmd: SubCommands,
+}
+
+#[actix_web::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    LogTracer::init().context("Failed to set logger")?;
+
+    let subscriber = Registry::default()
+        .with(EnvFilter::from_default_env())
+        .with(fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr));
+    tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(subscriber).unwrap();
+
+    let args = Arguments::parse();
+
+    match args.cmd {
+        SubCommands::Init(_) => init(args).await?,
+        SubCommands::Unseal => unseal(args).await?,
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn init(args: Arguments) -> Result<()> {
+    let conn = TeeConnection::new(&args.attestation, ATTESTATION_URL).await?;
+
+    info!("Quote verified! Connection secure!");
+
+    let SubCommands::Init(init_args) = args.cmd else {
+        unreachable!()
+    };
+
+    if init_args.admin_threshold == 0 {
+        bail!("admin threshold must be greater than 0");
+    }
+
+    if init_args.unseal_threshold == 0 {
+        bail!("unseal threshold must be greater than 0");
+    }
+
+    if init_args.admin_threshold > init_args.admin_pgp_key_file.len() {
+        bail!("admin threshold must be less than or equal to the number of admin pgp keys");
+    }
+
+    if init_args.unseal_threshold > init_args.unseal_pgp_key_file.len() {
+        bail!("unseal threshold must be less than or equal to the number of unseal pgp keys");
+    }
+
+    let mut pgp_keys = Vec::new();
+
+    for filename in init_args.unseal_pgp_key_file {
+        let mut file =
+            File::open(&filename).context(format!("Failed to open pgp key file {}", &filename))?;
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        file.read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
+        let key = std::str::from_utf8(&buf)?.trim().to_string();
+        pgp_keys.push(key);
+    }
+
+    let mut admin_pgp_keys = Vec::new();
+
+    for filename in init_args.admin_pgp_key_file {
+        let mut file =
+            File::open(&filename).context(format!("Failed to open pgp key file {}", &filename))?;
+        // read all lines from file and concatenate them
+        let mut key = String::new();
+        file.read_to_string(&mut key)
+            .context(format!("Failed to read pgp key file {}", &filename))?;
+        key.retain(|c| !c.is_ascii_whitespace());
+
+        let bytes = general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(key).context(format!(
+            "Failed to base64 decode pgp key file {}",
+            &filename
+        ))?;
+        admin_pgp_keys.push(bytes.into_boxed_slice());
+    }
+
+    let init = Init {
+        secret_shares: pgp_keys.len() as _,
+        secret_threshold: init_args.unseal_threshold,
+        admin_threshold: init_args.admin_threshold,
+        admin_tee_mrenclave: init_args.admin_tee_mrenclave,
+        admin_pgp_keys: admin_pgp_keys.into_boxed_slice(),
+        pgp_keys,
+    };
+
+    info!("Inititalizing vault");
+
+    let mut response = conn
+        .client()
+        .post(&format!(
+            "{server}{url}",
+            server = conn.server(),
+            url = Init::URL
+        ))
+        .send_json(&init)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("Error sending init request: {}", e))?;
+
+    let status_code = response.status();
+    if !status_code.is_success() {
+        error!("Failed to init vault: {}", status_code);
+        if let Ok(r) = response.json::<Value>().await {
+            eprintln!("Failed to init vault: {}", r);
+        }
+        bail!("failed to init vault: {}", status_code);
+    }
+
+    let init_response: Value = response.json().await.context("failed to init vault")?;
+
+    info!("Got Response: {}", init_response.to_string());
+
+    let resp: InitResponse =
+        serde_json::from_value(init_response).context("Failed to parse init response")?;
+    println!("{}", serde_json::to_string(&resp).unwrap());
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn unseal(args: Arguments) -> Result<()> {
+    info!("Reading unencrypted key from stdin");
+
+    // read all bytes from stdin
+    let mut stdin = std::io::stdin();
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    stdin.read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
+    let key = std::str::from_utf8(&buf)?.trim().to_string();
+
+    if key.is_empty() {
+        bail!("Error reading key from stdin");
+    }
+
+    let conn = TeeConnection::new(&args.attestation, ATTESTATION_URL).await?;
+
+    info!("Quote verified! Connection secure!");
+
+    info!("Unsealing vault");
+
+    let unseal_data = Unseal { key };
+
+    let mut response = conn
+        .client()
+        .post(&format!(
+            "{server}{url}",
+            server = conn.server(),
+            url = Unseal::URL
+        ))
+        .send_json(&unseal_data)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| anyhow!("Error sending unseal request: {}", e))?;
+
+    let status_code = response.status();
+    if !status_code.is_success() {
+        error!("Failed to unseal vault: {}", status_code);
+        if let Ok(r) = response.json::<Value>().await {
+            eprintln!("Failed to unseal vault: {}", r);
+        }
+        bail!("failed to unseal vault: {}", status_code);
+    }
+
+    let unseal_response: Value = response.json().await.context("failed to unseal vault")?;
+
+    trace!("Got Response: {}", unseal_response.to_string());
+
+    if matches!(unseal_response["sealed"].as_bool(), Some(true)) {
+        warn!("Vault is still sealed!");
+        println!("Vault is still sealed!");
+    } else {
+        info!("Vault is unsealed!");
+        println!("Vault is unsealed!");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
--- a/bin/verify-attestation/Cargo.toml
+++ b/bin/verify-attestation/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+[package]
+name = "verify-attestation"
+version.workspace = true
+edition.workspace = true
+authors.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+repository.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+hex.workspace = true
+intel-tee-quote-verification-rs.workspace = true
+teepot.workspace = true
--- a/bin/verify-attestation/Dockerfile
+++ b/bin/verify-attestation/Dockerfile
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+FROM docker.io/rust:1-bullseye AS buildtee
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        build-essential \
+        cmake \
+        rsync \
+        pkg-config \
+        libssl-dev \
+        libcurl4-openssl-dev \
+        libprotobuf-dev \
+        protobuf-compiler \
+        clang \
+        libsgx-headers \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
+
+WORKDIR /opt/vault/plugins
+
+WORKDIR /build
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/data rsync --exclude='/.git' --filter="dir-merge,- .gitignore" --exclude "Dockerfile-*" --exclude 'tee-vault-admin.manifest.template' -av /data/ ./
+RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/usr/local/cargo/registry --mount=type=cache,target=target \
+    RUSTFLAGS="-C target-cpu=icelake-server --cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe" \
+    cargo build --locked --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu --release -p verify-attestation --bin verify-attestation \
+    && mv ./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/verify-attestation ./
+
+FROM docker.io/ubuntu:20.04
+
+RUN apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y curl
+
+RUN curl -fsSLo /usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu/intel-sgx-deb.key \
+    && echo "deb [arch=amd64 signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/intel.asc] https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/sgx_repo/ubuntu focal main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/intel-sgx.list \
+    && apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+        libsgx-dcap-default-qpl \
+        libsgx-urts \
+        libsgx-enclave-common \
+        libsgx-dcap-quote-verify
+RUN apt purge -y libsgx-ae-qve
+RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+COPY --from=buildtee /build/verify-attestation /bin/verify-attestation
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
+CMD [ "verify-attestation" ]
--- a/bin/verify-attestation/src/main.rs
+++ b/bin/verify-attestation/src/main.rs
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Simple TEE attestation verification test
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
+use std::io::Read;
+use std::time::UNIX_EPOCH;
+use teepot::client::TcbLevel;
+use teepot::sgx::{tee_qv_get_collateral, verify_quote_with_collateral, QuoteVerificationResult};
+
+fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    // read myquote from stdin
+    let mut myquote = Vec::new();
+    std::io::stdin()
+        .read_to_end(&mut myquote)
+        .context("Failed to read quote from stdin")?;
+
+    let collateral = tee_qv_get_collateral(&myquote).context("Failed to get collateral")?;
+
+    let unix_time: i64 = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .unwrap()
+        .as_secs() as _;
+
+    let QuoteVerificationResult {
+        collateral_expired,
+        result,
+
+        quote,
+        advisories,
+        ..
+    } = verify_quote_with_collateral(&myquote, Some(&collateral), unix_time.saturating_add(60))
+        .context("Failed to verify quote with collateral")?;
+
+    if collateral_expired {
+        bail!("Freshly fetched collateral expired");
+    }
+
+    let tcblevel = TcbLevel::from(result);
+    if tcblevel != TcbLevel::Ok {
+        println!("Quote verification result: {}", tcblevel);
+    }
+
+    for advisory in advisories {
+        println!("\tInfo: Advisory ID: {advisory}");
+    }
+
+    println!("Quote verified successfully: {}", tcblevel);
+    println!("mrsigner: {}", hex::encode(quote.report_body.mrsigner));
+    println!("mrenclave: {}", hex::encode(quote.report_body.mrenclave));
+    println!("reportdata: {}", hex::encode(quote.report_body.reportdata));
+
+    Ok(())
+}
--- a/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-rs/Cargo.toml
+++ b/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-rs/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# Fork of the original crate: https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives
+
+[package]
+name = "intel-tee-quote-verification-rs"
+version = "0.2.1"
+edition = "2021"
+license = "BSD-3-Clause"
+
+[dependencies]
+intel-tee-quote-verification-sys.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
--- a/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-rs/License.txt
+++ b/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-rs/License.txt
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+BSD License
+
+Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+
+  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+    distribution.
+  * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
+    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+    from this software without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+
+==============================================================
+
+pce.signed.dll, qve.signed.dll,id_enclave.signed.dll and qe3.signed.dll,
+libsgx_pce.signed.so, libsgx_qve.signed.so, libsgx_id_enclave.signed.so,
+libsgx_qe3.signed.so and libsgx_tdqe.signed.so are licensed under
+3-Clause BSD License.
+
--- a/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-rs/src/lib.rs
+++ b/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-rs/src/lib.rs
@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ *   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *     the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *     distribution.
+ *   * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
+ *     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ *     from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+//! Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Data Center Attestation Primitives (Intel(R) SGX DCAP)
+//! Rust wrapper for Quote Verification Library
+//! ================================================
+//!
+//! This is a safe wrapper for **sgx-dcap-quoteverify-sys**.
+
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::marker::PhantomData;
+use std::mem;
+use std::ops::Deref;
+use std::slice;
+
+use intel_tee_quote_verification_sys as qvl_sys;
+
+pub use qvl_sys::quote3_error_t;
+pub use qvl_sys::sgx_ql_qe_report_info_t;
+pub use qvl_sys::sgx_ql_qv_result_t;
+pub use qvl_sys::sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t;
+pub use qvl_sys::sgx_ql_qve_collateral_t;
+pub use qvl_sys::sgx_ql_request_policy_t;
+pub use qvl_sys::sgx_qv_path_type_t;
+pub use qvl_sys::tdx_ql_qve_collateral_t;
+pub use qvl_sys::tee_supp_data_descriptor_t;
+
+/// When the Quoting Verification Library is linked to a process, it needs to know the proper enclave loading policy.
+/// The library may be linked with a long lived process, such as a service, where it can load the enclaves and leave
+/// them loaded (persistent). This better ensures that the enclaves will be available upon quote requests and not subject
+/// to EPC limitations if loaded on demand. However, if the Quoting library is linked with an application process, there
+/// may be many applications with the Quoting library and a better utilization of EPC is to load and unloaded the quoting
+/// enclaves on demand (ephemeral).  The library will be shipped with a default policy of loading enclaves and leaving
+/// them loaded until the library is unloaded (PERSISTENT). If the policy is set to EPHEMERAL, then the QE and PCE will
+/// be loaded and unloaded on-demand.  If either enclave is already loaded when the policy is change to EPHEMERAL, the
+/// enclaves will be unloaded before returning.
+///
+/// # Param
+/// - **policy**\
+/// Set the requested enclave loading policy to either *SGX_QL_PERSISTENT*, *SGX_QL_EPHEMERAL* or *SGX_QL_DEFAULT*.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// - ***SGX_QL_SUCCESS***\
+/// Successfully set the enclave loading policy for the quoting library's enclaves.\
+/// - ***SGX_QL_UNSUPPORTED_LOADING_POLICY***\
+/// The selected policy is not support by the quoting library.\
+/// - ***SGX_QL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED***\
+/// Unexpected internal error.
+///
+/// # Examples
+/// ```
+/// use intel_tee_quote_verification_rs::*;
+///
+/// let policy = sgx_ql_request_policy_t::SGX_QL_DEFAULT;
+/// let ret = sgx_qv_set_enclave_load_policy(policy);
+///
+/// assert_eq!(ret, quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_SUCCESS);
+/// ```
+pub fn sgx_qv_set_enclave_load_policy(policy: sgx_ql_request_policy_t) -> quote3_error_t {
+    unsafe { qvl_sys::sgx_qv_set_enclave_load_policy(policy) }
+}
+
+/// Get SGX supplemental data required size.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// Size of the supplemental data in bytes.
+///
+/// Status code of the operation, one of:
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER*
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_QVL_QVE_MISMATCH*
+/// - *SGX_QL_ENCLAVE_LOAD_ERROR*
+///
+/// # Examples
+/// ```
+/// use intel_tee_quote_verification_rs::*;
+///
+/// let data_size = sgx_qv_get_quote_supplemental_data_size().unwrap();
+///
+/// assert_eq!(data_size, std::mem::size_of::<sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t>() as u32);
+/// ```
+pub fn sgx_qv_get_quote_supplemental_data_size() -> Result<u32, quote3_error_t> {
+    let mut data_size = 0u32;
+    unsafe {
+        match qvl_sys::sgx_qv_get_quote_supplemental_data_size(&mut data_size) {
+            quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_SUCCESS => Ok(data_size),
+            error_code => Err(error_code),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Perform SGX ECDSA quote verification.
+///
+/// # Param
+/// - **quote**\
+/// SGX Quote, presented as u8 vector.
+/// - **quote_collateral**\
+/// Quote Certification Collateral provided by the caller.
+/// - **expiration_check_date**\
+/// This is the date that the QvE will use to determine if any of the inputted collateral have expired.
+/// - **qve_report_info**\
+/// This parameter can be used in 2 ways.\
+///     - If qve_report_info is NOT None, the API will use Intel QvE to perform quote verification, and QvE will generate a report using the target_info in sgx_ql_qe_report_info_t structure.\
+///     - if qve_report_info is None, the API will use QVL library to perform quote verification, note that the results can not be cryptographically authenticated in this mode.
+/// - **supplemental_data_size**\
+/// Size of the supplemental data (in bytes).
+/// - **supplemental_data**\
+/// The parameter is optional. If it is None, supplemental_data_size must be 0.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// Result type of (collateral_expiration_status, verification_result).
+///
+/// Status code of the operation, one of:
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER*
+/// - *SGX_QL_QUOTE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED*
+/// - *SGX_QL_QUOTE_CERTIFICATION_DATA_UNSUPPORTED*
+/// - *SGX_QL_UNABLE_TO_GENERATE_REPORT*
+/// - *SGX_QL_CRL_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT*
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED*
+///
+pub fn sgx_qv_verify_quote(
+    quote: &[u8],
+    quote_collateral: Option<&Collateral>,
+    expiration_check_date: i64,
+    qve_report_info: Option<&mut sgx_ql_qe_report_info_t>,
+    supplemental_data_size: u32,
+    supplemental_data: Option<&mut sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t>,
+) -> Result<(u32, sgx_ql_qv_result_t), quote3_error_t> {
+    let mut collateral_expiration_status = 1u32;
+    let mut quote_verification_result = sgx_ql_qv_result_t::SGX_QL_QV_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+    let quote_collateral = quote_collateral.map(SgxQlQveCollateralT::from);
+    let p_quote_collateral = quote_collateral.as_deref().map_or(std::ptr::null(), |p| p);
+
+    let p_qve_report_info = match qve_report_info {
+        Some(p) => p,
+        None => std::ptr::null_mut(),
+    };
+    let p_supplemental_data = match supplemental_data {
+        Some(p) => p as *mut sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t as *mut u8,
+        None => std::ptr::null_mut(),
+    };
+
+    unsafe {
+        match qvl_sys::sgx_qv_verify_quote(
+            quote.as_ptr(),
+            quote.len() as u32,
+            p_quote_collateral,
+            expiration_check_date,
+            &mut collateral_expiration_status,
+            &mut quote_verification_result,
+            p_qve_report_info,
+            supplemental_data_size,
+            p_supplemental_data,
+        ) {
+            quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_SUCCESS => {
+                Ok((collateral_expiration_status, quote_verification_result))
+            }
+            error_code => Err(error_code),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get TDX supplemental data required size.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// Size of the supplemental data in bytes.
+///
+/// Status code of the operation, one of:
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER*
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_QVL_QVE_MISMATCH*
+/// - *SGX_QL_ENCLAVE_LOAD_ERROR*
+///
+/// # Examples
+/// ```
+/// use intel_tee_quote_verification_rs::*;
+///
+/// let data_size = tdx_qv_get_quote_supplemental_data_size().unwrap();
+///
+/// assert_eq!(data_size, std::mem::size_of::<sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t>() as u32);
+/// ```
+pub fn tdx_qv_get_quote_supplemental_data_size() -> Result<u32, quote3_error_t> {
+    let mut data_size = 0u32;
+    unsafe {
+        match qvl_sys::tdx_qv_get_quote_supplemental_data_size(&mut data_size) {
+            quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_SUCCESS => Ok(data_size),
+            error_code => Err(error_code),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Perform TDX ECDSA quote verification.
+///
+/// # Param
+/// - **quote**\
+/// TDX Quote, presented as u8 vector.
+/// - **quote_collateral**\
+/// Quote Certification Collateral provided by the caller.
+/// - **expiration_check_date**\
+/// This is the date that the QvE will use to determine if any of the inputted collateral have expired.
+/// - **qve_report_info**\
+/// This parameter can be used in 2 ways.\
+///     - If qve_report_info is NOT None, the API will use Intel QvE to perform quote verification, and QvE will generate a report using the target_info in sgx_ql_qe_report_info_t structure.\
+///     - if qve_report_info is None, the API will use QVL library to perform quote verification, note that the results can not be cryptographically authenticated in this mode.
+/// - **supplemental_data_size**\
+/// Size of the supplemental data (in bytes).
+/// - **supplemental_data**\
+/// The parameter is optional. If it is None, supplemental_data_size must be 0.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// Result type of (collateral_expiration_status, verification_result).
+///
+/// Status code of the operation, one of:
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER*
+/// - *SGX_QL_QUOTE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED*
+/// - *SGX_QL_QUOTE_CERTIFICATION_DATA_UNSUPPORTED*
+/// - *SGX_QL_UNABLE_TO_GENERATE_REPORT*
+/// - *SGX_QL_CRL_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT*
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED*
+///
+pub fn tdx_qv_verify_quote(
+    quote: &[u8],
+    quote_collateral: Option<&Collateral>,
+    expiration_check_date: i64,
+    qve_report_info: Option<&mut sgx_ql_qe_report_info_t>,
+    supplemental_data_size: u32,
+    supplemental_data: Option<&mut sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t>,
+) -> Result<(u32, sgx_ql_qv_result_t), quote3_error_t> {
+    let mut collateral_expiration_status = 1u32;
+    let mut quote_verification_result = sgx_ql_qv_result_t::SGX_QL_QV_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+    let quote_collateral = quote_collateral.map(SgxQlQveCollateralT::from);
+    let p_quote_collateral = quote_collateral.as_deref().map_or(std::ptr::null(), |p| p);
+
+    let p_qve_report_info = match qve_report_info {
+        Some(p) => p,
+        None => std::ptr::null_mut(),
+    };
+    let p_supplemental_data = match supplemental_data {
+        Some(p) => p as *mut sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t as *mut u8,
+        None => std::ptr::null_mut(),
+    };
+
+    unsafe {
+        match qvl_sys::tdx_qv_verify_quote(
+            quote.as_ptr(),
+            quote.len() as u32,
+            p_quote_collateral,
+            expiration_check_date,
+            &mut collateral_expiration_status,
+            &mut quote_verification_result,
+            p_qve_report_info,
+            supplemental_data_size,
+            p_supplemental_data,
+        ) {
+            quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_SUCCESS => {
+                Ok((collateral_expiration_status, quote_verification_result))
+            }
+            error_code => Err(error_code),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Set the full path of QVE and QPL library.\
+/// The function takes the enum and the corresponding full path.
+///
+/// # Param
+/// - **path_type**\
+/// The type of binary being passed in.
+/// - **path**\
+/// It should be a valid full path.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// - ***SGX_QL_SUCCESS***\
+/// Successfully set the full path.
+/// - ***SGX_QL_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER***\
+/// Path is not a valid full path or the path is too long.
+///
+#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
+pub fn sgx_qv_set_path(path_type: sgx_qv_path_type_t, path: &str) -> quote3_error_t {
+    match std::ffi::CString::new(path) {
+        Ok(path) => unsafe { qvl_sys::sgx_qv_set_path(path_type, path.as_ptr()) },
+        _ => quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER,
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Collateral {
+    pub major_version: u16,
+    pub minor_version: u16,
+    pub tee_type: u32,
+    pub pck_crl_issuer_chain: Box<[u8]>,
+    pub root_ca_crl: Box<[u8]>,
+    pub pck_crl: Box<[u8]>,
+    pub tcb_info_issuer_chain: Box<[u8]>,
+    pub tcb_info: Box<[u8]>,
+    pub qe_identity_issuer_chain: Box<[u8]>,
+    pub qe_identity: Box<[u8]>,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<&sgx_ql_qve_collateral_t> for Collateral {
+    type Error = ();
+
+    fn try_from(value: &sgx_ql_qve_collateral_t) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        fn to_boxed_slice(p: *mut ::std::os::raw::c_char, size: u32) -> Result<Box<[u8]>, ()> {
+            if p.is_null() {
+                return Err(());
+            }
+            Ok(Box::from(unsafe {
+                slice::from_raw_parts(p as _, size as _)
+            }))
+        }
+
+        Ok(Collateral {
+            major_version: unsafe { value.__bindgen_anon_1.__bindgen_anon_1.major_version },
+            minor_version: unsafe { value.__bindgen_anon_1.__bindgen_anon_1.minor_version },
+            tee_type: value.tee_type,
+            pck_crl_issuer_chain: to_boxed_slice(
+                value.pck_crl_issuer_chain,
+                value.pck_crl_issuer_chain_size,
+            )?,
+            root_ca_crl: to_boxed_slice(value.root_ca_crl, value.root_ca_crl_size)?,
+            pck_crl: to_boxed_slice(value.pck_crl, value.pck_crl_size)?,
+            tcb_info_issuer_chain: to_boxed_slice(
+                value.tcb_info_issuer_chain,
+                value.tcb_info_issuer_chain_size,
+            )?,
+            tcb_info: to_boxed_slice(value.tcb_info, value.tcb_info_size)?,
+            qe_identity_issuer_chain: to_boxed_slice(
+                value.qe_identity_issuer_chain,
+                value.qe_identity_issuer_chain_size,
+            )?,
+            qe_identity: to_boxed_slice(value.qe_identity, value.qe_identity_size)?,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+// referential struct
+struct SgxQlQveCollateralT<'a> {
+    inner: sgx_ql_qve_collateral_t,
+    _phantom: PhantomData<&'a ()>,
+}
+
+// create the referential struct
+impl<'a> From<&'a Collateral> for SgxQlQveCollateralT<'a> {
+    fn from(data: &'a Collateral) -> Self {
+        let mut this = SgxQlQveCollateralT {
+            inner: sgx_ql_qve_collateral_t {
+                __bindgen_anon_1: Default::default(),
+                tee_type: data.tee_type,
+                pck_crl_issuer_chain: data.pck_crl_issuer_chain.as_ptr() as _,
+                pck_crl_issuer_chain_size: data.pck_crl_issuer_chain.len() as _,
+                root_ca_crl: data.root_ca_crl.as_ptr() as _,
+                root_ca_crl_size: data.root_ca_crl.len() as _,
+                pck_crl: data.pck_crl.as_ptr() as _,
+                pck_crl_size: data.pck_crl.len() as _,
+                tcb_info_issuer_chain: data.tcb_info_issuer_chain.as_ptr() as _,
+                tcb_info_issuer_chain_size: data.tcb_info_issuer_chain.len() as _,
+                tcb_info: data.tcb_info.as_ptr() as _,
+                tcb_info_size: data.tcb_info.len() as _,
+                qe_identity_issuer_chain: data.qe_identity_issuer_chain.as_ptr() as _,
+                qe_identity_issuer_chain_size: data.qe_identity_issuer_chain.len() as _,
+                qe_identity: data.qe_identity.as_ptr() as _,
+                qe_identity_size: data.qe_identity.len() as _,
+            },
+            _phantom: PhantomData,
+        };
+        this.inner.__bindgen_anon_1.__bindgen_anon_1.major_version = data.major_version;
+        this.inner.__bindgen_anon_1.__bindgen_anon_1.minor_version = data.minor_version;
+        this
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'a> Deref for SgxQlQveCollateralT<'a> {
+    type Target = sgx_ql_qve_collateral_t;
+
+    fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target {
+        &self.inner
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get quote verification collateral.
+///
+/// # Param
+/// - **quote**\
+/// SGX/TDX Quote, presented as u8 vector.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// Result type of quote_collecteral.
+///
+/// - **quote_collateral**\
+/// This is the Quote Certification Collateral retrieved based on Quote.
+///
+/// Status code of the operation, one of:
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER*
+/// - *SGX_QL_PLATFORM_LIB_UNAVAILABLE*
+/// - *SGX_QL_PCK_CERT_CHAIN_ERROR*
+/// - *SGX_QL_PCK_CERT_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT*
+/// - *SGX_QL_QUOTE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED*
+/// - *SGX_QL_OUT_OF_MEMORY*
+/// - *SGX_QL_NO_QUOTE_COLLATERAL_DATA*
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED*
+///
+pub fn tee_qv_get_collateral(quote: &[u8]) -> Result<Collateral, quote3_error_t> {
+    let mut buf = std::ptr::null_mut();
+    let mut buf_len = 0u32;
+
+    match unsafe {
+        qvl_sys::tee_qv_get_collateral(quote.as_ptr(), quote.len() as u32, &mut buf, &mut buf_len)
+    } {
+        quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_SUCCESS => {
+            assert!(!buf.is_null());
+            assert!(buf_len > 0);
+            assert_eq!(
+                (buf as usize) % mem::align_of::<sgx_ql_qve_collateral_t>(),
+                0
+            );
+            // SAFETY: buf is not null, buf_len is not zero, and buf is aligned.
+            let orig_collateral = &unsafe { *(buf as *const sgx_ql_qve_collateral_t) };
+            Collateral::try_from(orig_collateral).map_err(|_| quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_ERROR_MAX)
+        }
+        error_code => Err(error_code),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get supplemental data latest version and required size, support both SGX and TDX.
+///
+/// # Param
+/// - **quote**\
+/// SGX/TDX Quote, presented as u8 vector.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// Result type of (version, data_size) tuple.
+///
+/// - **version**\
+/// Latest version of the supplemental data.
+/// - **data_size**\
+/// The size of the buffer in bytes required to contain all of the supplemental data.
+///
+pub fn tee_get_supplemental_data_version_and_size(
+    quote: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(u32, u32), quote3_error_t> {
+    let mut version = 0u32;
+    let mut data_size = 0u32;
+
+    unsafe {
+        match qvl_sys::tee_get_supplemental_data_version_and_size(
+            quote.as_ptr(),
+            quote.len() as u32,
+            &mut version,
+            &mut data_size,
+        ) {
+            quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_SUCCESS => Ok((version, data_size)),
+            error_code => Err(error_code),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Perform quote verification for SGX and TDX.\
+/// This API works the same as the old one, but takes a new parameter to describe the supplemental data (supp_data_descriptor).
+///
+/// # Param
+/// - **quote**\
+/// SGX/TDX Quote, presented as u8 vector.
+/// - **quote_collateral**\
+/// Quote Certification Collateral provided by the caller.
+/// - **expiration_check_date**\
+/// This is the date that the QvE will use to determine if any of the inputted collateral have expired.
+/// - **qve_report_info**\
+/// This parameter can be used in 2 ways.\
+///     - If qve_report_info is NOT None, the API will use Intel QvE to perform quote verification, and QvE will generate a report using the target_info in sgx_ql_qe_report_info_t structure.\
+///     - if qve_report_info is None, the API will use QVL library to perform quote verification, note that the results can not be cryptographically authenticated in this mode.
+/// - **supp_datal_descriptor**\
+/// *tee_supp_data_descriptor_t* structure.\
+/// You can specify the major version of supplemental data by setting supp_datal_descriptor.major_version.\
+/// If supp_datal_descriptor is None, no supplemental data is returned.\
+/// If supp_datal_descriptor.major_version == 0, then return the latest version of the *sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t* structure.\
+/// If supp_datal_descriptor.major_version <= latest supported version, return the latest minor version associated with that major version.\
+/// If supp_datal_descriptor.major_version > latest supported version, return an error *SGX_QL_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED*.
+///
+/// # Return
+/// Result type of (collateral_expiration_status, verification_result).
+///
+/// Status code of the operation, one of:
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER*
+/// - *SGX_QL_QUOTE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED*
+/// - *SGX_QL_QUOTE_CERTIFICATION_DATA_UNSUPPORTED*
+/// - *SGX_QL_UNABLE_TO_GENERATE_REPORT*
+/// - *SGX_QL_CRL_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT*
+/// - *SGX_QL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED*
+///
+pub fn tee_verify_quote(
+    quote: &[u8],
+    quote_collateral: Option<&Collateral>,
+    expiration_check_date: i64,
+    qve_report_info: Option<&mut sgx_ql_qe_report_info_t>,
+    supp_data_descriptor: Option<&mut tee_supp_data_descriptor_t>,
+) -> Result<(u32, sgx_ql_qv_result_t), quote3_error_t> {
+    let mut collateral_expiration_status = 1u32;
+    let mut quote_verification_result = sgx_ql_qv_result_t::SGX_QL_QV_RESULT_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+    let quote_collateral = quote_collateral.map(SgxQlQveCollateralT::from);
+    let p_quote_collateral = quote_collateral.as_deref().map_or(std::ptr::null(), |p| p);
+
+    let p_qve_report_info = qve_report_info.map_or(std::ptr::null_mut(), |p| p);
+
+    let p_supp_data_descriptor = supp_data_descriptor.map_or(std::ptr::null_mut(), |p| p);
+
+    unsafe {
+        match qvl_sys::tee_verify_quote(
+            quote.as_ptr(),
+            quote.len() as u32,
+            p_quote_collateral as _,
+            expiration_check_date,
+            &mut collateral_expiration_status,
+            &mut quote_verification_result,
+            p_qve_report_info,
+            p_supp_data_descriptor,
+        ) {
+            quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_SUCCESS => {
+                Ok((collateral_expiration_status, quote_verification_result))
+            }
+            error_code => Err(error_code),
+        }
+    }
+}
--- a/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/Cargo.toml
+++ b/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/Cargo.toml
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Fork of the original crate: https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives
+
+[package]
+name = "intel-tee-quote-verification-sys"
+version = "0.2.0"
+edition = "2021"
+license = "BSD-3-Clause"
+
+[build-dependencies]
+bindgen.workspace = true
--- a/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/License.txt
+++ b/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/License.txt
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+BSD License
+
+Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+
+  * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+  * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+    distribution.
+  * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
+    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+    from this software without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+
+==============================================================
+
+pce.signed.dll, qve.signed.dll,id_enclave.signed.dll and qe3.signed.dll,
+libsgx_pce.signed.so, libsgx_qve.signed.so, libsgx_id_enclave.signed.so,
+libsgx_qe3.signed.so and libsgx_tdqe.signed.so are licensed under
+3-Clause BSD License.
+
--- a/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/bindings.h
+++ b/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/bindings.h
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ *   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *     the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *     distribution.
+ *   * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
+ *     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ *     from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "sgx_dcap_quoteverify.h"
--- a/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/build.rs
+++ b/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/build.rs
@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ *   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *     the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *     distribution.
+ *   * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
+ *     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ *     from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+use std::env;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+fn main() {
+    // Tell cargo to tell rustc to link the system
+    // sgx-dcap-quoteverify shared library.
+    println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=sgx_dcap_quoteverify");
+
+    // Tell cargo to invalidate the built crate whenever the wrapper changes
+    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=bindings.h");
+
+    // Set sdk to search path if SGX_SDK is in environment variable
+    let mut sdk_inc = String::from("");
+    if let Ok(val) = env::var("SGX_SDK") {
+        sdk_inc.push_str("-I");
+        sdk_inc.push_str(&val);
+        sdk_inc.push_str("/include/");
+    }
+
+    // The bindgen::Builder is the main entry point
+    // to bindgen, and lets you build up options for
+    // the resulting bindings.
+    let bindings = bindgen::Builder::default()
+        // The input header we would like to generate
+        // bindings for.
+        .header("bindings.h")
+        // Include search path
+        .clang_arg(sdk_inc)
+        // Convert C enum to Rust enum
+        .rustified_enum("_quote3_error_t")
+        .rustified_enum("_sgx_ql_request_policy")
+        .rustified_enum("_sgx_ql_qv_result_t")
+        .rustified_enum("sgx_qv_path_type_t")
+        // Disable Debug trait for packed C structures
+        .no_debug("_quote_t")
+        .no_debug("_sgx_ql_auth_data_t")
+        .no_debug("_sgx_ql_certification_data_t")
+        .no_debug("_sgx_ql_ecdsa_sig_data_t")
+        .no_debug("_sgx_quote3_t")
+        .no_debug("_sgx_ql_att_key_id_param_t")
+        // Enable Default trait
+        .derive_default(true)
+        // Tell cargo to invalidate the built crate whenever any of the
+        // included header files changed.
+        .parse_callbacks(Box::new(bindgen::CargoCallbacks::new()))
+        // Finish the builder and generate the bindings.
+        .generate()
+        // Unwrap the Result and panic on failure.
+        .expect("Unable to generate bindings");
+
+    // Write the bindings to the $OUT_DIR/bindings.rs file.
+    let out_path = PathBuf::from(env::var("OUT_DIR").unwrap());
+    bindings
+        .write_to_file(out_path.join("bindings.rs"))
+        .expect("Couldn't write bindings!");
+}
--- a/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/src/lib.rs
+++ b/crates/intel-tee-quote-verification-sys/src/lib.rs
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011-2021 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ *   * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *   * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *     the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *     distribution.
+ *   * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
+ *     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ *     from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
+ * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+//! Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions Data Center Attestation Primitives (Intel(R) SGX DCAP)
+//! Rust raw FFI bindings for Quote Verification Library
+//! ================================================
+//!
+//! Please install the following prerequisite:
+//! * Intel(R) SGX DCAP Driver
+//! * Intel(R) SGX SDK
+//! * Intel(R) SGX DCAP Packages
+//! * Intel(R) SGX DCAP PCCS (Provisioning Certificate Caching Service)
+//!
+//! *Please refer to [SGX DCAP Linux installation guide](
+//! https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/latest/linux-latest/docs/Intel_SGX_SW_Installation_Guide_for_Linux.pdf)
+//! to install above dependencies.*
+//!
+//! *Note that you need to install **libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev** and **clang** for this package.*
+
+#![allow(non_upper_case_globals)]
+#![allow(non_camel_case_types)]
+#![allow(non_snake_case)]
+#![allow(clippy::missing_safety_doc)]
+include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/bindings.rs"));
--- a/deny.toml
+++ b/deny.toml
@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+targets = []
+all-features = false
+no-default-features = false
+feature-depth = 1
+
+[advisories]
+db-path = "~/.cargo/advisory-db"
+db-urls = ["https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db"]
+vulnerability = "deny"
+unmaintained = "warn"
+yanked = "warn"
+notice = "warn"
+ignore = [
+  # Sidechannel attack to get the private key https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071
+  # currently no rsa private key is used in the codebase,
+  # except for signing SGX enclaves, which is only triggered with enough admin signatures
+  "RUSTSEC-2023-0071",
+  # ed25519-dalek 2.0.0-rc.3 already contains the fix for RUSTSEC-2022-0093
+  "RUSTSEC-2022-0093",
+]
+
+[licenses]
+unlicensed = "deny"
+copyleft = "deny"
+allow = [
+  "MIT",
+  "Apache-2.0",
+  "ISC",
+  "Unlicense",
+  "MPL-2.0",
+  "Unicode-DFS-2016",
+  "CC0-1.0",
+  "BSD-2-Clause",
+  "BSD-3-Clause",
+  "OpenSSL",
+]
+deny = []
+allow-osi-fsf-free = "neither"
+default = "deny"
+confidence-threshold = 0.8
+exceptions = []
+
+[[licenses.clarify]]
+name = "ring"
+version = "*"
+expression = "MIT AND ISC AND OpenSSL"
+license-files = [{ path = "LICENSE", hash = 0xbd0eed23 }]
+
+[licenses.private]
+ignore = false
+registries = []
+
+[bans]
+multiple-versions = "warn"
+wildcards = "allow"
+highlight = "all"
+workspace-default-features = "allow"
+external-default-features = "allow"
+allow = []
+deny = []
+skip = []
+skip-tree = []
+
+[sources]
+unknown-registry = "warn"
+unknown-git = "warn"
+allow-registry = ["https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"]
+allow-git = [
+  # we need the mio override to disable eventfd for SGX
+  "https://github.com/tokio-rs/mio?rev=ec0776f5af29548e4e1f48f86f5fa123a46caa07#ec0776f5af29548e4e1f48f86f5fa123a46caa07",
+]
+
+[sources.allow-org]
+github = [""]
+gitlab = [""]
+bitbucket = [""]
--- a/examples/README.md
+++ b/examples/README.md
@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+# Scratch Notes for running the teepot vault setup
+
+## Build and Run on SGX server
+
+```bash
+$ docker compose build
+$ docker compose up
+```
+
+## Build and Run on client machine
+```bash
+$ cd teepot
+$ gpg --export username@example.com | base64 > gpgkey.pub
+❯ RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-unseal --  --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d     --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded      --server https://20.172.154.218:8443    init   --unseal-threshold 1 -u bin/tee-vault-admin/tests/data/gpgkey.pub  --admin-threshold 1 -a  bin/tee-vault-admin/tests/data/gpgkey.pub --admin-tee-mrenclave 21c8c1a4dbcce04798f5119eb47203084bc74e564a3c954d1a21172c656cb801
+    Finished dev [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.09s
+     Running `target/debug/vault-unseal --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded --server 'https://20.172.154.218:8443' init --unseal-threshold 1 -u bin/tee-vault-admin/tests/data/gpgkey.pub --admin-threshold 1 -a bin/tee-vault-admin/tests/data/gpgkey.pub --admin-tee-mrenclave 21c8c1a4dbcce04798f5119eb47203084bc74e564a3c954d1a21172c656cb801`
+2023-08-23T14:47:56.902422Z  INFO tee_client: Getting attestation report
+2023-08-23T14:47:57.340877Z  INFO tee_client: Checked or set server certificate public key hash `b4bf52fdb37431c8531fb310be389c2d17ad9bd41d662e10308c9147c007d0d0`
+2023-08-23T14:47:57.741599Z  INFO tee_client: Verifying attestation report
+2023-08-23T14:47:57.763320Z  INFO tee_client: TcbLevel is allowed: SwHardeningNeeded: Software hardening is needed
+2023-08-23T14:47:57.763356Z  WARN tee_client: Info: Advisory ID: INTEL-SA-00615
+2023-08-23T14:47:57.763371Z  INFO tee_client: Report data matches `b4bf52fdb37431c8531fb310be389c2d17ad9bd41d662e10308c9147c007d0d0`
+2023-08-23T14:47:57.763391Z  INFO tee_client: mrsigner `c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d` matches
+2023-08-23T14:47:57.763412Z  INFO vault_unseal: Quote verified! Connection secure!
+2023-08-23T14:47:57.763418Z  INFO vault_unseal: Inititalizing vault
+2023-08-23T14:48:07.278090Z  INFO vault_unseal: Got Response: {"unseal_keys":["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"]}
+{"unseal_keys":["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"]}
+
+❯ echo 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 | base64 --decode | gpg -dq | RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-unseal --  --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d     --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded      --server https://20.172.154.218:8443    unseal
+    Finished dev [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.09s
+     Running `target/debug/vault-unseal --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded --server 'https://20.172.154.218:8443' unseal`
+2023-08-23T14:48:20.735605Z  INFO tee_client: Getting attestation report
+2023-08-23T14:48:21.349424Z  INFO tee_client: Checked or set server certificate public key hash `b4bf52fdb37431c8531fb310be389c2d17ad9bd41d662e10308c9147c007d0d0`
+2023-08-23T14:48:21.742086Z  INFO tee_client: Verifying attestation report
+2023-08-23T14:48:21.757960Z  INFO tee_client: TcbLevel is allowed: SwHardeningNeeded: Software hardening is needed
+2023-08-23T14:48:21.757996Z  WARN tee_client: Info: Advisory ID: INTEL-SA-00615
+2023-08-23T14:48:21.758014Z  INFO tee_client: Report data matches `b4bf52fdb37431c8531fb310be389c2d17ad9bd41d662e10308c9147c007d0d0`
+2023-08-23T14:48:21.758039Z  INFO tee_client: mrsigner `c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d` matches
+2023-08-23T14:48:21.758060Z  INFO vault_unseal: Quote verified! Connection secure!
+2023-08-23T14:48:21.758065Z  INFO vault_unseal: Unsealing vault
+2023-08-23T14:49:28.144877Z  INFO vault_unseal: Vault is unsealed!
+Vault is unsealed!
+
+```
+
+```bash
+❯ (id=$(docker create tva); docker cp $id:/app/tee-vault-admin.sig ~/tee-vault-admin.sig; docker rm -v $id)
+❯ cargo run -p vault-admin -- create-sign-request ~/tee-vault-admin.sig > ~/sign_admin_tee.json
+❯ vim sign_admin_tee.json
+❯ gpg --local-user test@example.com --detach-sign --armor ~/sign_admin_tee.json
+❯ RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-admin -- \
+  sign-tee \
+  --sgx-mrenclave 080c3210d5b6bcf47887101a554c117c21d80e75240bb70846c3e158a713ec65 \
+  --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded \
+  --server https://127.0.0.1:8444 \
+  --out new_admin.sig \
+  ~/sign_admin_tee.json ~/sign_admin_tee.json.asc
+
+❯ gramine-sgx-sigstruct-view new_admin.sig
+Attributes:
+    mr_signer: 8392a970ea57f1f37fb8985d9394b26611b18a5d5591b7d9d58d23998a116298
+    mr_enclave: 080c3210d5b6bcf47887101a554c117c21d80e75240bb70846c3e158a713ec65
+    isv_prod_id: 0
+    isv_svn: 0
+    debug_enclave: False
+
+❯ RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-admin -- digest  --sgx-mrsigner 8392a970ea57f1f37fb8985d9394b26611b18a5d5591b7d9d58d23998a116298   --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded   --server https://127.0.0.1:8444
+    Finished dev [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 0.12s
+     Running `target/debug/vault-admin digest --sgx-mrsigner 8392a970ea57f1f37fb8985d9394b26611b18a5d5591b7d9d58d23998a116298 --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded --server 'https://127.0.0.1:8444'`
+2023-09-01T09:13:40.502841Z  INFO vault_admin: Quote verified! Connection secure!
+2023-09-01T09:13:40.503374Z  INFO tee_client: Getting attestation report
+2023-09-01T09:13:40.810238Z  INFO tee_client: Checked or set server certificate public key hash `6296a59283e8b70b5501cf391457bd618159df4c206a4c5b206afc5b324cdd91`
+2023-09-01T09:13:41.110855Z  INFO tee_client: Verifying attestation report
+2023-09-01T09:13:41.131057Z  INFO tee_client: TcbLevel is allowed: SwHardeningNeeded: Software hardening is needed
+2023-09-01T09:13:41.131099Z  WARN tee_client: Info: Advisory ID: INTEL-SA-00615
+2023-09-01T09:13:41.131121Z  INFO tee_client: Report data matches `6296a59283e8b70b5501cf391457bd618159df4c206a4c5b206afc5b324cdd91`
+2023-09-01T09:13:41.131143Z  INFO tee_client: mrsigner `8392a970ea57f1f37fb8985d9394b26611b18a5d5591b7d9d58d23998a116298` matches
+{
+  "last_digest": "c9929fef9c87b5c7bb7c47b563c83c4609741245847f173de0bedb2b3a00daa8"
+}
+
+```
+
+```bash
+❯ docker compose build && (docker compose rm; docker volume rm teepot_vault-storage teepot_ha-raft-1 teepot_shared-1 teepot_ha-raft-2 teepot_shared-2 teepot_ha-raft-3 teepot_shared-3; docke
+r compose up --remove-orphans vault-1 tvu-1)
+❯ (id=$(docker create teepot-admin); docker cp $id:/app/tee-vault-admin.sig ~/tee-vault-admin.sig; docker rm -v $id)
+❯ gramine-sgx-sigstruct-view ~/tee-vault-admin.sig
+Attributes:
+    mr_signer: c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d
+    mr_enclave: 265ca491bf13e2486fd67d12038fcce02f133c5d91277e42f58c0ab464d5b46b
+    isv_prod_id: 0
+    isv_svn: 0
+    debug_enclave: False
+❯ RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-unseal --  --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d     --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded      --server https://127.0.0.1:8413    init   --unseal-threshold 1 -u tests/data/gpgkey.pub  --admin-threshold 1 -a  tests/data/gpgkey.pub --admin-tee-mrenclave 265ca491bf13e2486fd67d12038fcce02f133c5d91277e42f58c0ab464d5b46b
+❯ export GPG_TTY=$(tty)
+❯ gpg-connect-agent updatestartuptty /bye >/dev/null
+❯ gpg-connect-agent reloadagent /bye
+OK
+❯ echo 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  | base64 --decode | gpg -dq | RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-unseal --  --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d     --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded      --server https://127.0.0.1:8413    unseal Please enter the passphrase to unlock the OpenPGP secret key:
+"test <test@example.com>"
+3072-bit RSA key, ID D15A3B15DB3A12FB,
+created 2023-08-08 (main key ID 6D728F29A2DBABF8).
+
+Passphrase:
+❯ (id=$(docker create teepot-stress); docker cp $id:/app/tee-stress-client.sig ~/tee-stress-client.sig; docker rm -v $id)
+
+
+```
+
+## Kubernetes
+
+Find out the `mr_enclave` value of the tee-vault-admin enclave and extract the sigstruct file:
+
+```bash
+❯ docker run -v .:/mnt --pull always -it matterlabsrobot/teepot-tva:latest 'gramine-sgx-sigstruct-view tee-vault-admin.sig; cp tee-vault-admin.sig /mnt'
+[...]
+Attributes:
+    mr_signer: c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d
+    mr_enclave: 98a540dd7056584e2009c7cf7374f932fbb8e30a4c66cc815c9809620653f751
+    isv_prod_id: 0
+    isv_svn: 0
+    debug_enclave: False
+❯ ls -l ~/tee-vault-admin.sig
+-rw-r--r--. 1 harald harald 1808  2. Nov 10:46 tee-vault-admin.sig
+```
+
+Start the vault service and pod and forward the port
+
+```bash
+❯ kubectl apply \
+  -f examples/k8s/data-1-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml \
+  -f examples/k8s/shared-1-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml \
+  -f examples/k8s/vault-1-pod.yaml \
+  -f examples/k8s/vault-1-service.yaml
+❯ kubectl port-forward pods/vault-1 8443
+```
+
+Initialize the instance.
+This can take up to 6 minutes, depending on the `performance_multiplier` setting in vault.
+Adjust the `--admin-tee-mrenclave` parameter to match the `mr_enclave` value of the tee-vault-admin container.
+
+```bash
+❯ RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-unseal --  \
+  --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d \
+  --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded \
+  --server https://127.0.0.1:8443 \
+  init \
+  --unseal-threshold 1 \
+  --unseal-pgp-key-file ./tests/data/gpgkey.pub \
+  --admin-threshold 1 \
+  --admin-pgp-key-file  ./tests/data/gpgkey.pub \
+  --admin-tee-mrenclave 98a540dd7056584e2009c7cf7374f932fbb8e30a4c66cc815c9809620653f751
+```
+
+Unseal the instance
+
+```bash
+❯ echo <one of the unseal secrets from the init output> \
+    | base64 --decode \
+    | gpg -dq \
+    | RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-unseal -- \
+    --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d \
+    --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded \
+    --server https://127.0.0.1:8443 \
+    unseal
+```
+
+End the port forwarding of vault-1 and start the rest of the nodes:
+
+```bash
+❯ kubectl apply -f examples/k8s
+```
+
+Unseal the other vault instances:
+
+Every unseal secret holder has to do it, until the threshold is reached.
+
+```bash
+❯ kubectl port-forward pods/vault-$NUM 8443
+❯ echo <one of the unseal secrets from the init output> \
+    | base64 --decode \
+    | gpg -dq \
+    | RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-unseal -- \
+    --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d \
+    --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded \
+    --server https://127.0.0.1:8443 \
+    unseal
+❯ kubectl port-forward pods/vault-3 8443
+❯ echo <one of the unseal secrets from the init output> \
+    | base64 --decode \
+    | gpg -dq \
+    | RUST_LOG=info cargo run -p vault-unseal -- \
+    --sgx-mrsigner c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d \
+    --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded \
+    --server https://127.0.0.1:8443 \
+    unseal
+```
+
+The vault cluster should now settle to be completely unsealed and synced.
+
+Start the vault-admin pod and forward the port:
+
+```bash
+❯ kubectl port-forward pods/tee-vault-admin 8444
+```
+
+Next is to sign the admin tee with the vault-admin tool:
+
+```bash
+❯ cargo run -p vault-admin -- create-sign-request --tee-name admin ~/tee-vault-admin.sig > ~/tee-vault-admin.json
+❯ gpg --local-user test@example.com --detach-sign --armor ~/tee-vault-admin.json
+❯ cargo run -p vault-admin -- command \
+  --server https://127.0.0.1:8444 \
+  --sgx-allowed-tcb-levels SwHardeningNeeded \
+  --out ~/tee-vault-admin-new.sig \
+  ~/tee-vault-admin.json ~/tee-vault-admin.json.asc
+```
+
+Then replace `tee-vault-admin.sig` with `tee-vault-admin-new.sig` in the container image `matterlabsrobot/teepot-tva:latest` with this Dockerfile:
+
+```Dockerfile
+FROM matterlabsrobot/teepot-tva:latest
+COPY tee-vault-admin-new.sig /app/tee-vault-admin.sig
+```
+
+Build and push the new image:
+
+```bash
+❯ docker build -t matterlabsrobot/teepot-tva-signed:latest .
+❯ docker push matterlabsrobot/teepot-tva-signed:latest
+```
+
+Delete the old vault-admin pod and start the new one:
+
+```bash
+❯ kubectl delete pod/tee-vault-admin
+❯ kubectl apply -f examples/k8s/vault-admin-signed-pod.yaml
+```
+
+The new signed admin tee can now be used.
--- a/examples/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/examples/docker-compose.yml
@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# From the main directory run:
+# ❯ docker compose -f examples/docker-compose.yml --project-directory $PWD up
+services:
+  tvu-1:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: bin/tee-vault-unseal/Dockerfile-azure
+    image: tee-vault-unseal
+    restart: "no"
+    ports:
+      - 8413:8443
+    environment:
+      VAULT_ADDR: "https://vault-1:8210"
+      ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+    privileged: true
+    init: true
+    volumes:
+      - /run/aesmd:/run/aesmd
+      - /dev/sgx_enclave:/dev/sgx_enclave
+      - shared-1:/opt/vault/tls
+  vault-1:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: vault/Dockerfile
+    image: vault
+    restart: "no"
+    ports:
+      - 8210:8210
+#      - 8211:8211
+    environment:
+      VAULT_API_ADDR: "https://vault-1:8210"
+      VAULT_CLUSTER_ADDR: "https://vault-1:8211"
+      VAULT_RAFT_NODE_ID: "vault-1"
+    privileged: true
+    init: true
+    volumes:
+      - /run/aesmd:/run/aesmd
+      - /dev/sgx_enclave:/dev/sgx_enclave
+      - shared-1:/opt/vault/tls
+      - data-1:/opt/vault/data
+
+  tvu-2:
+    image: tee-vault-unseal
+    restart: "no"
+    ports:
+      - 8423:8443
+    environment:
+      VAULT_ADDR: "https://vault-2:8210"
+      ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+    privileged: true
+    init: true
+    volumes:
+      - /run/aesmd:/run/aesmd
+      - /dev/sgx_enclave:/dev/sgx_enclave
+      - shared-2:/opt/vault/tls
+  vault-2:
+    image: vault
+    restart: "no"
+    ports:
+      - 8220:8210
+#      - 8221:8211
+    environment:
+      VAULT_API_ADDR: "https://vault-2:8210"
+      VAULT_CLUSTER_ADDR: "https://vault-2:8211"
+      VAULT_RAFT_NODE_ID: "vault-2"
+    privileged: true
+    init: true
+    volumes:
+      - /run/aesmd:/run/aesmd
+      - /dev/sgx_enclave:/dev/sgx_enclave
+      - shared-2:/opt/vault/tls
+      - data-2:/opt/vault/data
+
+  tvu-3:
+    image: tee-vault-unseal
+    restart: "no"
+    ports:
+      - 8433:8443
+    environment:
+      VAULT_ADDR: "https://vault-3:8210"
+      ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+    privileged: true
+    init: true
+    volumes:
+      - /run/aesmd:/run/aesmd
+      - /dev/sgx_enclave:/dev/sgx_enclave
+      - shared-3:/opt/vault/tls
+  vault-3:
+    image: vault
+    restart: "no"
+    ports:
+      - 8230:8210
+#      - 8231:8211
+    environment:
+      VAULT_API_ADDR: "https://vault-3:8210"
+      VAULT_CLUSTER_ADDR: "https://vault-3:8211"
+      VAULT_RAFT_NODE_ID: "vault-3"
+    privileged: true
+    init: true
+    volumes:
+      - /run/aesmd:/run/aesmd
+      - /dev/sgx_enclave:/dev/sgx_enclave
+      - shared-3:/opt/vault/tls
+      - data-3:/opt/vault/data
+
+  admin:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: bin/tee-vault-admin/Dockerfile-azure
+    restart: "no"
+    ports:
+      - 8444:8444
+    environment:
+      VAULT_ADDR: "https://vault-1:8210"
+      VAULT_SGX_MRSIGNER: "c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d"
+      VAULT_SGX_ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+      ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+    privileged: true
+    init: true
+    volumes:
+      - /run/aesmd:/run/aesmd
+      - /dev/sgx_enclave:/dev/sgx_enclave
+
+  stress:
+    build:
+      context: .
+      dockerfile: bin/tee-stress-client/Dockerfile-azure
+    restart: "no"
+    environment:
+      VAULT_ADDR: "https://vault-1:8210"
+      VAULT_SGX_MRSIGNER: "c5591a72b8b86e0d8814d6e8750e3efe66aea2d102b8ba2405365559b858697d"
+      VAULT_SGX_ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+      ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+    privileged: true
+    init: true
+    volumes:
+      - /run/aesmd:/run/aesmd
+      - /dev/sgx_enclave:/dev/sgx_enclave
+
+volumes:
+  shared-1:
+  data-1:
+  shared-2:
+  data-2:
+  shared-3:
+  data-3:
--- a/examples/k8s/data-1-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/data-1-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: data-1
+  name: data-1
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 100Mi
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/data-2-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/data-2-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: data-2
+  name: data-2
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 100Mi
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/data-3-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/data-3-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: data-3
+  name: data-3
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 100Mi
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/shared-1-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/shared-1-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: shared-1
+  name: shared-1
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 100Mi
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/shared-2-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/shared-2-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: shared-2
+  name: shared-2
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 100Mi
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/shared-3-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/shared-3-persistentvolumeclaim.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: shared-3
+  name: shared-3
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  accessModes:
+    - ReadWriteOnce
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 100Mi
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/vault-1-pod.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/vault-1-pod.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  annotations:
+    kompose.cmd: kompose convert
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.network/teepot-default: "true"
+    io.kompose.service: vault-1
+    app: vault
+  name: vault-1
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  tolerations:
+    - key: sgx.intel.com/provision
+      operator: Exists
+      effect: NoSchedule
+  affinity:
+    podAntiAffinity:
+      requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+        - topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
+          labelSelector:
+            matchExpressions:
+              - key: app
+                operator: In
+                values:
+                  - vault
+  imagePullSecrets:
+    - name: docker-regcred
+  containers:
+    - image: matterlabsrobot/teepot-vault:latest
+      name: vault
+      imagePullPolicy: Always
+      env:
+        - name: VAULT_API_ADDR
+          value: "https://vault-1:8210"
+        - name: VAULT_CLUSTER_ADDR
+          value: "https://vault-1:8211"
+        - name: VAULT_RAFT_NODE_ID
+          value: "vault-1"
+      readinessProbe:
+        exec:
+          command:
+          - curl
+          - -k
+          - https://localhost:8210/v1/sys/health
+        initialDelaySeconds: 5
+        periodSeconds: 5
+      ports:
+        - containerPort: 8210
+          hostPort: 8210
+          protocol: TCP
+        - containerPort: 8211
+          hostPort: 8211
+          protocol: TCP
+      resources:
+        limits:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+        requests:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+      securityContext:
+        privileged: true
+      volumeMounts:
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/tls
+          name: shared-1
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/data
+          name: data-1
+    - image: matterlabsrobot/teepot-tvu:latest
+      name: vault-unseal
+      imagePullPolicy: Always
+      env:
+      - name: VAULT_ADDR
+        value: "https://vault-1:8210"
+      - name: ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS
+        value: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+      ports:
+        - containerPort: 8443
+          hostPort: 8443
+          protocol: TCP
+      resources:
+        limits:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+        requests:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+      securityContext:
+        privileged: true
+      volumeMounts:
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/tls
+          name: shared-1
+  restartPolicy: Never
+  volumes:
+    - name: shared-1
+      persistentVolumeClaim:
+        claimName: shared-1
+    - name: data-1
+      persistentVolumeClaim:
+        claimName: data-1
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/vault-1-service.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/vault-1-service.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  annotations:
+    kompose.cmd: kompose convert
+
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: vault-1
+  name: vault-1
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  ports:
+    - name: "8210"
+      port: 8210
+      targetPort: 8210
+    - name: "8211"
+      port: 8211
+      targetPort: 8211
+  selector:
+    io.kompose.service: vault-1
--- a/examples/k8s/vault-2-pod.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/vault-2-pod.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  annotations:
+    kompose.cmd: kompose convert
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.network/teepot-default: "true"
+    io.kompose.service: vault-2
+    app: vault
+  name: vault-2
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  tolerations:
+    - key: sgx.intel.com/provision
+      operator: Exists
+      effect: NoSchedule
+  affinity:
+    podAntiAffinity:
+      requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+        - topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
+          labelSelector:
+            matchExpressions:
+              - key: app
+                operator: In
+                values:
+                  - vault
+  imagePullSecrets:
+    - name: docker-regcred
+  containers:
+    - image: matterlabsrobot/teepot-vault:latest
+      name: vault
+      imagePullPolicy: Always
+      env:
+        - name: VAULT_API_ADDR
+          value: "https://vault-2:8210"
+        - name: VAULT_CLUSTER_ADDR
+          value: "https://vault-2:8211"
+        - name: VAULT_RAFT_NODE_ID
+          value: "vault-2"
+      readinessProbe:
+        exec:
+          command:
+          - curl
+          - -k
+          - https://localhost:8210/v1/sys/health
+        initialDelaySeconds: 5
+        periodSeconds: 5
+      ports:
+        - containerPort: 8210
+          hostPort: 8210
+          protocol: TCP
+        - containerPort: 8211
+          hostPort: 8211
+          protocol: TCP
+      resources:
+        limits:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+        requests:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+      securityContext:
+        privileged: true
+      volumeMounts:
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/tls
+          name: shared-2
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/data
+          name: data-2
+    - image: matterlabsrobot/teepot-tvu:latest
+      name: vault-unseal
+      imagePullPolicy: Always
+      env:
+        - name: VAULT_ADDR
+          value: "https://vault-2:8210"
+        - name: ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS
+          value: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+      ports:
+        - containerPort: 8443
+          hostPort: 8443
+          protocol: TCP
+      resources:
+        limits:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+        requests:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+      securityContext:
+        privileged: true
+      volumeMounts:
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/tls
+          name: shared-2
+  restartPolicy: Never
+  volumes:
+    - name: shared-2
+      persistentVolumeClaim:
+        claimName: shared-2
+    - name: data-2
+      persistentVolumeClaim:
+        claimName: data-2
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/vault-2-service.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/vault-2-service.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  annotations:
+    kompose.cmd: kompose convert
+
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: vault-2
+  name: vault-2
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  ports:
+    - name: "8210"
+      port: 8210
+      targetPort: 8210
+    - name: "8211"
+      port: 8211
+      targetPort: 8211
+  selector:
+    io.kompose.service: vault-2
--- a/examples/k8s/vault-3-pod.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/vault-3-pod.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Pod
+metadata:
+  annotations:
+    kompose.cmd: kompose convert
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.network/teepot-default: "true"
+    io.kompose.service: vault-3
+    app: vault
+  name: vault-3
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  tolerations:
+    - key: sgx.intel.com/provision
+      operator: Exists
+      effect: NoSchedule
+  affinity:
+    podAntiAffinity:
+      requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
+        - topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
+          labelSelector:
+            matchExpressions:
+              - key: app
+                operator: In
+                values:
+                  - vault
+  imagePullSecrets:
+    - name: docker-regcred
+  containers:
+    - image: matterlabsrobot/teepot-vault:latest
+      name: vault
+      imagePullPolicy: Always
+      env:
+        - name: VAULT_API_ADDR
+          value: "https://vault-3:8210"
+        - name: VAULT_CLUSTER_ADDR
+          value: "https://vault-3:8211"
+        - name: VAULT_RAFT_NODE_ID
+          value: "vault-3"
+      readinessProbe:
+        exec:
+          command:
+          - curl
+          - -k
+          - https://localhost:8210/v1/sys/health
+        initialDelaySeconds: 5
+        periodSeconds: 5
+      ports:
+        - containerPort: 8210
+          hostPort: 8210
+          protocol: TCP
+        - containerPort: 8211
+          hostPort: 8211
+          protocol: TCP
+      resources:
+        limits:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+        requests:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+      securityContext:
+        privileged: true
+      volumeMounts:
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/tls
+          name: shared-3
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/data
+          name: data-3
+    - image: matterlabsrobot/teepot-tvu:latest
+      name: vault-unseal
+      imagePullPolicy: Always
+      env:
+        - name: VAULT_ADDR
+          value: "https://vault-3:8210"
+        - name: ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS
+          value: "SwHardeningNeeded"
+      ports:
+        - containerPort: 8443
+          hostPort: 8443
+          protocol: TCP
+      resources:
+        limits:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+        requests:
+          sgx.intel.com/epc: "10Mi"
+      securityContext:
+        privileged: true
+      volumeMounts:
+        - mountPath: /opt/vault/tls
+          name: shared-3
+  restartPolicy: Never
+  volumes:
+    - name: shared-3
+      persistentVolumeClaim:
+        claimName: shared-3
+    - name: data-3
+      persistentVolumeClaim:
+        claimName: data-3
+status: {}
--- a/examples/k8s/vault-3-service.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/vault-3-service.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  annotations:
+    kompose.cmd: kompose convert
+
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: vault-3
+  name: vault-3
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  ports:
+    - name: "8210"
+      port: 8210
+      targetPort: 8210
+    - name: "8211"
+      port: 8211
+      targetPort: 8211
+  selector:
+    io.kompose.service: vault-3
--- a/examples/k8s/vault-ha-serice.yaml
+++ b/examples/k8s/vault-ha-serice.yaml
@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  annotations:
+    kompose.cmd: kompose convert
+  labels:
+    io.kompose.service: vault-ha
+  name: vault-ha
+  namespace: default
+spec:
+  ports:
+    - name: "8210"
+      port: 8210
+      targetPort: 8210
+    - name: "8211"
+      port: 8211
+      targetPort: 8211
+  selector:
+    app: vault
--- a/flake.lock
+++ b/flake.lock
@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+{
+  "nodes": {
+    "flake-compat": {
+      "flake": false,
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1650374568,
+        "narHash": "sha256-Z+s0J8/r907g149rllvwhb4pKi8Wam5ij0st8PwAh+E=",
+        "owner": "edolstra",
+        "repo": "flake-compat",
+        "rev": "b4a34015c698c7793d592d66adbab377907a2be8",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "edolstra",
+        "repo": "flake-compat",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "flake-utils": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "systems": "systems"
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1705309234,
+        "narHash": "sha256-uNRRNRKmJyCRC/8y1RqBkqWBLM034y4qN7EprSdmgyA=",
+        "owner": "numtide",
+        "repo": "flake-utils",
+        "rev": "1ef2e671c3b0c19053962c07dbda38332dcebf26",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "numtide",
+        "repo": "flake-utils",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "flake-utils-plus": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "flake-utils": "flake-utils_2"
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1696331477,
+        "narHash": "sha256-YkbRa/1wQWdWkVJ01JvV+75KIdM37UErqKgTf0L54Fk=",
+        "owner": "gytis-ivaskevicius",
+        "repo": "flake-utils-plus",
+        "rev": "bfc53579db89de750b25b0c5e7af299e0c06d7d3",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "gytis-ivaskevicius",
+        "repo": "flake-utils-plus",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "flake-utils_2": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "systems": "systems_2"
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1694529238,
+        "narHash": "sha256-zsNZZGTGnMOf9YpHKJqMSsa0dXbfmxeoJ7xHlrt+xmY=",
+        "owner": "numtide",
+        "repo": "flake-utils",
+        "rev": "ff7b65b44d01cf9ba6a71320833626af21126384",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "numtide",
+        "repo": "flake-utils",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "flake-utils_3": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "systems": "systems_3"
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1705309234,
+        "narHash": "sha256-uNRRNRKmJyCRC/8y1RqBkqWBLM034y4qN7EprSdmgyA=",
+        "owner": "numtide",
+        "repo": "flake-utils",
+        "rev": "1ef2e671c3b0c19053962c07dbda38332dcebf26",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "numtide",
+        "repo": "flake-utils",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "nix-filter": {
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1705332318,
+        "narHash": "sha256-kcw1yFeJe9N4PjQji9ZeX47jg0p9A0DuU4djKvg1a7I=",
+        "owner": "numtide",
+        "repo": "nix-filter",
+        "rev": "3449dc925982ad46246cfc36469baf66e1b64f17",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "numtide",
+        "repo": "nix-filter",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "nixpkgs": {
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1706515015,
+        "narHash": "sha256-eFfY5A7wlYy3jD/75lx6IJRueg4noE+jowl0a8lIlVo=",
+        "owner": "nixos",
+        "repo": "nixpkgs",
+        "rev": "f4a8d6d5324c327dcc2d863eb7f3cc06ad630df4",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "nixos",
+        "ref": "nixos-23.11",
+        "repo": "nixpkgs",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "nixpkgs_2": {
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1706487304,
+        "narHash": "sha256-LE8lVX28MV2jWJsidW13D2qrHU/RUUONendL2Q/WlJg=",
+        "owner": "NixOS",
+        "repo": "nixpkgs",
+        "rev": "90f456026d284c22b3e3497be980b2e47d0b28ac",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "NixOS",
+        "ref": "nixpkgs-unstable",
+        "repo": "nixpkgs",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "nixsgx-flake": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "nixpkgs": [
+          "nixpkgs"
+        ],
+        "snowfall-lib": "snowfall-lib"
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1706717028,
+        "narHash": "sha256-paQ5fBXWRpYdQMXphi8/gahl3/ptej4kncqxsMFguH4=",
+        "owner": "haraldh",
+        "repo": "nixsgx",
+        "rev": "ff39bbbbbf7e88a28eeace784784839f1bf7e3b0",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "haraldh",
+        "repo": "nixsgx",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "root": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "flake-utils": "flake-utils",
+        "nix-filter": "nix-filter",
+        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs",
+        "nixsgx-flake": "nixsgx-flake",
+        "rust-overlay": "rust-overlay"
+      }
+    },
+    "rust-overlay": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "flake-utils": "flake-utils_3",
+        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs_2"
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1706753617,
+        "narHash": "sha256-ZKqTFzhFwSWFEpQTJ0uXnfJBs5Y/po9/8TK4bzssdbs=",
+        "owner": "oxalica",
+        "repo": "rust-overlay",
+        "rev": "58be43ae223034217ea1bd58c73210644031b687",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "oxalica",
+        "repo": "rust-overlay",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "snowfall-lib": {
+      "inputs": {
+        "flake-compat": "flake-compat",
+        "flake-utils-plus": "flake-utils-plus",
+        "nixpkgs": [
+          "nixsgx-flake",
+          "nixpkgs"
+        ]
+      },
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1696432959,
+        "narHash": "sha256-oJQZv2MYyJaVyVJY5IeevzqpGvMGKu5pZcCCJvb+xjc=",
+        "owner": "snowfallorg",
+        "repo": "lib",
+        "rev": "92803a029b5314d4436a8d9311d8707b71d9f0b6",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "snowfallorg",
+        "repo": "lib",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "systems": {
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1681028828,
+        "narHash": "sha256-Vy1rq5AaRuLzOxct8nz4T6wlgyUR7zLU309k9mBC768=",
+        "owner": "nix-systems",
+        "repo": "default",
+        "rev": "da67096a3b9bf56a91d16901293e51ba5b49a27e",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "nix-systems",
+        "repo": "default",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "systems_2": {
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1681028828,
+        "narHash": "sha256-Vy1rq5AaRuLzOxct8nz4T6wlgyUR7zLU309k9mBC768=",
+        "owner": "nix-systems",
+        "repo": "default",
+        "rev": "da67096a3b9bf56a91d16901293e51ba5b49a27e",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "nix-systems",
+        "repo": "default",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
+    "systems_3": {
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1681028828,
+        "narHash": "sha256-Vy1rq5AaRuLzOxct8nz4T6wlgyUR7zLU309k9mBC768=",
+        "owner": "nix-systems",
+        "repo": "default",
+        "rev": "da67096a3b9bf56a91d16901293e51ba5b49a27e",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "nix-systems",
+        "repo": "default",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "root": "root",
+  "version": 7
+}
--- a/flake.nix
+++ b/flake.nix
@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+{
+  description = "teepot";
+
+  inputs = {
+    nixpkgs.url = "github:nixos/nixpkgs/nixos-23.11";
+
+    nix-filter.url = "github:numtide/nix-filter";
+    flake-utils.url = "github:numtide/flake-utils";
+
+    nixsgx-flake = {
+      url = "github:matter-labs/nixsgx";
+      inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
+    };
+
+    rust-overlay.url = "github:oxalica/rust-overlay";
+  };
+
+  outputs = { self, nixpkgs, flake-utils, nix-filter, nixsgx-flake, rust-overlay }:
+    flake-utils.lib.eachDefaultSystem (system:
+      let
+        pkgs = import nixpkgs { inherit system; overlays = [ (import rust-overlay) nixsgx-flake.overlays.default ]; };
+        rustVersion = pkgs.rust-bin.fromRustupToolchainFile ./rust-toolchain.toml;
+        makeRustPlatform = pkgs.makeRustPlatform.override {
+          stdenv = pkgs.stdenvAdapters.useMoldLinker pkgs.gccStdenv;
+        };
+        rustPlatform = makeRustPlatform {
+          cargo = rustVersion;
+          rustc = rustVersion;
+        };
+
+        filter = nix-filter.lib;
+
+        bin = rustPlatform.buildRustPackage {
+          pname = "teepot";
+          version = "0.1.0";
+
+          nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
+            pkg-config
+            rustPlatform.bindgenHook
+          ];
+
+          buildInputs = with pkgs; [
+            nixsgx.sgx-sdk
+            nixsgx.sgx-dcap
+            nixsgx.sgx-dcap.quote_verify
+          ];
+
+          src = filter {
+            root = ./.;
+            exclude = [
+              ".github"
+              ".gitignore"
+              "flake.lock"
+              "flake.nix"
+              "LICENSE-APACHE"
+              "LICENSE-MIT"
+              "README.md"
+              "renovate.json"
+              "deny.toml"
+              (filter.inDirectory "examples")
+              (filter.inDirectory "vault")
+            ];
+          };
+          RUSTFLAGS = "--cfg mio_unsupported_force_waker_pipe";
+          cargoBuildFlags = "--all";
+          checkType = "debug";
+          cargoLock = {
+            lockFile = ./Cargo.lock;
+          };
+
+          outputs = [
+            "out"
+            "tee_key_preexec"
+            "tee_self_attestation_test"
+            "tee_stress_client"
+            "tee_vault_admin"
+            "tee_vault_unseal"
+            "teepot_read"
+            "teepot_write"
+            "vault_admin"
+            "vault_unseal"
+            "verify_attestation"
+          ];
+
+          postInstall = ''
+            mkdir -p $out/nix-support
+            for i in $outputs; do
+              [[ $i == "out" ]] && continue
+              mkdir -p "''${!i}/bin"
+              echo "''${!i}" >> $out/nix-support/propagated-user-env-packages
+              binname=''${i//_/-}
+              mv "$out/bin/$binname" "''${!i}/bin/"
+            done
+          '';
+        };
+      in
+      {
+        formatter = pkgs.nixpkgs-fmt;
+
+        packages = rec {
+          teepot = bin;
+          default = teepot;
+        };
+
+        devShells = {
+          default = pkgs.mkShell {
+            inputsFrom = [ bin ];
+            nativeBuildInputs = with pkgs; [
+              rustup
+              rustVersion
+            ];
+          };
+        };
+      });
+}
--- a/rust-toolchain.toml
+++ b/rust-toolchain.toml
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[toolchain]
+channel = "1.75"
+components = ["rustfmt", "clippy", "rust-src"]
--- a/src/client/mod.rs
+++ b/src/client/mod.rs
@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023-2024 Matter Labs
+
+//! Helper functions for CLI clients to verify Intel SGX enclaves and other TEEs.
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+pub mod vault;
+
+use crate::json::http::AttestationResponse;
+use crate::sgx::Collateral;
+pub use crate::sgx::{
+    parse_tcb_levels, sgx_ql_qv_result_t, verify_quote_with_collateral, EnumSet,
+    QuoteVerificationResult, TcbLevel,
+};
+use actix_web::http::header;
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use awc::{Client, Connector};
+use clap::Args;
+use rustls::client::danger::{HandshakeSignatureValid, ServerCertVerifier};
+use rustls::client::WebPkiServerVerifier;
+use rustls::pki_types::{CertificateDer, ServerName, UnixTime};
+use rustls::{ClientConfig, DigitallySignedStruct, Error, SignatureScheme};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
+use std::time;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use tracing::{error, info, warn};
+use x509_cert::der::{Decode as _, Encode as _};
+use x509_cert::Certificate;
+
+/// Options and arguments needed to attest a TEE
+#[derive(Args, Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct AttestationArgs {
+    /// hex encoded SGX mrsigner of the enclave to attest
+    #[arg(long)]
+    pub sgx_mrsigner: Option<String>,
+    /// hex encoded SGX mrenclave of the enclave to attest
+    #[arg(long)]
+    pub sgx_mrenclave: Option<String>,
+    /// URL of the server
+    #[arg(long, required = true)]
+    pub server: String,
+    /// allowed TCB levels, comma separated:
+    /// Ok, ConfigNeeded, ConfigAndSwHardeningNeeded, SwHardeningNeeded, OutOfDate, OutOfDateConfigNeeded
+    #[arg(long, value_parser = parse_tcb_levels)]
+    pub sgx_allowed_tcb_levels: Option<EnumSet<TcbLevel>>,
+}
+
+/// A connection to a TEE, which implements the `teepot` attestation API
+pub struct TeeConnection {
+    /// Options and arguments needed to attest a TEE
+    server: String,
+    client: Client,
+}
+
+impl TeeConnection {
+    /// Create a new connection to a TEE
+    ///
+    /// This will verify the attestation report and check that the enclave
+    /// is running the expected code.
+    pub async fn new(args: &AttestationArgs, attestation_url: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+        let pk_hash = Arc::new(OnceLock::new());
+
+        let tls_config = Arc::new(
+            ClientConfig::builder()
+                .dangerous()
+                .with_custom_certificate_verifier(Arc::new(Self::make_verifier(pk_hash.clone())))
+                .with_no_client_auth(),
+        );
+
+        let agent = Client::builder()
+            .add_default_header((header::USER_AGENT, "teepot/1.0"))
+            // a "connector" wraps the stream into an encrypted connection
+            .connector(Connector::new().rustls_0_22(tls_config))
+            .timeout(Duration::from_secs(12000))
+            .finish();
+
+        let this = Self {
+            server: args.server.clone(),
+            client: agent,
+        };
+
+        this.check_attestation(args, attestation_url, pk_hash)
+            .await?;
+
+        Ok(this)
+    }
+
+    /// Create a new connection to a TEE
+    ///
+    /// # Safety
+    /// This function is unsafe, because it does not verify the attestation report.
+    pub unsafe fn new_from_client_without_attestation(server: String, client: Client) -> Self {
+        Self { server, client }
+    }
+
+    /// Get a reference to the agent, which can be used to make requests to the TEE
+    ///
+    /// Note, that it will refuse to connect to any other TLS server than the one
+    /// specified in the `AttestationArgs` of the `Self::new` function.
+    pub fn client(&self) -> &Client {
+        &self.client
+    }
+
+    /// Get a reference to the server URL
+    pub fn server(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.server
+    }
+
+    async fn check_attestation(
+        &self,
+        args: &AttestationArgs,
+        attestation_url: &str,
+        pk_hash: Arc<OnceLock<[u8; 32]>>,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        info!("Getting attestation report");
+
+        let mut response = self
+            .client
+            .get(&format!("{}{attestation_url}", args.server))
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow!("Error sending attestation request: {}", e))?;
+
+        let status_code = response.status();
+        if !status_code.is_success() {
+            error!("Failed to get attestation: {}", status_code);
+            if let Ok(r) = response.json::<Value>().await {
+                eprintln!("Failed to get attestation: {}", r);
+            }
+            bail!("failed to get attestation: {}", status_code);
+        }
+
+        let attestation: AttestationResponse =
+            response.json().await.context("failed to get attestation")?;
+
+        let current_time: i64 = time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+            .unwrap()
+            .as_secs() as _;
+
+        info!("Verifying attestation report");
+
+        let quote: &[u8] = &attestation.quote;
+        let collateral: Option<&Collateral> = Some(&attestation.collateral);
+        let pk_hash = pk_hash.get().unwrap();
+
+        Self::check_attestation_args(args, current_time, quote, collateral, pk_hash)?;
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Check the attestation report against `AttestationArgs`
+    pub fn check_attestation_args(
+        args: &AttestationArgs,
+        current_time: i64,
+        quote: &[u8],
+        collateral: Option<&Collateral>,
+        pk_hash: &[u8; 32],
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        let QuoteVerificationResult {
+            collateral_expired,
+            result,
+            quote,
+            advisories,
+            ..
+        } = verify_quote_with_collateral(quote, collateral, current_time).unwrap();
+
+        if collateral_expired || !matches!(result, sgx_ql_qv_result_t::SGX_QL_QV_RESULT_OK) {
+            if collateral_expired {
+                error!("Collateral is out of date!");
+                bail!("Collateral is out of date!");
+            }
+
+            let tcblevel = TcbLevel::from(result);
+            if args
+                .sgx_allowed_tcb_levels
+                .map_or(true, |levels| !levels.contains(tcblevel))
+            {
+                error!("Quote verification result: {}", tcblevel);
+                bail!("Quote verification result: {}", tcblevel);
+            }
+
+            info!("TcbLevel is allowed: {}", tcblevel);
+        }
+
+        for advisory in advisories {
+            warn!("Info: Advisory ID: {advisory}");
+        }
+
+        if &quote.report_body.reportdata[..32] != pk_hash {
+            error!("Report data mismatch");
+            bail!("Report data mismatch");
+        } else {
+            info!(
+                "Report data matches `{}`",
+                hex::encode(&quote.report_body.reportdata[..32])
+            );
+        }
+
+        if let Some(mrsigner) = &args.sgx_mrsigner {
+            let mrsigner_bytes = hex::decode(mrsigner).context("Failed to decode mrsigner")?;
+            if quote.report_body.mrsigner[..] != mrsigner_bytes {
+                bail!(
+                    "mrsigner mismatch: got {}, expected {}",
+                    hex::encode(quote.report_body.mrsigner),
+                    &mrsigner
+                );
+            } else {
+                info!("mrsigner `{mrsigner}` matches");
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let Some(mrenclave) = &args.sgx_mrenclave {
+            let mrenclave_bytes = hex::decode(mrenclave).context("Failed to decode mrenclave")?;
+            if quote.report_body.mrenclave[..] != mrenclave_bytes {
+                bail!(
+                    "mrenclave mismatch: got {}, expected {}",
+                    hex::encode(quote.report_body.mrenclave),
+                    &mrenclave
+                );
+            } else {
+                info!("mrenclave `{mrenclave}` matches");
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Save the hash of the public server key to `REPORT_DATA` to check
+    /// the attestations against it and it does not change on reconnect.
+    pub fn make_verifier(pk_hash: Arc<OnceLock<[u8; 32]>>) -> impl ServerCertVerifier {
+        #[derive(Debug)]
+        struct V {
+            pk_hash: Arc<OnceLock<[u8; 32]>>,
+            server_verifier: Arc<WebPkiServerVerifier>,
+        }
+        impl ServerCertVerifier for V {
+            fn verify_server_cert(
+                &self,
+                end_entity: &CertificateDer,
+                _intermediates: &[CertificateDer],
+                _server_name: &ServerName,
+                _ocsp_response: &[u8],
+                _now: UnixTime,
+            ) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified, rustls::Error> {
+                let cert = Certificate::from_der(end_entity.as_ref())
+                    .map_err(|e| Error::General(format!("Failed get certificate {e:?}")))?;
+                let pub_key = cert
+                    .tbs_certificate
+                    .subject_public_key_info
+                    .to_der()
+                    .unwrap();
+
+                let hash = Sha256::digest(pub_key);
+                let data = self.pk_hash.get_or_init(|| hash[..32].try_into().unwrap());
+
+                if data == &hash[..32] {
+                    info!(
+                        "Checked or set server certificate public key hash `{}`",
+                        hex::encode(&hash[..32])
+                    );
+                    Ok(rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified::assertion())
+                } else {
+                    error!("Server certificate does not match expected certificate");
+                    Err(rustls::Error::General(
+                        "Server certificate does not match expected certificate".to_string(),
+                    ))
+                }
+            }
+
+            fn verify_tls12_signature(
+                &self,
+                message: &[u8],
+                cert: &CertificateDer<'_>,
+                dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
+            ) -> std::result::Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
+                self.server_verifier
+                    .verify_tls12_signature(message, cert, dss)
+            }
+
+            fn verify_tls13_signature(
+                &self,
+                message: &[u8],
+                cert: &CertificateDer<'_>,
+                dss: &DigitallySignedStruct,
+            ) -> std::result::Result<HandshakeSignatureValid, Error> {
+                self.server_verifier
+                    .verify_tls13_signature(message, cert, dss)
+            }
+
+            fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<SignatureScheme> {
+                self.server_verifier.supported_verify_schemes()
+            }
+        }
+        let root_store = Arc::new(rustls::RootCertStore::empty());
+        let server_verifier = WebPkiServerVerifier::builder(root_store).build().unwrap();
+        V {
+            pk_hash,
+            server_verifier,
+        }
+    }
+}
--- a/src/client/vault.rs
+++ b/src/client/vault.rs
@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Helper functions for CLI clients to verify Intel SGX enclaves and other TEEs.
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+use super::{AttestationArgs, TeeConnection};
+use crate::json::http::{AuthRequest, AuthResponse};
+use crate::server::pki::make_self_signed_cert;
+use crate::server::{AnyHowResponseError, HttpResponseError, Status};
+pub use crate::sgx::{
+    parse_tcb_levels, sgx_gramine_get_quote, sgx_ql_qv_result_t, tee_qv_get_collateral,
+    verify_quote_with_collateral, Collateral, EnumSet, QuoteVerificationResult, TcbLevel,
+};
+use actix_http::error::PayloadError;
+use actix_web::http::header;
+use actix_web::ResponseError;
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use awc::error::{SendRequestError, StatusCode};
+use awc::{Client, ClientResponse, Connector};
+use bytes::Bytes;
+use futures_core::Stream;
+use getrandom::getrandom;
+use rustls::ClientConfig;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::fmt::{Display, Formatter};
+use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
+use std::time;
+use tracing::{debug, error, info, trace};
+
+const VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER: &str = "X-Vault-Token";
+
+/// Error returned when sending a request to Vault
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum VaultSendError {
+    /// Error sending the request
+    SendRequest(String),
+    /// Error returned by the Vault API
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    Vault(#[from] HttpResponseError),
+}
+
+impl Display for VaultSendError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            VaultSendError::SendRequest(e) => write!(f, "VaultSendError: {}", e),
+            VaultSendError::Vault(e) => write!(f, "VaultSendError: {}", e),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+const _: () = {
+    fn assert_send<T: Send>() {}
+    let _ = assert_send::<VaultSendError>;
+};
+
+impl From<VaultSendError> for HttpResponseError {
+    fn from(value: VaultSendError) -> Self {
+        match value {
+            VaultSendError::SendRequest(e) => HttpResponseError::Anyhow(AnyHowResponseError {
+                status_code: StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY,
+                error: anyhow!(e),
+            }),
+            VaultSendError::Vault(e) => e,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// A connection to a Vault TEE, which implements the `teepot` attestation API
+/// called by a TEE itself. This authenticates the TEE to Vault and gets a token,
+/// which can be used to access the Vault API.
+pub struct VaultConnection {
+    /// Options and arguments needed to attest Vault
+    pub conn: TeeConnection,
+    key_hash: [u8; 64],
+    client_token: String,
+    name: String,
+}
+
+impl VaultConnection {
+    /// Create a new connection to Vault
+    ///
+    /// This will verify the attestation report and check that the enclave
+    /// is running the expected code.
+    pub async fn new(args: &AttestationArgs, name: String) -> Result<Self> {
+        let pk_hash = Arc::new(OnceLock::new());
+
+        let (key_hash, rustls_certificate, rustls_pk) = make_self_signed_cert()?;
+
+        let tls_config = Arc::new(
+            ClientConfig::builder()
+                .dangerous()
+                .with_custom_certificate_verifier(Arc::new(TeeConnection::make_verifier(
+                    pk_hash.clone(),
+                )))
+                .with_client_auth_cert(vec![rustls_certificate], rustls_pk)?,
+        );
+
+        let client = Client::builder()
+            .add_default_header((header::USER_AGENT, "teepot/1.0"))
+            // a "connector" wraps the stream into an encrypted connection
+            .connector(Connector::new().rustls_0_22(tls_config))
+            .timeout(time::Duration::from_secs(12000))
+            .finish();
+
+        let mut this = Self {
+            name,
+            key_hash,
+            conn: unsafe {
+                TeeConnection::new_from_client_without_attestation(args.server.clone(), client)
+            },
+            client_token: Default::default(),
+        };
+
+        this.client_token = this.auth(args).await?.auth.client_token;
+
+        trace!("Got Token: {:#?}", &this.client_token);
+
+        Ok(this)
+    }
+
+    /// create a new [`VaultConnection`] to Vault from an existing connection
+    ///
+    /// # Safety
+    /// This function is unsafe, because it does not verify the attestation report.
+    pub unsafe fn new_from_client_without_attestation(
+        server: String,
+        client: Client,
+        name: String,
+        client_token: String,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            name,
+            client_token,
+            conn: unsafe { TeeConnection::new_from_client_without_attestation(server, client) },
+            key_hash: [0u8; 64],
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Get a reference to the agent, which can be used to make requests to the TEE
+    ///
+    /// Note, that it will refuse to connect to any other TLS server than the one
+    /// specified in the `AttestationArgs` of the `Self::new` function.
+    pub fn agent(&self) -> &Client {
+        self.conn.client()
+    }
+
+    async fn auth(&self, args: &AttestationArgs) -> Result<AuthResponse> {
+        info!("Getting attestation report");
+        let attestation_url = AuthRequest::URL;
+        let quote = sgx_gramine_get_quote(&self.key_hash).context("Failed to get own quote")?;
+        let collateral = tee_qv_get_collateral(&quote).context("Failed to get own collateral")?;
+
+        let mut challenge_bytes = [0u8; 32];
+        getrandom(&mut challenge_bytes)?;
+        let challenge = hex::encode(challenge_bytes);
+        info!("Challenging Vault with: {}", challenge);
+        let challenge = Some(challenge_bytes);
+
+        let auth_req = AuthRequest {
+            name: self.name.clone(),
+            tee_type: "sgx".to_string(),
+            quote,
+            collateral: serde_json::to_string(&collateral)?,
+            challenge,
+        };
+
+        let mut response = self
+            .agent()
+            .post(&format!(
+                "{server}{attestation_url}",
+                server = self.conn.server,
+            ))
+            .send_json(&auth_req)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow!("Error sending attestation request: {}", e))?;
+
+        let status_code = response.status();
+        if !status_code.is_success() {
+            error!("Failed to login to vault: {}", status_code);
+            if let Ok(r) = response.json::<Value>().await {
+                eprintln!("Failed to login to vault: {}", r);
+            }
+            bail!("failed to login to vault: {}", status_code);
+        }
+
+        let auth_response: Value = response.json().await.context("failed to login to vault")?;
+        trace!(
+            "Got AuthResponse: {:?}",
+            serde_json::to_string(&auth_response)
+        );
+
+        let auth_response: AuthResponse =
+            serde_json::from_value(auth_response).context("Failed to parse AuthResponse")?;
+
+        trace!("Got AuthResponse: {:#?}", &auth_response);
+
+        let current_time: i64 = time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+            .unwrap()
+            .as_secs() as _;
+
+        info!("Verifying attestation report");
+
+        let collateral: Option<Collateral> =
+            serde_json::from_str(&auth_response.data.collateral).ok();
+        let collateral = collateral.as_ref();
+
+        TeeConnection::check_attestation_args(
+            args,
+            current_time,
+            &auth_response.data.quote,
+            collateral,
+            &challenge_bytes,
+        )
+        .context("Failed to verify Vault attestation report")?;
+
+        Ok(auth_response)
+    }
+
+    /// Send a put request to the vault
+    pub async fn vault_put(
+        &self,
+        action: &str,
+        url: &str,
+        json: &Value,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<(StatusCode, Option<Value>), VaultSendError> {
+        let full_url = format!("{}{url}", self.conn.server);
+        info!("{action} via put {full_url}");
+        debug!(
+            "sending json: {:?}",
+            serde_json::to_string(json).unwrap_or_default()
+        );
+        let res = self
+            .agent()
+            .put(full_url)
+            .insert_header((VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER, self.client_token.clone()))
+            .send_json(json)
+            .await;
+        Self::handle_client_response(action, res).await
+    }
+
+    /// Send a get request to the vault
+    pub async fn vault_get(
+        &self,
+        action: &str,
+        url: &str,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<(StatusCode, Option<Value>), VaultSendError> {
+        let full_url = format!("{}{url}", self.conn.server);
+        info!("{action} via get {full_url}");
+        let res = self
+            .agent()
+            .get(full_url)
+            .insert_header((VAULT_TOKEN_HEADER, self.client_token.clone()))
+            .send()
+            .await;
+        Self::handle_client_response(action, res).await
+    }
+
+    async fn handle_client_response<S>(
+        action: &str,
+        res: std::result::Result<ClientResponse<S>, SendRequestError>,
+    ) -> std::result::Result<(StatusCode, Option<Value>), VaultSendError>
+    where
+        S: Stream<Item = Result<Bytes, PayloadError>>,
+    {
+        match res {
+            Ok(mut r) => {
+                let status_code = r.status();
+                if status_code.is_success() {
+                    let msg = r.json().await.ok();
+                    debug!(
+                        "{action}: status code: {status_code} {:?}",
+                        serde_json::to_string(&msg)
+                    );
+                    Ok((status_code, msg))
+                } else {
+                    let err = HttpResponseError::from_proxy(r).await;
+                    error!("{action}: {err:?}");
+                    Err(err.into())
+                }
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                error!("{}: {}", action, e);
+                Err(VaultSendError::SendRequest(e.to_string()))
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Revoke the token
+    pub async fn revoke_token(&self) -> std::result::Result<(), VaultSendError> {
+        self.vault_put(
+            "Revoke the token",
+            "/v1/auth/token/revoke-self",
+            &Value::default(),
+        )
+        .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn check_rel_path(rel_path: &str) -> Result<(), HttpResponseError> {
+        if !rel_path.is_ascii() {
+            return Err(anyhow!("path is not ascii")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        }
+
+        // check if rel_path is alphanumeric
+        if !rel_path.chars().all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || c == '_') {
+            return Err(anyhow!("path is not alphanumeric")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// set a secret in the vault
+    pub async fn store_secret<'de, T: serde::Serialize>(
+        &self,
+        val: T,
+        rel_path: &str,
+    ) -> Result<(), HttpResponseError> {
+        self.store_secret_for_tee(&self.name, val, rel_path).await
+    }
+
+    /// set a secret in the vault for a different TEE
+    pub async fn store_secret_for_tee<'de, T: serde::Serialize>(
+        &self,
+        tee_name: &str,
+        val: T,
+        rel_path: &str,
+    ) -> Result<(), HttpResponseError> {
+        Self::check_rel_path(rel_path)?;
+
+        let value = serde_json::to_value(val)
+            .context("converting value to json")
+            .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+
+        let value = json!({ "data" : { "_" : value } });
+
+        self.vault_put(
+            "Setting secret",
+            &format!("/v1/secret/data/tee/{}/{}", tee_name, rel_path),
+            &value,
+        )
+        .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// get a secret from the vault
+    pub async fn load_secret<'de, T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
+        &self,
+        rel_path: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Option<T>, HttpResponseError> {
+        self.load_secret_for_tee(&self.name, rel_path).await
+    }
+
+    /// get a secret from the vault for a specific TEE
+    pub async fn load_secret_for_tee<'de, T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
+        &self,
+        tee_name: &str,
+        rel_path: &str,
+    ) -> Result<Option<T>, HttpResponseError> {
+        Self::check_rel_path(rel_path)?;
+        let v = self
+            .vault_get(
+                "Getting secret",
+                &format!("/v1/secret/data/tee/{}/{}", tee_name, rel_path),
+            )
+            .await
+            .or_else(|e| match e {
+                VaultSendError::Vault(ref se) => {
+                    if se.status_code() == StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
+                        debug!("Secret not found: {}", rel_path);
+                        Ok((StatusCode::OK, None))
+                    } else {
+                        Err(e)
+                    }
+                }
+                VaultSendError::SendRequest(_) => Err(e),
+            })?
+            .1
+            .as_ref()
+            .and_then(|v| v.get("data"))
+            .and_then(|v| v.get("data"))
+            .and_then(|v| v.get("_"))
+            .and_then(|v| serde_json::from_value(v.clone()).transpose())
+            .transpose()
+            .context("Error getting value from vault")
+            .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?
+            .flatten();
+        Ok(v)
+    }
+}
--- a/src/json/http.rs
+++ b/src/json/http.rs
@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Common types for the teepot http JSON API
+
+use crate::sgx::Collateral;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use serde_with::base64::Base64;
+use serde_with::serde_as;
+use std::fmt::Display;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+/// The unseal request data
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Unseal {
+    /// The unseal key
+    pub key: String,
+}
+
+impl Unseal {
+    /// The unseal URL
+    pub const URL: &'static str = "/v1/sys/unseal";
+}
+
+/// The attestation URL
+pub const ATTESTATION_URL: &str = "/v1/sys/attestation";
+
+/// The attestation response
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AttestationResponse {
+    /// The quote
+    pub quote: Arc<[u8]>,
+    /// The collateral
+    pub collateral: Arc<Collateral>,
+}
+
+/// The init request data
+#[serde_as]
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Init {
+    /// PGP keys to encrypt the unseal keys with
+    pub pgp_keys: Vec<String>,
+    /// number of secret shares
+    pub secret_shares: usize,
+    /// secret threshold
+    pub secret_threshold: usize,
+    /// PGP keys to sign commands for the admin tee
+    #[serde_as(as = "Box<[Base64]>")]
+    pub admin_pgp_keys: Box<[Box<[u8]>]>,
+    /// admin threshold
+    pub admin_threshold: usize,
+    /// admin TEE mrenclave
+    pub admin_tee_mrenclave: String,
+}
+
+impl Init {
+    /// The init URL
+    pub const URL: &'static str = "/v1/sys/init";
+}
+
+/// The init request data
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct VaultInitRequest {
+    /// PGP keys to encrypt the unseal keys with
+    pub pgp_keys: Vec<String>,
+    /// number of secret shares
+    pub secret_shares: usize,
+    /// secret threshold
+    pub secret_threshold: usize,
+}
+
+/// The init response data
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct InitResponse {
+    /// The unseal keys (gpg encrypted)
+    pub unseal_keys: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+/// The Vault TEE auth request data
+#[serde_as]
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AuthRequest {
+    /// The name of the TEE
+    pub name: String,
+    /// The type of the TEE
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    pub tee_type: String,
+    /// The attestation report data base64 encoded
+    #[serde_as(as = "Base64")]
+    pub quote: Box<[u8]>,
+    /// The attestation collateral json encoded
+    pub collateral: String,
+    /// The vault attestation challenge (hex encoded)
+    #[serde_as(as = "Option<serde_with::hex::Hex>")]
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none", default = "Option::default")]
+    pub challenge: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+}
+
+impl AuthRequest {
+    /// The auth URL
+    pub const URL: &'static str = "/v1/auth/tee/login";
+}
+
+/// Vault auth metadata
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AuthMetadataField {
+    collateral_expiration_date: String,
+    tee_name: String,
+}
+
+/// Vault auth data
+#[serde_as]
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AuthDataField {
+    /// The attestation report data base64 encoded
+    #[serde_as(as = "Base64")]
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub quote: Box<[u8]>,
+    /// The attestation collateral json encoded
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub collateral: String,
+}
+
+/// Vault auth
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AuthField {
+    /// TODO
+    pub renewable: bool,
+    /// TODO
+    pub lease_duration: isize,
+    /// TODO
+    pub policies: Vec<String>,
+    /// TODO
+    pub accessor: String,
+    /// TODO
+    pub client_token: String,
+    /// TODO
+    pub metadata: AuthMetadataField,
+}
+
+/// The Vault TEE auth response data
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AuthResponse {
+    /// vault auth
+    pub auth: AuthField,
+    ///
+    pub data: AuthDataField,
+}
+
+/// One command datum
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct VaultCommand {
+    /// The command to execute
+    pub url: String,
+    /// The command to execute
+    pub data: Value,
+}
+
+impl Display for VaultCommand {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        if f.alternate() {
+            f.write_str(
+                serde_json::to_string_pretty(self)
+                    .unwrap_or("{}".into())
+                    .as_str(),
+            )
+        } else {
+            f.write_str(serde_json::to_string(self).unwrap_or("{}".into()).as_str())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Multiple command data
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct VaultCommands {
+    /// The sha-256 hash of the last command hex encoded
+    pub last_digest: String,
+    /// The actual commands
+    pub commands: Vec<VaultCommand>,
+}
+
+/// The command request data
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct VaultCommandRequest {
+    /// The commands to execute
+    ///
+    /// The commands are json serialized `VaultCommands`,
+    /// because they are signed with multiple signatures.
+    ///
+    /// The commands are executed in order.
+    pub commands: String,
+    /// The signatures of the commands
+    pub signatures: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+impl VaultCommandRequest {
+    /// The command request URL
+    pub const URL: &'static str = "/v1/command";
+}
+
+/// The command response
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct VaultCommandResponse {
+    /// The status code
+    pub status_code: u16,
+    /// The response body
+    pub value: Option<Value>,
+}
+
+/// The command response
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct VaultCommandsResponse {
+    /// The stored digest for the execution
+    pub digest: String,
+    /// The results of the individual commands
+    pub results: Vec<VaultCommandResponse>,
+}
+
+impl Display for VaultCommandResponse {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        if f.alternate() {
+            f.write_str(
+                serde_json::to_string_pretty(self)
+                    .unwrap_or("{}".into())
+                    .as_str(),
+            )
+        } else {
+            f.write_str(serde_json::to_string(self).unwrap_or("{}".into()).as_str())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// The command request URL
+pub const DIGEST_URL: &str = "/v1/digest";
+
+/// The signing request
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SignRequest {
+    /// json serialized `SignRequestData`, because it is signed with multiple signatures.
+    pub sign_request_data: String,
+    /// The signatures of the SignRequestData
+    pub signatures: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+impl SignRequest {
+    /// The sign request URL
+    pub const URL: &'static str = "/v1/sign";
+}
+
+/// The signing request data
+#[serde_as]
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SignRequestData {
+    /// The sha-256 hash of the last command hex encoded
+    pub last_digest: String,
+    /// The name of the TEE
+    pub tee_name: String,
+    /// The type of the TEE
+    #[serde(rename = "type")]
+    pub tee_type: String,
+    /// The TEE security version number
+    pub tee_svn: u16,
+    /// The data to be signed.
+    ///
+    /// In case of `tee_type == "sgx"`, it's the SGX Sigstruct Body
+    #[serde_as(as = "Base64")]
+    pub data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+/// The signing request
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SignResponse {
+    /// The stored digest for the execution
+    pub digest: String,
+    /// The signed data for the tee.
+    ///
+    /// In case of `tee_type == "sgx"`, it's the SGX Sigstruct
+    pub signed_data: Vec<u8>,
+}
--- a/src/json/mod.rs
+++ b/src/json/mod.rs
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Common types for the teepot JSON API
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+pub mod http;
+pub mod secrets;
--- a/src/json/secrets.rs
+++ b/src/json/secrets.rs
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Common types for the teepot secrets JSON API
+
+use crate::sgx::sign::Zeroizing;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_with::base64::Base64;
+use serde_with::serde_as;
+
+/// Configuration for the admin tee
+#[serde_as]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AdminConfig {
+    /// PGP keys to sign commands for the admin tee
+    #[serde_as(as = "Box<[Base64]>")]
+    pub admin_pgp_keys: Box<[Box<[u8]>]>,
+    /// admin threshold
+    pub admin_threshold: usize,
+}
+
+/// Configuration for the admin tee
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AdminState {
+    /// last digest of executed commands
+    pub last_digest: String,
+}
+
+/// Configuration for the admin tee
+#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SGXSigningKey {
+    /// private key in PEM format
+    pub pem_pk: Zeroizing<String>,
+}
--- a/src/lib.rs
+++ b/src/lib.rs
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Helper functions to verify Intel SGX enclaves and other TEEs.
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+pub mod client;
+pub mod json;
+pub mod server;
+pub mod sgx;
+
+pub mod quote;
--- a/src/quote/mod.rs
+++ b/src/quote/mod.rs
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023-2024 Matter Labs
+
+//! Get a quote from a TEE
+
+use crate::sgx::sgx_gramine_get_quote;
+use std::io;
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[allow(missing_docs)]
+#[error("{msg}")]
+pub struct GetQuoteError {
+    pub(crate) msg: Box<str>,
+    #[source] // optional if field name is `source`
+    pub(crate) source: io::Error,
+}
+
+/// Get the attestation quote from a TEE
+pub fn get_quote(report_data: &[u8]) -> Result<Box<[u8]>, GetQuoteError> {
+    // check, if we are running in a TEE
+    if std::fs::metadata("/dev/attestation").is_ok() {
+        if report_data.len() > 64 {
+            return Err(GetQuoteError {
+                msg: "Report data too long".into(),
+                source: io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::Other, "Report data too long"),
+            });
+        }
+
+        let mut report_data_fixed = [0u8; 64];
+        report_data_fixed[..report_data.len()].copy_from_slice(report_data);
+
+        sgx_gramine_get_quote(&report_data_fixed)
+    } else {
+        // if not, return an error
+        Err(GetQuoteError {
+            msg: "Not running in a TEE".into(),
+            source: io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::Other, "Not running in a TEE"),
+        })
+    }
+}
--- a/src/server/attestation.rs
+++ b/src/server/attestation.rs
@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Common attestation API for all TEEs
+
+use crate::client::AttestationArgs;
+use crate::json::http::AttestationResponse;
+use crate::sgx::{
+    parse_tcb_levels, sgx_gramine_get_quote, tee_qv_get_collateral, verify_quote_with_collateral,
+    Collateral, EnumSet, QuoteVerificationResult, TcbLevel,
+};
+use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
+use clap::Args;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
+use std::time::{Duration, UNIX_EPOCH};
+use tracing::{debug, error, info, trace, warn};
+
+struct Attestation {
+    quote: Arc<[u8]>,
+    collateral: Arc<Collateral>,
+    report_data: [u8; 64],
+    earliest_expiration_date: i64,
+}
+
+/// Returns the quote and collateral for the current TEE.
+///
+/// if `allowed_tcb_levels` is `None`, then any TCB level is accepted.
+/// Otherwise, the quote must be verified and the collateral must be
+/// within the allowed TCB levels.
+pub fn get_quote_and_collateral(
+    allowed_tcb_levels: Option<EnumSet<TcbLevel>>,
+    report_data: &[u8; 64],
+) -> Result<AttestationResponse> {
+    static ATTESTATION: RwLock<Option<Attestation>> = RwLock::new(None);
+
+    let unix_time: i64 = std::time::SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .unwrap()
+        .as_secs() as _;
+
+    if let Some(attestation) = ATTESTATION.read().unwrap().as_ref() {
+        trace!(attestation.earliest_expiration_date);
+
+        if attestation.earliest_expiration_date > unix_time.saturating_add(60)
+            && report_data.eq(&attestation.report_data)
+        {
+            debug!("return cache attestation quote and collateral");
+            return Ok(AttestationResponse {
+                quote: attestation.quote.clone(),
+                collateral: attestation.collateral.clone(),
+            });
+        }
+    }
+
+    let myquote = sgx_gramine_get_quote(report_data).context("Failed to get own quote")?;
+    let collateral = tee_qv_get_collateral(&myquote).context("Failed to get own collateral")?;
+
+    let QuoteVerificationResult {
+        collateral_expired,
+        result,
+        earliest_expiration_date,
+        tcb_level_date_tag,
+        quote,
+        advisories,
+    } = verify_quote_with_collateral(&myquote, Some(&collateral), unix_time.saturating_add(60))
+        .context("Failed to verify own quote with collateral")?;
+
+    debug!(tcb_level_date_tag);
+
+    if collateral_expired {
+        bail!("Freshly fetched collateral expired");
+    }
+
+    let tcblevel = TcbLevel::from(result);
+    if tcblevel != TcbLevel::Ok
+        && allowed_tcb_levels.map_or(false, |levels| !levels.contains(tcblevel))
+    {
+        error!("Quote verification result: {}", tcblevel);
+        bail!("Quote verification result: {}", tcblevel);
+    }
+
+    for advisory in advisories {
+        warn!("\tInfo: Advisory ID: {advisory}");
+    }
+
+    info!("Own quote verified successfully: {}", tcblevel);
+    info!(
+        "Earliest expiration in {:?}",
+        Duration::from_secs((earliest_expiration_date - unix_time) as _)
+    );
+    info!("mrsigner: {}", hex::encode(quote.report_body.mrsigner));
+    info!("mrenclave: {}", hex::encode(quote.report_body.mrenclave));
+
+    let quote: Arc<[u8]> = Arc::from(myquote);
+    let collateral = Arc::from(collateral);
+
+    let mut attestation = ATTESTATION.write().unwrap();
+    *attestation = Some(Attestation {
+        quote: quote.clone(),
+        collateral: collateral.clone(),
+        report_data: *report_data,
+        earliest_expiration_date,
+    });
+
+    Ok(AttestationResponse { quote, collateral })
+}
+
+/// Options and arguments needed to attest a TEE
+#[derive(Args, Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
+pub struct VaultAttestationArgs {
+    /// hex encoded SGX mrsigner of the enclave to attest
+    #[arg(long, env = "VAULT_SGX_MRSIGNER")]
+    pub vault_sgx_mrsigner: Option<String>,
+    /// hex encoded SGX mrenclave of the enclave to attest
+    #[arg(long, env = "VAULT_SGX_MRENCLAVE")]
+    pub vault_sgx_mrenclave: Option<String>,
+    /// URL of the server
+    #[arg(long, required = true, env = "VAULT_ADDR")]
+    pub vault_addr: String,
+    /// allowed TCB levels, comma separated:
+    /// Ok, ConfigNeeded, ConfigAndSwHardeningNeeded, SwHardeningNeeded, OutOfDate, OutOfDateConfigNeeded
+    #[arg(long, value_parser = parse_tcb_levels, env = "VAULT_SGX_ALLOWED_TCB_LEVELS")]
+    pub vault_sgx_allowed_tcb_levels: Option<EnumSet<TcbLevel>>,
+}
+
+impl From<VaultAttestationArgs> for AttestationArgs {
+    fn from(value: VaultAttestationArgs) -> Self {
+        AttestationArgs {
+            sgx_mrsigner: value.vault_sgx_mrsigner,
+            sgx_mrenclave: value.vault_sgx_mrenclave,
+            server: value.vault_addr,
+            sgx_allowed_tcb_levels: value.vault_sgx_allowed_tcb_levels,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<&VaultAttestationArgs> for AttestationArgs {
+    fn from(value: &VaultAttestationArgs) -> Self {
+        AttestationArgs {
+            sgx_mrsigner: value.vault_sgx_mrsigner.clone(),
+            sgx_mrenclave: value.vault_sgx_mrenclave.clone(),
+            server: value.vault_addr.clone(),
+            sgx_allowed_tcb_levels: value.vault_sgx_allowed_tcb_levels,
+        }
+    }
+}
--- a/src/server/mod.rs
+++ b/src/server/mod.rs
@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! # tee-server
+
+#![deny(missing_docs)]
+#![deny(clippy::all)]
+
+pub mod attestation;
+pub mod pki;
+pub mod signatures;
+
+use actix_web::http::StatusCode;
+use actix_web::web::Bytes;
+use actix_web::{error, HttpRequest, HttpResponse};
+use actix_web::{HttpMessage, ResponseError};
+use anyhow::anyhow;
+use awc::error::{PayloadError, SendRequestError};
+use awc::ClientResponse;
+use futures_core::Stream;
+use std::fmt::{Debug, Display, Formatter};
+use tracing::error;
+
+/// Anyhow error with an HTTP status code
+pub struct AnyHowResponseError {
+    /// error message
+    pub error: anyhow::Error,
+    /// HTTP status code
+    pub status_code: StatusCode,
+}
+
+/// Proxy response error
+pub struct ProxyResponseError {
+    /// HTTP status code
+    pub status_code: StatusCode,
+    /// HTTP body
+    pub body: Option<Bytes>,
+    /// HTTP content type
+    pub content_type: String,
+}
+
+/// custom HTTP response error
+pub enum HttpResponseError {
+    /// Anyhow error
+    Anyhow(AnyHowResponseError),
+    /// Proxy error
+    Proxy(ProxyResponseError),
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for HttpResponseError {}
+
+/// Attach an HTTP status code to an anyhow error turning it into an HttpResponseError
+pub trait Status {
+    /// The Ok type
+    type Ok;
+    /// Attach an HTTP status code to an anyhow error turning it into an HttpResponseError
+    fn status(self, status: StatusCode) -> Result<Self::Ok, HttpResponseError>;
+}
+
+impl<T> Status for Result<T, anyhow::Error> {
+    type Ok = T;
+    fn status(self, status: StatusCode) -> Result<T, HttpResponseError> {
+        match self {
+            Ok(value) => Ok(value),
+            Err(error) => Err(HttpResponseError::new(error, status)),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl HttpResponseError {
+    fn new(error: anyhow::Error, status_code: StatusCode) -> Self {
+        Self::Anyhow(AnyHowResponseError { error, status_code })
+    }
+
+    /// Create a new HTTP response error from a proxy response
+    pub async fn from_proxy<S>(mut response: ClientResponse<S>) -> Self
+    where
+        S: Stream<Item = Result<Bytes, PayloadError>>,
+    {
+        let status_code = response.status();
+        error!("Vault returned server error: {}", status_code);
+        let body = response.body().await.ok();
+        let content_type = response.content_type().to_string();
+        Self::Proxy(ProxyResponseError {
+            status_code,
+            body,
+            content_type,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<&str> for HttpResponseError {
+    fn from(value: &str) -> Self {
+        error!("{}", value);
+        HttpResponseError::new(
+            anyhow!(value.to_string()),
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<SendRequestError> for HttpResponseError {
+    fn from(error: SendRequestError) -> Self {
+        error!("Error sending request: {:?}", error);
+        HttpResponseError::new(
+            anyhow!(error.to_string()),
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+impl Debug for HttpResponseError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        if let Self::Anyhow(e) = self {
+            if f.alternate() {
+                write!(f, "{:#?}", e.error)
+            } else {
+                write!(f, "{:?}", e.error)
+            }
+        } else {
+            write!(f, "HttpResponseError")
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Display for HttpResponseError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        if let Self::Anyhow(e) = self {
+            if f.alternate() {
+                write!(f, "{:#}", e.error)
+            } else {
+                write!(f, "{}", e.error)
+            }
+        } else {
+            write!(f, "HttpResponseError")
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl ResponseError for HttpResponseError {
+    fn status_code(&self) -> StatusCode {
+        match self {
+            HttpResponseError::Anyhow(e) => e.status_code,
+            HttpResponseError::Proxy(e) => e.status_code,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn error_response(&self) -> HttpResponse {
+        match self {
+            HttpResponseError::Anyhow(e) => HttpResponse::build(self.status_code())
+                .content_type("application/json")
+                .body(format!(r#"{{"error":"{}"}}"#, e.error)),
+            HttpResponseError::Proxy(e) => {
+                if let Some(ref body) = e.body {
+                    HttpResponse::build(self.status_code())
+                        .content_type(e.content_type.clone())
+                        .body(body.clone())
+                } else {
+                    HttpResponse::new(self.status_code())
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Create a new json config
+pub fn new_json_cfg() -> actix_web::web::JsonConfig {
+    actix_web::web::JsonConfig::default()
+        .limit(1024 * 1024)
+        .error_handler(json_error_handler)
+}
+
+fn json_error_handler(err: error::JsonPayloadError, _: &HttpRequest) -> actix_web::Error {
+    error::InternalError::from_response(
+        "",
+        HttpResponse::BadRequest()
+            .content_type("application/json")
+            .body(format!(r#"{{"error":"json error: {}"}}"#, err)),
+    )
+    .into()
+}
--- a/src/server/pki.rs
+++ b/src/server/pki.rs
@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023-2024 Matter Labs
+
+//! Some cryptographic utilities
+
+pub use crate::sgx::{
+    parse_tcb_levels, sgx_ql_qv_result_t, verify_quote_with_collateral, EnumSet,
+    QuoteVerificationResult, TcbLevel,
+};
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
+use const_oid::db::rfc5280::{
+    ID_CE_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, ID_CE_EXT_KEY_USAGE, ID_CE_KEY_USAGE, ID_KP_CLIENT_AUTH,
+    ID_KP_SERVER_AUTH,
+};
+use const_oid::db::rfc5912::SECP_256_R_1;
+use getrandom::getrandom;
+use pkcs8::der::asn1::OctetString;
+use pkcs8::der::referenced::OwnedToRef;
+use pkcs8::der::referenced::RefToOwned;
+use pkcs8::{
+    AlgorithmIdentifierRef, ObjectIdentifier, PrivateKeyInfo, SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+    SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef,
+};
+use rustls::pki_types::PrivatePkcs8KeyDer;
+use sec1::EcPrivateKey;
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::str::FromStr;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use x509_cert::der::asn1::BitString;
+use x509_cert::der::{Decode as _, Encode as _};
+use x509_cert::ext::pkix::{BasicConstraints, ExtendedKeyUsage, KeyUsage, KeyUsages};
+use x509_cert::name::RdnSequence;
+use x509_cert::serial_number::SerialNumber;
+use x509_cert::time::Validity;
+use x509_cert::{Certificate, TbsCertificate};
+use zeroize::Zeroizing;
+
+use const_oid::db::rfc5912::{
+    ECDSA_WITH_SHA_256, ECDSA_WITH_SHA_384, ID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY as ECPK, SECP_256_R_1 as P256,
+    SECP_384_R_1 as P384,
+};
+use pkcs8::der::asn1::BitStringRef;
+
+const ES256: AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'static> = AlgorithmIdentifierRef {
+    oid: ECDSA_WITH_SHA_256,
+    parameters: None,
+};
+
+const ES384: AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'static> = AlgorithmIdentifierRef {
+    oid: ECDSA_WITH_SHA_384,
+    parameters: None,
+};
+
+/// Utility trait for signing with a private key
+pub trait PrivateKeyInfoExt {
+    /// Generates a keypair
+    ///
+    /// Returns the DER encoding of the `PrivateKeyInfo` type.
+    fn generate(oid: ObjectIdentifier) -> Result<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>>;
+
+    /// Get the public key
+    ///
+    /// This function creates a `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` which corresponds with
+    /// this private key. Note that this function does not do any cryptographic
+    /// calculations. It expects that the `PrivateKeyInfo` already contains the
+    /// public key.
+    fn public_key(&self) -> Result<SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef<'_>>;
+
+    /// Get the default signing algorithm for this `SubjectPublicKeyInfo`
+    fn signs_with(&self) -> Result<AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'_>>;
+
+    /// Signs the body with the specified algorithm
+    ///
+    /// Note that the signature is returned in its encoded form as it will
+    /// appear in an X.509 certificate or PKCS#10 certification request.
+    fn sign(&self, body: &[u8], algo: AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'_>) -> Result<Vec<u8>>;
+}
+
+impl<'a> PrivateKeyInfoExt for PrivateKeyInfo<'a> {
+    fn generate(oid: ObjectIdentifier) -> Result<Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>> {
+        let rand = ring::rand::SystemRandom::new();
+
+        let doc = match oid {
+            P256 => {
+                use ring::signature::{EcdsaKeyPair, ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING as ALG};
+                EcdsaKeyPair::generate_pkcs8(&ALG, &rand)?
+            }
+
+            P384 => {
+                use ring::signature::{EcdsaKeyPair, ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING as ALG};
+                EcdsaKeyPair::generate_pkcs8(&ALG, &rand)?
+            }
+
+            _ => return Err(anyhow!("unsupported")),
+        };
+
+        Ok(doc.as_ref().to_vec().into())
+    }
+
+    fn public_key(&self) -> Result<SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef<'_>> {
+        match self.algorithm.oids()? {
+            (ECPK, ..) => {
+                let ec = EcPrivateKey::from_der(self.private_key)?;
+                let pk = ec.public_key.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("missing public key"))?;
+                Ok(SubjectPublicKeyInfo {
+                    algorithm: self.algorithm,
+                    subject_public_key: BitStringRef::new(0, pk)?,
+                })
+            }
+            _ => Err(anyhow!("unsupported")),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn signs_with(&self) -> Result<AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'_>> {
+        match self.algorithm.oids()? {
+            (ECPK, Some(P256)) => Ok(ES256),
+            (ECPK, Some(P384)) => Ok(ES384),
+            _ => Err(anyhow!("unsupported")),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn sign(&self, body: &[u8], algo: AlgorithmIdentifierRef<'_>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let rng = ring::rand::SystemRandom::new();
+        match (self.algorithm.oids()?, algo) {
+            ((ECPK, Some(P256)), ES256) => {
+                use ring::signature::{EcdsaKeyPair, ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING as ALG};
+                let kp = EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(&ALG, &self.to_der()?, &rng)?;
+                Ok(kp.sign(&rng, body)?.as_ref().to_vec())
+            }
+
+            ((ECPK, Some(P384)), ES384) => {
+                use ring::signature::{EcdsaKeyPair, ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING as ALG};
+                let kp = EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(&ALG, &self.to_der()?, &rng)?;
+                Ok(kp.sign(&rng, body)?.as_ref().to_vec())
+            }
+
+            _ => Err(anyhow!("unsupported")),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Create a private key and a self-signed certificate
+pub fn make_self_signed_cert() -> Result<(
+    [u8; 64],
+    rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'static>,
+    rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer<'static>,
+)> {
+    // Generate a keypair.
+    let raw = PrivateKeyInfo::generate(SECP_256_R_1).context("failed to generate a private key")?;
+    let pki = PrivateKeyInfo::from_der(raw.as_ref())
+        .context("failed to parse DER-encoded private key")?;
+    let der = pki.public_key().unwrap().to_der().unwrap();
+
+    let mut key_hash = [0u8; 64];
+    let hash = Sha256::digest(der);
+    key_hash[..32].copy_from_slice(&hash);
+
+    // Create a relative distinguished name.
+    let rdns = RdnSequence::from_str("CN=localhost")?;
+
+    // Create the extensions.
+    let ku = KeyUsage(KeyUsages::DigitalSignature | KeyUsages::KeyEncipherment).to_der()?;
+    let eu = ExtendedKeyUsage(vec![ID_KP_SERVER_AUTH, ID_KP_CLIENT_AUTH]).to_der()?;
+    let bc = BasicConstraints {
+        ca: false,
+        path_len_constraint: None,
+    }
+    .to_der()?;
+
+    let mut serial = [0u8; 16];
+    getrandom(&mut serial)?;
+
+    // Create the certificate body.
+    let tbs = TbsCertificate {
+        version: x509_cert::Version::V3,
+        serial_number: SerialNumber::new(&serial)?,
+        signature: pki.signs_with()?.ref_to_owned(),
+        issuer: rdns.clone(),
+        validity: Validity::from_now(Duration::from_secs(60 * 60 * 24 * 365))?,
+        subject: rdns,
+        subject_public_key_info: pki.public_key()?.ref_to_owned(),
+        issuer_unique_id: None,
+        subject_unique_id: None,
+        extensions: Some(vec![
+            x509_cert::ext::Extension {
+                extn_id: ID_CE_KEY_USAGE,
+                critical: true,
+                extn_value: OctetString::new(ku)?,
+            },
+            x509_cert::ext::Extension {
+                extn_id: ID_CE_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
+                critical: true,
+                extn_value: OctetString::new(bc)?,
+            },
+            x509_cert::ext::Extension {
+                extn_id: ID_CE_EXT_KEY_USAGE,
+                critical: false,
+                extn_value: OctetString::new(eu)?,
+            },
+        ]),
+    };
+
+    // Self-sign the certificate.
+    let alg = tbs.signature.clone();
+    let sig = pki.sign(&tbs.to_der()?, alg.owned_to_ref())?;
+    let crt = Certificate {
+        tbs_certificate: tbs,
+        signature_algorithm: alg,
+        signature: BitString::from_bytes(&sig)?,
+    };
+
+    let rustls_certificate = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(crt.to_der()?);
+    let rustls_pk = rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer::from(PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(pki.to_der()?));
+    Ok((key_hash, rustls_certificate, rustls_pk))
+}
--- a/src/server/signatures.rs
+++ b/src/server/signatures.rs
@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Signature checking utilities
+
+use crate::json::secrets::AdminConfig;
+use crate::server::{HttpResponseError, Status as _};
+use actix_web::http::StatusCode;
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
+use pgp::types::KeyTrait;
+use pgp::{Deserializable, SignedPublicKey, StandaloneSignature};
+use tracing::debug;
+
+/// Verify a pgp signature for some message given some public keys
+pub fn verify_sig(sig: &str, msg: &[u8], keys: &[SignedPublicKey]) -> anyhow::Result<usize> {
+    let (signatures, _) =
+        StandaloneSignature::from_string_many(sig).context(format!("reading signature {}", sig))?;
+
+    for signature in signatures {
+        let signature = match signature {
+            Ok(s) => s,
+            Err(e) => {
+                debug!("Failed to parse signature: {}", e);
+                continue;
+            }
+        };
+
+        for (pos, key) in keys.iter().enumerate() {
+            let actual_key = &key.primary_key;
+            if actual_key.is_signing_key() && signature.verify(&actual_key, msg).is_ok() {
+                return Ok(pos);
+            }
+            for sub_key in &key.public_subkeys {
+                if sub_key.is_signing_key() && signature.verify(sub_key, msg).is_ok() {
+                    return Ok(pos);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    eprintln!("Failed to verify signature for `{sig}`");
+    bail!("Failed to verify signature for `{sig}`");
+}
+
+/// Verify pgp signatures for a message with some threshold
+pub fn check_sigs(
+    pgp_keys: &[Box<[u8]>],
+    threshold: usize,
+    signatures: &[String],
+    msg: &[u8],
+) -> Result<(), HttpResponseError> {
+    let mut keys = Vec::new();
+
+    for bytes in pgp_keys {
+        let key = SignedPublicKey::from_bytes(bytes.as_ref())
+            .context("parsing public key")
+            .status(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR)?;
+        keys.push(key);
+    }
+
+    let mut verified: usize = 0;
+
+    for sig in signatures {
+        if let Ok(pos) = verify_sig(sig, msg, &keys) {
+            keys.remove(pos);
+            verified += 1;
+        }
+        if verified >= threshold {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if verified < threshold {
+        return Err(anyhow!("not enough valid signatures")).status(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Verify pgp signatures for a message
+pub trait VerifySig {
+    /// Verify pgp signatures for a message
+    fn check_sigs(&self, signatures: &[String], msg: &[u8]) -> Result<(), HttpResponseError>;
+}
+
+impl VerifySig for AdminConfig {
+    fn check_sigs(&self, signatures: &[String], msg: &[u8]) -> Result<(), HttpResponseError> {
+        check_sigs(&self.admin_pgp_keys, self.admin_threshold, signatures, msg)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::verify_sig;
+    use base64::{engine::general_purpose, Engine as _};
+    use pgp::{Deserializable, SignedPublicKey};
+
+    const TEST_DATA: &str = include_str!("../../tests/data/test.json");
+
+    // gpg --armor --local-user test@example.com --detach-sign bin/tee-vault-admin/tests/data/test.json
+    const TEST_SIG: &str = include_str!("../../tests/data/test.json.asc");
+
+    // gpg --armor --export 81A312C59D679D930FA9E8B06D728F29A2DBABF8  > bin/tee-vault-admin/tests/data/pub-81A312C59D679D930FA9E8B06D728F29A2DBABF8.asc
+    const TEST_KEY: &str =
+        include_str!("../../tests/data/pub-81A312C59D679D930FA9E8B06D728F29A2DBABF8.asc");
+
+    const TEST_KEY_BASE64: &str =
+        include_str!("../../tests/data/pub-81A312C59D679D930FA9E8B06D728F29A2DBABF8.b64");
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_sig() {
+        let test_key = SignedPublicKey::from_string(TEST_KEY).unwrap().0;
+        verify_sig(TEST_SIG, TEST_DATA.as_bytes(), &[test_key]).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_key_import() {
+        let str = TEST_KEY_BASE64.lines().collect::<String>();
+        let bytes = general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(str).unwrap();
+        let _ = SignedPublicKey::from_bytes(bytes.as_slice()).unwrap();
+    }
+}
--- a/src/sgx/error.rs
+++ b/src/sgx/error.rs
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+//! Intel SGX Enclave error wrapper
+
+use bytemuck::PodCastError;
+use intel_tee_quote_verification_rs::quote3_error_t;
+use std::fmt::Formatter;
+
+/// Wrapper for the quote verification Error
+#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
+pub struct Quote3Error {
+    /// error message
+    pub msg: &'static str,
+    /// raw error code
+    pub inner: quote3_error_t,
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for Quote3Error {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "{}: {:?}", self.msg, self.inner)
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Debug for Quote3Error {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        write!(f, "{}: {:?}", self.msg, self.inner)
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::error::Error for Quote3Error {}
+
+impl From<quote3_error_t> for Quote3Error {
+    fn from(inner: quote3_error_t) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            msg: "Generic",
+            inner,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[allow(missing_docs)]
+pub enum QuoteFromError {
+    #[error(transparent)]
+    PodCastError(#[from] PodCastError),
+
+    #[error("Quote version is invalid")]
+    InvalidVersion,
+}
--- a/src/sgx/mod.rs
+++ b/src/sgx/mod.rs
@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) 2023 Matter Labs
+
+// Copyright (c) The Enarx Project Developers https://github.com/enarx/sgx
+
+//! Intel SGX Enclave report structures.
+
+pub mod error;
+pub mod sign;
+pub mod tcblevel;
+
+use bytemuck::{cast_slice, try_from_bytes, AnyBitPattern, PodCastError};
+use intel_tee_quote_verification_rs::{
+    quote3_error_t, sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t, tee_get_supplemental_data_version_and_size,
+    tee_supp_data_descriptor_t, tee_verify_quote,
+};
+use std::ffi::CStr;
+use std::fs::OpenOptions;
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::mem;
+use tracing::{trace, warn};
+
+use crate::quote::GetQuoteError;
+pub use error::{Quote3Error, QuoteFromError};
+pub use intel_tee_quote_verification_rs::{sgx_ql_qv_result_t, Collateral};
+pub use tcblevel::{parse_tcb_levels, EnumSet, TcbLevel};
+
+/// Structure of a quote
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, AnyBitPattern)]
+#[repr(C)]
+pub struct Quote {
+    version: [u8; 2],
+    key_type: [u8; 2],
+    reserved: [u8; 4],
+    qe_svn: [u8; 2],
+    pce_svn: [u8; 2],
+    qe_vendor_id: [u8; 16],
+    /// The user data that was passed, when creating the enclave
+    pub user_data: [u8; 20],
+    /// The report body
+    pub report_body: ReportBody,
+}
+
+impl Quote {
+    /// Creates a quote from a byte slice
+    pub fn try_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<&Self, QuoteFromError> {
+        if bytes.len() < mem::size_of::<Self>() {
+            return Err(PodCastError::SizeMismatch.into());
+        }
+        let this: &Self = try_from_bytes(&bytes[..mem::size_of::<Self>()])?;
+        if this.version() != 3 {
+            return Err(QuoteFromError::InvalidVersion);
+        }
+        Ok(this)
+    }
+
+    /// Version of the `Quote` structure
+    pub fn version(&self) -> u16 {
+        u16::from_le_bytes(self.version)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The enclave report body.
+///
+/// For more information see the following documents:
+///
+/// [Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) Data Center Attestation Primitives: ECDSA Quote Library API](https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/dcap-1.0/docs/SGX_ECDSA_QuoteGenReference_DCAP_API_Linux_1.0.pdf)
+///
+/// Table 5, A.4. Quote Format
+///
+/// [Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual Volume 3 (3A, 3B, 3C & 3D): System Programming Guide](https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-technology/64-ia-32-architectures-software-developer-vol-3d-part-4-manual.html)
+///
+/// Table 38-21. Layout of REPORT
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, AnyBitPattern)]
+#[repr(C)]
+pub struct ReportBody {
+    /// The security version number of the enclave.
+    pub cpusvn: [u8; 16],
+    /// The Misc section of the StateSaveArea of the enclave
+    pub miscselect: [u8; 4],
+    reserved1: [u8; 28],
+    /// The allowed Features of the enclave.
+    pub features: [u8; 8],
+    /// The allowed XCr0Flags of the enclave.
+    pub xfrm: [u8; 8],
+    /// The measurement of the enclave
+    pub mrenclave: [u8; 32],
+    reserved2: [u8; 32],
+    /// The hash of the public key, that signed the enclave
+    pub mrsigner: [u8; 32],
+    reserved3: [u8; 96],
+    /// ISV assigned Product ID of the enclave.
+    pub isv_prodid: [u8; 2],
+    /// ISV assigned SVN (security version number) of the enclave.
+    pub isv_svn: [u8; 2],
+    reserved4: [u8; 60],
+    /// The enclave report data, injected when requesting the quote, that is used for attestation.
+    pub reportdata: [u8; 64],
+}
+
+/// The result of the quote verification
+pub struct QuoteVerificationResult<'a> {
+    /// the raw result
+    pub result: sgx_ql_qv_result_t,
+    /// indicates if the collateral is expired
+    pub collateral_expired: bool,
+    /// the earliest expiration date of the collateral
+    pub earliest_expiration_date: i64,
+    /// Date of the TCB level
+    pub tcb_level_date_tag: i64,
+    /// the advisory string
+    pub advisories: Vec<String>,
+    /// the quote
+    pub quote: &'a Quote,
+}
+
+/// Verifies a quote with collateral material
+pub fn verify_quote_with_collateral<'a>(
+    quote: &'a [u8],
+    collateral: Option<&Collateral>,
+    current_time: i64,
+) -> Result<QuoteVerificationResult<'a>, Quote3Error> {
+    let mut supp_data: mem::MaybeUninit<sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t> = mem::MaybeUninit::zeroed();
+    let mut supp_data_desc = tee_supp_data_descriptor_t {
+        major_version: 0,
+        data_size: 0,
+        p_data: supp_data.as_mut_ptr() as *mut u8,
+    };
+    trace!("tee_get_supplemental_data_version_and_size");
+    let (_, supp_size) =
+        tee_get_supplemental_data_version_and_size(quote).map_err(|e| Quote3Error {
+            msg: "tee_get_supplemental_data_version_and_size",
+            inner: e,
+        })?;
+
+    trace!(
+        "tee_get_supplemental_data_version_and_size supp_size: {}",
+        supp_size
+    );
+
+    if supp_size == mem::size_of::<sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t>() as u32 {
+        supp_data_desc.data_size = supp_size;
+    } else {
+        supp_data_desc.data_size = 0;
+        trace!(
+            "tee_get_supplemental_data_version_and_size supp_size: {}",
+            supp_size
+        );
+        trace!(
+            "mem::size_of::<sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t>(): {}",
+            mem::size_of::<sgx_ql_qv_supplemental_t>()
+        );
+        warn!("Quote supplemental data size is different between DCAP QVL and QvE, please make sure you installed DCAP QVL and QvE from same release.")
+    }
+
+    let p_supplemental_data = match supp_data_desc.data_size {
+        0 => None,
+        _ => Some(&mut supp_data_desc),
+    };
+
+    let has_sup = p_supplemental_data.is_some();
+
+    trace!("tee_verify_quote");
+
+    let (collateral_expiration_status, result) =
+        tee_verify_quote(quote, collateral, current_time, None, p_supplemental_data).map_err(
+            |e| Quote3Error {
+                msg: "tee_verify_quote",
+                inner: e,
+            },
+        )?;
+
+    // check supplemental data if necessary
+    let (advisories, earliest_expiration_date, tcb_level_date_tag) = if has_sup {
+        unsafe {
+            let supp_data = supp_data.assume_init();
+            // convert to valid UTF-8 string
+            let ads = CStr::from_bytes_until_nul(cast_slice(&supp_data.sa_list[..]))
+                .ok()
+                .and_then(|s| CStr::to_str(s).ok())
+                .into_iter()
+                .flat_map(|s| s.split(',').map(str::trim).map(String::from))
+                .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+                .collect();
+            (
+                ads,
+                supp_data.earliest_expiration_date,
+                supp_data.tcb_level_date_tag,
+            )
+        }
+    } else {
+        (vec![], 0, 0)
+    };
+
+    let quote = Quote::try_from_bytes(quote).map_err(|_| Quote3Error {
+        msg: "Quote::try_from_bytes",
+        inner: quote3_error_t::SGX_QL_QUOTE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED,
+    })?;
+
+    let res = QuoteVerificationResult {
+        collateral_expired: collateral_expiration_status != 0,
+        earliest_expiration_date,
+        tcb_level_date_tag,
+        result,
+        quote,
+        advisories,
+    };
+
+    Ok(res)
+}
+
+/// Get the attestation report in a Gramine enclave
+pub fn sgx_gramine_get_quote(report_data: &[u8; 64]) -> Result<Box<[u8]>, GetQuoteError> {
+    let mut file = OpenOptions::new()
+        .write(true)
+        .open("/dev/attestation/user_report_data")
+        .map_err(|e| GetQuoteError {
+            msg: "Failed to open `/dev/attestation/user_report_data`".into(),
+            source: e,
+        })?;
+
+    file.write(report_data).map_err(|e| GetQuoteError {
+        msg: "Failed to write `/dev/attestation/user_report_data`".into(),
+        source: e,
+    })?;
+
+    drop(file);
+
+    let mut file = OpenOptions::new()
+        .read(true)
+        .open("/dev/attestation/quote")
+        .map_err(|e| GetQuoteError {
+            msg: "Failed to open `/dev/attestation/quote`".into(),
+            source: e,
+        })?;
+
+    let mut quote = Vec::new();
+    file.read_to_end(&mut quote).map_err(|e| GetQuoteError {
+        msg: "Failed to read `/dev/attestation/quote`".into(),
+        source: e,
+    })?;
+    Ok(quote.into_boxed_slice())
+}
+
+/// Wrapper func for error
+/// TODO: move to intel_tee_quote_verification_rs
+pub fn tee_qv_get_collateral(quote: &[u8]) -> Result<Collateral, Quote3Error> {
+    intel_tee_quote_verification_rs::tee_qv_get_collateral(quote).map_err(Into::into)
+}
--- a/Show more
+++ b/Show more
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