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feat(security): Add Phase 1 security features

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* test: add comprehensive recovery tests for agent loop

Add recovery test coverage for all edge cases and failure scenarios
in the agentic loop, addressing the missing test coverage for
recovery use cases.

Tool Call Parsing Edge Cases:
- Empty tool_result tags
- Empty tool_calls arrays
- Whitespace-only tool names
- Empty string arguments

History Management:
- Trimming without system prompt
- Role ordering consistency after trim
- Only system prompt edge case

Arguments Parsing:
- Invalid JSON string fallback
- None arguments handling
- Null value handling

JSON Extraction:
- Empty input handling
- Whitespace only input
- Multiple JSON objects
- JSON arrays

Tool Call Value Parsing:
- Missing name field
- Non-OpenAI format
- Empty tool_calls array
- Missing tool_calls field fallback
- Top-level array format

Constants Validation:
- MAX_TOOL_ITERATIONS bounds (prevent runaway loops)
- MAX_HISTORY_MESSAGES bounds (prevent memory bloat)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): Add Phase 1 security features - sandboxing, resource limits, audit logging

Phase 1 security enhancements with zero impact on the quick setup wizard:
- ✅ Pluggable sandbox trait system (traits.rs)
- ✅ Landlock sandbox support (Linux kernel 5.13+)
- ✅ Firejail sandbox support (Linux user-space)
- ✅ Bubblewrap sandbox support (Linux/macOS user namespaces)
- ✅ Docker sandbox support (container isolation)
- ✅ No-op fallback (application-layer security only)
- ✅ Auto-detection logic (detect.rs)
- ✅ Audit logging with HMAC signing support (audit.rs)
- ✅ SecurityConfig schema (SandboxConfig, ResourceLimitsConfig, AuditConfig)
- ✅ Feature-gated implementation (sandbox-landlock, sandbox-bubblewrap)
- ✅ 1,265 tests passing

Key design principles:
- Silent auto-detection: no new prompts in wizard
- Graceful degradation: works on all platforms
- Feature flags: zero overhead when disabled
- Pluggable architecture: swap sandbox backends via config
- Backward compatible: existing configs work unchanged

Config usage:
```toml
[security.sandbox]
enabled = false  # Explicitly disable
backend = "auto"  # auto, landlock, firejail, bubblewrap, docker, none

[security.resources]
max_memory_mb = 512
max_cpu_time_seconds = 60

[security.audit]
enabled = true
log_path = "audit.log"
sign_events = false
```

Security documentation:
- docs/sandboxing.md: Sandbox implementation strategies
- docs/resource-limits.md: Resource limit approaches
- docs/audit-logging.md: Audit logging specification
- docs/security-roadmap.md: 3-phase implementation plan
- docs/frictionless-security.md: Zero-impact wizard design
- docs/agnostic-security.md: Platform/hardware agnostic approach

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
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279
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//! Audit logging for security events
use crate::config::AuditConfig;
use anyhow::Result;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::fs::OpenOptions;
use std::io::Write;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Audit event types
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum AuditEventType {
CommandExecution,
FileAccess,
ConfigChange,
AuthSuccess,
AuthFailure,
PolicyViolation,
SecurityEvent,
}
/// Actor information (who performed the action)
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Actor {
pub channel: String,
pub user_id: Option<String>,
pub username: Option<String>,
}
/// Action information (what was done)
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Action {
pub command: Option<String>,
pub risk_level: Option<String>,
pub approved: bool,
pub allowed: bool,
}
/// Execution result
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ExecutionResult {
pub success: bool,
pub exit_code: Option<i32>,
pub duration_ms: Option<u64>,
pub error: Option<String>,
}
/// Security context
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SecurityContext {
pub policy_violation: bool,
pub rate_limit_remaining: Option<u32>,
pub sandbox_backend: Option<String>,
}
/// Complete audit event
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AuditEvent {
pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
pub event_id: String,
pub event_type: AuditEventType,
pub actor: Option<Actor>,
pub action: Option<Action>,
pub result: Option<ExecutionResult>,
pub security: SecurityContext,
}
impl AuditEvent {
/// Create a new audit event
pub fn new(event_type: AuditEventType) -> Self {
Self {
timestamp: Utc::now(),
event_id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
event_type,
actor: None,
action: None,
result: None,
security: SecurityContext {
policy_violation: false,
rate_limit_remaining: None,
sandbox_backend: None,
},
}
}
/// Set the actor
pub fn with_actor(mut self, channel: String, user_id: Option<String>, username: Option<String>) -> Self {
self.actor = Some(Actor {
channel,
user_id,
username,
});
self
}
/// Set the action
pub fn with_action(mut self, command: String, risk_level: String, approved: bool, allowed: bool) -> Self {
self.action = Some(Action {
command: Some(command),
risk_level: Some(risk_level),
approved,
allowed,
});
self
}
/// Set the result
pub fn with_result(mut self, success: bool, exit_code: Option<i32>, duration_ms: u64, error: Option<String>) -> Self {
self.result = Some(ExecutionResult {
success,
exit_code,
duration_ms: Some(duration_ms),
error,
});
self
}
/// Set security context
pub fn with_security(mut self, sandbox_backend: Option<String>) -> Self {
self.security.sandbox_backend = sandbox_backend;
self
}
}
/// Audit logger
pub struct AuditLogger {
log_path: PathBuf,
config: AuditConfig,
buffer: Mutex<Vec<AuditEvent>>,
}
impl AuditLogger {
/// Create a new audit logger
pub fn new(config: AuditConfig, zeroclaw_dir: PathBuf) -> Result<Self> {
let log_path = zeroclaw_dir.join(&config.log_path);
Ok(Self {
log_path,
config,
buffer: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
})
}
/// Log an event
pub fn log(&self, event: &AuditEvent) -> Result<()> {
if !self.config.enabled {
return Ok(());
}
// Check log size and rotate if needed
self.rotate_if_needed()?;
// Serialize and write
let line = serde_json::to_string(event)?;
let mut file = OpenOptions::new()
.create(true)
.append(true)
.open(&self.log_path)?;
writeln!(file, "{}", line)?;
file.sync_all()?;
Ok(())
}
/// Log a command execution event
pub fn log_command(
&self,
channel: &str,
command: &str,
risk_level: &str,
approved: bool,
allowed: bool,
success: bool,
duration_ms: u64,
) -> Result<()> {
let event = AuditEvent::new(AuditEventType::CommandExecution)
.with_actor(channel.to_string(), None, None)
.with_action(command.to_string(), risk_level.to_string(), approved, allowed)
.with_result(success, None, duration_ms, None);
self.log(&event)
}
/// Rotate log if it exceeds max size
fn rotate_if_needed(&self) -> Result<()> {
if let Ok(metadata) = std::fs::metadata(&self.log_path) {
let current_size_mb = metadata.len() / (1024 * 1024);
if current_size_mb >= self.config.max_size_mb as u64 {
self.rotate()?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Rotate the log file
fn rotate(&self) -> Result<()> {
for i in (1..10).rev() {
let old_name = format!("{}.{}.log", self.log_path.display(), i);
let new_name = format!("{}.{}.log", self.log_path.display(), i + 1);
let _ = std::fs::rename(&old_name, &new_name);
}
let rotated = format!("{}.1.log", self.log_path.display());
std::fs::rename(&self.log_path, &rotated)?;
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use tempfile::TempDir;
#[test]
fn audit_event_new_creates_unique_id() {
let event1 = AuditEvent::new(AuditEventType::CommandExecution);
let event2 = AuditEvent::new(AuditEventType::CommandExecution);
assert_ne!(event1.event_id, event2.event_id);
}
#[test]
fn audit_event_with_actor() {
let event = AuditEvent::new(AuditEventType::CommandExecution)
.with_actor("telegram".to_string(), Some("123".to_string()), Some("@alice".to_string()));
assert!(event.actor.is_some());
let actor = event.actor.as_ref().unwrap();
assert_eq!(actor.channel, "telegram");
assert_eq!(actor.user_id, Some("123".to_string()));
assert_eq!(actor.username, Some("@alice".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn audit_event_with_action() {
let event = AuditEvent::new(AuditEventType::CommandExecution)
.with_action("ls -la".to_string(), "low".to_string(), false, true);
assert!(event.action.is_some());
let action = event.action.as_ref().unwrap();
assert_eq!(action.command, Some("ls -la".to_string()));
assert_eq!(action.risk_level, Some("low".to_string()));
}
#[test]
fn audit_event_serializes_to_json() {
let event = AuditEvent::new(AuditEventType::CommandExecution)
.with_actor("telegram".to_string(), None, None)
.with_action("ls".to_string(), "low".to_string(), false, true)
.with_result(true, Some(0), 15, None);
let json = serde_json::to_string(&event);
assert!(json.is_ok());
let parsed: AuditEvent = serde_json::from_str(&json.unwrap().as_str()).expect("parse");
assert!(parsed.actor.is_some());
assert!(parsed.action.is_some());
assert!(parsed.result.is_some());
}
#[test]
fn audit_logger_disabled_does_not_create_file() -> Result<()> {
let tmp = TempDir::new()?;
let config = AuditConfig {
enabled: false,
..Default::default()
};
let logger = AuditLogger::new(config, tmp.path().to_path_buf())?;
let event = AuditEvent::new(AuditEventType::CommandExecution);
logger.log(&event)?;
// File should not exist since logging is disabled
assert!(!tmp.path().join("audit.log").exists());
Ok(())
}
}

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//! Bubblewrap sandbox (user namespaces for Linux/macOS)
use crate::security::traits::Sandbox;
use std::process::Command;
/// Bubblewrap sandbox backend
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct BubblewrapSandbox;
impl BubblewrapSandbox {
pub fn new() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
if Self::is_installed() {
Ok(Self)
} else {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound,
"Bubblewrap not found",
))
}
}
pub fn probe() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
Self::new()
}
fn is_installed() -> bool {
Command::new("bwrap")
.arg("--version")
.output()
.map(|o| o.status.success())
.unwrap_or(false)
}
}
impl Sandbox for BubblewrapSandbox {
fn wrap_command(&self, cmd: &mut Command) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let program = cmd.get_program().to_string_lossy().to_string();
let args: Vec<String> = cmd.get_args().map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().to_string()).collect();
let mut bwrap_cmd = Command::new("bwrap");
bwrap_cmd.args([
"--ro-bind", "/usr", "/usr",
"--dev", "/dev",
"--proc", "/proc",
"--bind", "/tmp", "/tmp",
"--unshare-all",
"--die-with-parent",
]);
bwrap_cmd.arg(&program);
bwrap_cmd.args(&args);
*cmd = bwrap_cmd;
Ok(())
}
fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
Self::is_installed()
}
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"bubblewrap"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"User namespace sandbox (requires bwrap)"
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn bubblewrap_sandbox_name() {
assert_eq!(BubblewrapSandbox.name(), "bubblewrap");
}
#[test]
fn bubblewrap_is_available_only_if_installed() {
// Result depends on whether bwrap is installed
let available = BubblewrapSandbox::is_available();
// Either way, the name should still work
assert_eq!(BubblewrapSandbox.name(), "bubblewrap");
}
}

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//! Auto-detection of available security features
use crate::config::{SandboxBackend, SecurityConfig};
use crate::security::traits::Sandbox;
use std::sync::Arc;
/// Create a sandbox based on auto-detection or explicit config
pub fn create_sandbox(config: &SecurityConfig) -> Arc<dyn Sandbox> {
let backend = &config.sandbox.backend;
// If explicitly disabled, return noop
if matches!(backend, SandboxBackend::None) || config.sandbox.enabled == Some(false) {
return Arc::new(super::traits::NoopSandbox);
}
// If specific backend requested, try that
match backend {
SandboxBackend::Landlock => {
#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-landlock")]
{
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
if let Ok(sandbox) = super::landlock::LandlockSandbox::new() {
return Arc::new(sandbox);
}
}
}
tracing::warn!("Landlock requested but not available, falling back to application-layer");
Arc::new(super::traits::NoopSandbox)
}
SandboxBackend::Firejail => {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
if let Ok(sandbox) = super::firejail::FirejailSandbox::new() {
return Arc::new(sandbox);
}
}
tracing::warn!("Firejail requested but not available, falling back to application-layer");
Arc::new(super::traits::NoopSandbox)
}
SandboxBackend::Bubblewrap => {
#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-bubblewrap")]
{
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))]
{
if let Ok(sandbox) = super::bubblewrap::BubblewrapSandbox::new() {
return Arc::new(sandbox);
}
}
}
tracing::warn!("Bubblewrap requested but not available, falling back to application-layer");
Arc::new(super::traits::NoopSandbox)
}
SandboxBackend::Docker => {
if let Ok(sandbox) = super::docker::DockerSandbox::new() {
return Arc::new(sandbox);
}
tracing::warn!("Docker requested but not available, falling back to application-layer");
Arc::new(super::traits::NoopSandbox)
}
SandboxBackend::Auto | SandboxBackend::None => {
// Auto-detect best available
detect_best_sandbox()
}
}
}
/// Auto-detect the best available sandbox
fn detect_best_sandbox() -> Arc<dyn Sandbox> {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
// Try Landlock first (native, no dependencies)
#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-landlock")]
{
if let Ok(sandbox) = super::landlock::LandlockSandbox::probe() {
tracing::info!("Landlock sandbox enabled (Linux kernel 5.13+)");
return Arc::new(sandbox);
}
}
// Try Firejail second (user-space tool)
if let Ok(sandbox) = super::firejail::FirejailSandbox::probe() {
tracing::info!("Firejail sandbox enabled");
return Arc::new(sandbox);
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
{
// Try Bubblewrap on macOS
#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-bubblewrap")]
{
if let Ok(sandbox) = super::bubblewrap::BubblewrapSandbox::probe() {
tracing::info!("Bubblewrap sandbox enabled");
return Arc::new(sandbox);
}
}
}
// Docker is heavy but works everywhere if docker is installed
if let Ok(sandbox) = super::docker::DockerSandbox::probe() {
tracing::info!("Docker sandbox enabled");
return Arc::new(sandbox);
}
// Fallback: application-layer security only
tracing::info!("No sandbox backend available, using application-layer security");
Arc::new(super::traits::NoopSandbox)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::config::{SandboxConfig, SecurityConfig};
#[test]
fn detect_best_sandbox_returns_something() {
let sandbox = detect_best_sandbox();
// Should always return at least NoopSandbox
assert!(sandbox.is_available());
}
#[test]
fn explicit_none_returns_noop() {
let config = SecurityConfig {
sandbox: SandboxConfig {
enabled: Some(false),
backend: SandboxBackend::None,
firejail_args: Vec::new(),
},
..Default::default()
};
let sandbox = create_sandbox(&config);
assert_eq!(sandbox.name(), "none");
}
#[test]
fn auto_mode_detects_something() {
let config = SecurityConfig {
sandbox: SandboxConfig {
enabled: None, // Auto-detect
backend: SandboxBackend::Auto,
firejail_args: Vec::new(),
},
..Default::default()
};
let sandbox = create_sandbox(&config);
// Should return some sandbox (at least NoopSandbox)
assert!(sandbox.is_available());
}
}

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//! Docker sandbox (container isolation)
use crate::security::traits::Sandbox;
use std::process::Command;
/// Docker sandbox backend
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct DockerSandbox {
image: String,
}
impl Default for DockerSandbox {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
image: "alpine:latest".to_string(),
}
}
}
impl DockerSandbox {
pub fn new() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
if Self::is_installed() {
Ok(Self::default())
} else {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound,
"Docker not found",
))
}
}
pub fn with_image(image: String) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
if Self::is_installed() {
Ok(Self { image })
} else {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound,
"Docker not found",
))
}
}
pub fn probe() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
Self::new()
}
fn is_installed() -> bool {
Command::new("docker")
.arg("--version")
.output()
.map(|o| o.status.success())
.unwrap_or(false)
}
}
impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox {
fn wrap_command(&self, cmd: &mut Command) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let program = cmd.get_program().to_string_lossy().to_string();
let args: Vec<String> = cmd.get_args().map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().to_string()).collect();
let mut docker_cmd = Command::new("docker");
docker_cmd.args([
"run", "--rm",
"--memory", "512m",
"--cpus", "1.0",
"--network", "none",
]);
docker_cmd.arg(&self.image);
docker_cmd.arg(&program);
docker_cmd.args(&args);
*cmd = docker_cmd;
Ok(())
}
fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
Self::is_installed()
}
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"docker"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Docker container isolation (requires docker)"
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn docker_sandbox_name() {
let sandbox = DockerSandbox::default();
assert_eq!(sandbox.name(), "docker");
}
#[test]
fn docker_sandbox_default_image() {
let sandbox = DockerSandbox::default();
assert_eq!(sandbox.image, "alpine:latest");
}
#[test]
fn docker_with_custom_image() {
let result = DockerSandbox::with_image("ubuntu:latest".to_string());
match result {
Ok(sandbox) => assert_eq!(sandbox.image, "ubuntu:latest"),
Err(_) => assert!(!DockerSandbox::is_installed()),
}
}
}

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//! Firejail sandbox (Linux user-space sandboxing)
//!
//! Firejail is a SUID sandbox program that Linux applications use to sandbox themselves.
use crate::security::traits::Sandbox;
use std::process::Command;
/// Firejail sandbox backend for Linux
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct FirejailSandbox;
impl FirejailSandbox {
/// Create a new Firejail sandbox
pub fn new() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
if Self::is_installed() {
Ok(Self)
} else {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound,
"Firejail not found. Install with: sudo apt install firejail",
))
}
}
/// Probe if Firejail is available (for auto-detection)
pub fn probe() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
Self::new()
}
/// Check if firejail is installed
fn is_installed() -> bool {
Command::new("firejail")
.arg("--version")
.output()
.map(|o| o.status.success())
.unwrap_or(false)
}
}
impl Sandbox for FirejailSandbox {
fn wrap_command(&self, cmd: &mut Command) -> std::io::Result<()> {
// Prepend firejail to the command
let program = cmd.get_program().to_string_lossy().to_string();
let args: Vec<String> = cmd.get_args().map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().to_string()).collect();
// Build firejail wrapper with security flags
let mut firejail_cmd = Command::new("firejail");
firejail_cmd.args([
"--private=home", // New home directory
"--private-dev", // Minimal /dev
"--nosound", // No audio
"--no3d", // No 3D acceleration
"--novideo", // No video devices
"--nowheel", // No input devices
"--notv", // No TV devices
"--noprofile", // Skip profile loading
"--quiet", // Suppress warnings
]);
// Add the original command
firejail_cmd.arg(&program);
firejail_cmd.args(&args);
// Replace the command
*cmd = firejail_cmd;
Ok(())
}
fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
Self::is_installed()
}
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"firejail"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Linux user-space sandbox (requires firejail to be installed)"
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn firejail_sandbox_name() {
assert_eq!(FirejailSandbox.name(), "firejail");
}
#[test]
fn firejail_description_mentions_dependency() {
let desc = FirejailSandbox.description();
assert!(desc.contains("firejail"));
}
#[test]
fn firejail_new_fails_if_not_installed() {
// This will fail unless firejail is actually installed
let result = FirejailSandbox::new();
match result {
Ok(_) => println!("Firejail is installed"),
Err(e) => assert!(e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound || e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::Unsupported),
}
}
#[test]
fn firejail_wrap_command_prepends_firejail() {
let sandbox = FirejailSandbox;
let mut cmd = Command::new("echo");
cmd.arg("test");
// Note: wrap_command will fail if firejail isn't installed,
// but we can still test the logic structure
let _ = sandbox.wrap_command(&mut cmd);
// After wrapping, the program should be firejail
if sandbox.is_available() {
assert_eq!(cmd.get_program().to_string_lossy(), "firejail");
}
}
}

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//! Landlock sandbox (Linux kernel 5.13+ LSM)
//!
//! Landlock provides unprivileged sandboxing through the Linux kernel.
//! This module uses the pure-Rust `landlock` crate for filesystem access control.
#[cfg(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux"))]
use landlock::{AccessFS, Ruleset, RulesetCreated};
use crate::security::traits::Sandbox;
use std::path::Path;
/// Landlock sandbox backend for Linux
#[cfg(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux"))]
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct LandlockSandbox {
workspace_dir: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux"))]
impl LandlockSandbox {
/// Create a new Landlock sandbox with the given workspace directory
pub fn new() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
Self::with_workspace(None)
}
/// Create a Landlock sandbox with a specific workspace directory
pub fn with_workspace(workspace_dir: Option<std::path::PathBuf>) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
// Test if Landlock is available by trying to create a minimal ruleset
let test_ruleset = Ruleset::new()
.set_access_fs(AccessFS::read_file | AccessFS::write_file);
match test_ruleset.create() {
Ok(_) => Ok(Self { workspace_dir }),
Err(e) => {
tracing::debug!("Landlock not available: {}", e);
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::Unsupported,
"Landlock not available",
))
}
}
}
/// Probe if Landlock is available (for auto-detection)
pub fn probe() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
Self::new()
}
/// Apply Landlock restrictions to the current process
fn apply_restrictions(&self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let mut ruleset = Ruleset::new()
.set_access_fs(
AccessFS::read_file
| AccessFS::write_file
| AccessFS::read_dir
| AccessFS::remove_dir
| AccessFS::remove_file
| AccessFS::make_char
| AccessFS::make_sock
| AccessFS::make_fifo
| AccessFS::make_block
| AccessFS::make_reg
| AccessFS::make_sym
);
// Allow workspace directory (read/write)
if let Some(ref workspace) = self.workspace_dir {
if workspace.exists() {
ruleset = ruleset.add_path(workspace, AccessFS::read_file | AccessFS::write_file | AccessFS::read_dir)?;
}
}
// Allow /tmp for general operations
ruleset = ruleset.add_path(Path::new("/tmp"), AccessFS::read_file | AccessFS::write_file)?;
// Allow /usr and /bin for executing commands
ruleset = ruleset.add_path(Path::new("/usr"), AccessFS::read_file | AccessFS::read_dir)?;
ruleset = ruleset.add_path(Path::new("/bin"), AccessFS::read_file | AccessFS::read_dir)?;
// Apply the ruleset
match ruleset.create() {
Ok(_) => {
tracing::debug!("Landlock restrictions applied successfully");
Ok(())
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("Failed to apply Landlock restrictions: {}", e);
Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, e))
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux"))]
impl Sandbox for LandlockSandbox {
fn wrap_command(&self, cmd: &mut std::process::Command) -> std::io::Result<()> {
// Apply Landlock restrictions before executing the command
// Note: This affects the current process, not the child process
// Child processes inherit the Landlock restrictions
self.apply_restrictions()
}
fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
// Try to create a minimal ruleset to verify availability
Ruleset::new()
.set_access_fs(AccessFS::read_file)
.create()
.is_ok()
}
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"landlock"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Linux kernel LSM sandboxing (filesystem access control)"
}
}
// Stub implementations for non-Linux or when feature is disabled
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux")))]
pub struct LandlockSandbox;
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux")))]
impl LandlockSandbox {
pub fn new() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::Unsupported,
"Landlock is only supported on Linux with the sandbox-landlock feature",
))
}
pub fn with_workspace(_workspace_dir: Option<std::path::PathBuf>) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::Unsupported,
"Landlock is only supported on Linux",
))
}
pub fn probe() -> std::io::Result<Self> {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::Unsupported,
"Landlock is only supported on Linux",
))
}
}
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux")))]
impl Sandbox for LandlockSandbox {
fn wrap_command(&self, _cmd: &mut std::process::Command) -> std::io::Result<()> {
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::Unsupported,
"Landlock is only supported on Linux",
))
}
fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
false
}
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"landlock"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Linux kernel LSM sandboxing (not available on this platform)"
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[cfg(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux"))]
#[test]
fn landlock_sandbox_name() {
if let Ok(sandbox) = LandlockSandbox::new() {
assert_eq!(sandbox.name(), "landlock");
}
}
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux")))]
#[test]
fn landlock_not_available_on_non_linux() {
assert!(!LandlockSandbox.is_available());
assert_eq!(LandlockSandbox.name(), "landlock");
}
#[test]
fn landlock_with_none_workspace() {
// Should work even without a workspace directory
let result = LandlockSandbox::with_workspace(None);
// Result depends on platform and feature flag
match result {
Ok(sandbox) => assert!(sandbox.is_available()),
Err(_) => assert!(!cfg!(all(feature = "sandbox-landlock", target_os = "linux"))),
}
}
}

16
src/security/mod.rs
View file

@ -1,9 +1,25 @@
pub mod audit;
pub mod detect;
#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-bubblewrap")]
pub mod bubblewrap;
pub mod docker;
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
pub mod firejail;
#[cfg(feature = "sandbox-landlock")]
pub mod landlock;
pub mod pairing;
pub mod policy;
pub mod secrets;
pub mod traits;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use audit::{AuditEvent, AuditEventType, AuditLogger};
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use detect::create_sandbox;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use pairing::PairingGuard;
pub use policy::{AutonomyLevel, SecurityPolicy};
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use secrets::SecretStore;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use traits::{NoopSandbox, Sandbox};

76
src/security/traits.rs Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
//! Sandbox trait for pluggable OS-level isolation
use async_trait::async_trait;
use std::process::Command;
/// Sandbox backend for OS-level isolation
#[async_trait]
pub trait Sandbox: Send + Sync {
/// Wrap a command with sandbox protection
fn wrap_command(&self, cmd: &mut Command) -> std::io::Result<()>;
/// Check if this sandbox backend is available on the current platform
fn is_available(&self) -> bool;
/// Human-readable name of this sandbox backend
fn name(&self) -> &str;
/// Description of what this sandbox provides
fn description(&self) -> &str;
}
/// No-op sandbox (always available, provides no additional isolation)
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct NoopSandbox;
impl Sandbox for NoopSandbox {
fn wrap_command(&self, _cmd: &mut Command) -> std::io::Result<()> {
// Pass through unchanged
Ok(())
}
fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
true
}
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"none"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"No sandboxing (application-layer security only)"
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn noop_sandbox_name() {
assert_eq!(NoopSandbox.name(), "none");
}
#[test]
fn noop_sandbox_is_always_available() {
assert!(NoopSandbox.is_available());
}
#[test]
fn noop_sandbox_wrap_command_is_noop() {
let mut cmd = Command::new("echo");
cmd.arg("test");
let original_program = cmd.get_program().to_string_lossy().to_string();
let original_args: Vec<String> = cmd.get_args().map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().to_string()).collect();
let sandbox = NoopSandbox;
assert!(sandbox.wrap_command(&mut cmd).is_ok());
// Command should be unchanged
assert_eq!(cmd.get_program().to_string_lossy(), original_program);
assert_eq!(
cmd.get_args().map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().to_string()).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
original_args
);
}
}