feat(security): Add Phase 1 security features

* test: add comprehensive recovery tests for agent loop Add recovery test coverage for all edge cases and failure scenarios in the agentic loop, addressing the missing test coverage for recovery use cases. Tool Call Parsing Edge Cases: - Empty tool_result tags - Empty tool_calls arrays - Whitespace-only tool names - Empty string arguments History Management: - Trimming without system prompt - Role ordering consistency after trim - Only system prompt edge case Arguments Parsing: - Invalid JSON string fallback - None arguments handling - Null value handling JSON Extraction: - Empty input handling - Whitespace only input - Multiple JSON objects - JSON arrays Tool Call Value Parsing: - Missing name field - Non-OpenAI format - Empty tool_calls array - Missing tool_calls field fallback - Top-level array format Constants Validation: - MAX_TOOL_ITERATIONS bounds (prevent runaway loops) - MAX_HISTORY_MESSAGES bounds (prevent memory bloat) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(security): Add Phase 1 security features - sandboxing, resource limits, audit logging Phase 1 security enhancements with zero impact on the quick setup wizard: - ✅ Pluggable sandbox trait system (traits.rs) - ✅ Landlock sandbox support (Linux kernel 5.13+) - ✅ Firejail sandbox support (Linux user-space) - ✅ Bubblewrap sandbox support (Linux/macOS user namespaces) - ✅ Docker sandbox support (container isolation) - ✅ No-op fallback (application-layer security only) - ✅ Auto-detection logic (detect.rs) - ✅ Audit logging with HMAC signing support (audit.rs) - ✅ SecurityConfig schema (SandboxConfig, ResourceLimitsConfig, AuditConfig) - ✅ Feature-gated implementation (sandbox-landlock, sandbox-bubblewrap) - ✅ 1,265 tests passing Key design principles: - Silent auto-detection: no new prompts in wizard - Graceful degradation: works on all platforms - Feature flags: zero overhead when disabled - Pluggable architecture: swap sandbox backends via config - Backward compatible: existing configs work unchanged Config usage: ```toml [security.sandbox] enabled = false # Explicitly disable backend = "auto" # auto, landlock, firejail, bubblewrap, docker, none [security.resources] max_memory_mb = 512 max_cpu_time_seconds = 60 [security.audit] enabled = true log_path = "audit.log" sign_events = false ``` Security documentation: - docs/sandboxing.md: Sandbox implementation strategies - docs/resource-limits.md: Resource limit approaches - docs/audit-logging.md: Audit logging specification - docs/security-roadmap.md: 3-phase implementation plan - docs/frictionless-security.md: Zero-impact wizard design - docs/agnostic-security.md: Platform/hardware agnostic approach Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-16 04:14:16 -05:00 · 2026-02-16 04:14:16 -05:00 · 0383a82a6f
commit 0383a82a6f
parent 1140a7887d
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--- a/docs/audit-logging.md
+++ b/docs/audit-logging.md
@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+# Audit Logging for ZeroClaw
+
+## Problem
+ZeroClaw logs actions but lacks tamper-evident audit trails for:
+- Who executed what command
+- When and from which channel
+- What resources were accessed
+- Whether security policies were triggered
+
+---
+
+## Proposed Audit Log Format
+
+```json
+{
+  "timestamp": "2026-02-16T12:34:56Z",
+  "event_id": "evt_1a2b3c4d",
+  "event_type": "command_execution",
+  "actor": {
+    "channel": "telegram",
+    "user_id": "123456789",
+    "username": "@alice"
+  },
+  "action": {
+    "command": "ls -la",
+    "risk_level": "low",
+    "approved": false,
+    "allowed": true
+  },
+  "result": {
+    "success": true,
+    "exit_code": 0,
+    "duration_ms": 15
+  },
+  "security": {
+    "policy_violation": false,
+    "rate_limit_remaining": 19
+  },
+  "signature": "SHA256:abc123..."  // HMAC for tamper evidence
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Implementation
+
+```rust
+// src/security/audit.rs
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct AuditEvent {
+    pub timestamp: String,
+    pub event_id: String,
+    pub event_type: AuditEventType,
+    pub actor: Actor,
+    pub action: Action,
+    pub result: ExecutionResult,
+    pub security: SecurityContext,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub enum AuditEventType {
+    CommandExecution,
+    FileAccess,
+    ConfigurationChange,
+    AuthSuccess,
+    AuthFailure,
+    PolicyViolation,
+}
+
+pub struct AuditLogger {
+    log_path: PathBuf,
+    signing_key: Option<hmac::Hmac<sha2::Sha256>>,
+}
+
+impl AuditLogger {
+    pub fn log(&self, event: &AuditEvent) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let mut line = serde_json::to_string(event)?;
+
+        // Add HMAC signature if key configured
+        if let Some(ref key) = self.signing_key {
+            let signature = compute_hmac(key, line.as_bytes());
+            line.push_str(&format!("\n\"signature\": \"{}\"", signature));
+        }
+
+        let mut file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
+            .create(true)
+            .append(true)
+            .open(&self.log_path)?;
+
+        writeln!(file, "{}", line)?;
+        file.sync_all()?;  // Force flush for durability
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    pub fn search(&self, filter: AuditFilter) -> Vec<AuditEvent> {
+        // Search log file by filter criteria
+        todo!()
+    }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Config Schema
+
+```toml
+[security.audit]
+enabled = true
+log_path = "~/.config/zeroclaw/audit.log"
+max_size_mb = 100
+rotate = "daily"  # daily | weekly | size
+
+# Tamper evidence
+sign_events = true
+signing_key_path = "~/.config/zeroclaw/audit.key"
+
+# What to log
+log_commands = true
+log_file_access = true
+log_auth_events = true
+log_policy_violations = true
+```
+
+---
+
+## Audit Query CLI
+
+```bash
+# Show all commands executed by @alice
+zeroclaw audit --user @alice
+
+# Show all high-risk commands
+zeroclaw audit --risk high
+
+# Show violations from last 24 hours
+zeroclaw audit --since 24h --violations-only
+
+# Export to JSON for analysis
+zeroclaw audit --format json --output audit.json
+
+# Verify log integrity
+zeroclaw audit --verify-signatures
+```
+
+---
+
+## Log Rotation
+
+```rust
+pub fn rotate_audit_log(log_path: &PathBuf, max_size: u64) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    let metadata = std::fs::metadata(log_path)?;
+    if metadata.len() < max_size {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    // Rotate: audit.log -> audit.log.1 -> audit.log.2 -> ...
+    let stem = log_path.file_stem().unwrap_or_default();
+    let extension = log_path.extension().and_then(|s| s.to_str()).unwrap_or("log");
+
+    for i in (1..10).rev() {
+        let old_name = format!("{}.{}.{}", stem, i, extension);
+        let new_name = format!("{}.{}.{}", stem, i + 1, extension);
+        let _ = std::fs::rename(old_name, new_name);
+    }
+
+    let rotated = format!("{}.1.{}", stem, extension);
+    std::fs::rename(log_path, &rotated)?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Implementation Priority
+
+| Phase | Feature | Effort | Security Value |
+|-------|---------|--------|----------------|
+| **P0** | Basic event logging | Low | Medium |
+| **P1** | Query CLI | Medium | Medium |
+| **P2** | HMAC signing | Medium | High |
+| **P3** | Log rotation + archival | Low | Medium |