zeroclaw/src/tools/file_read.rs
argenis de la rosa 05cb353f7f feat: initial release — ZeroClaw v0.1.0
- 22 AI providers (OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI, Mistral, etc.)
- 7 channels (CLI, Telegram, Discord, Slack, iMessage, Matrix, Webhook)
- 5-step onboarding wizard with Project Context personalization
- OpenClaw-aligned system prompt (SOUL.md, IDENTITY.md, USER.md, AGENTS.md, etc.)
- SQLite memory backend with auto-save
- Skills system with on-demand loading
- Security: autonomy levels, command allowlists, cost limits
- 532 tests passing, 0 clippy warnings
2026-02-13 12:19:14 -05:00

203 lines
6.5 KiB
Rust

use super::traits::{Tool, ToolResult};
use crate::security::SecurityPolicy;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use serde_json::json;
use std::sync::Arc;
/// Read file contents with path sandboxing
pub struct FileReadTool {
security: Arc<SecurityPolicy>,
}
impl FileReadTool {
pub fn new(security: Arc<SecurityPolicy>) -> Self {
Self { security }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for FileReadTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"file_read"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Read the contents of a file in the workspace"
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"path": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Relative path to the file within the workspace"
}
},
"required": ["path"]
})
}
async fn execute(&self, args: serde_json::Value) -> anyhow::Result<ToolResult> {
let path = args
.get("path")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing 'path' parameter"))?;
// Security check: validate path is within workspace
if !self.security.is_path_allowed(path) {
return Ok(ToolResult {
success: false,
output: String::new(),
error: Some(format!("Path not allowed by security policy: {path}")),
});
}
let full_path = self.security.workspace_dir.join(path);
match tokio::fs::read_to_string(&full_path).await {
Ok(contents) => Ok(ToolResult {
success: true,
output: contents,
error: None,
}),
Err(e) => Ok(ToolResult {
success: false,
output: String::new(),
error: Some(format!("Failed to read file: {e}")),
}),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::security::{AutonomyLevel, SecurityPolicy};
fn test_security(workspace: std::path::PathBuf) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: workspace,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
})
}
#[test]
fn file_read_name() {
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(std::env::temp_dir()));
assert_eq!(tool.name(), "file_read");
}
#[test]
fn file_read_schema_has_path() {
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(std::env::temp_dir()));
let schema = tool.parameters_schema();
assert!(schema["properties"]["path"].is_object());
assert!(schema["required"]
.as_array()
.unwrap()
.contains(&json!("path")));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn file_read_existing_file() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join("zeroclaw_test_file_read");
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await.unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(dir.join("test.txt"), "hello world")
.await
.unwrap();
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(dir.clone()));
let result = tool.execute(json!({"path": "test.txt"})).await.unwrap();
assert!(result.success);
assert_eq!(result.output, "hello world");
assert!(result.error.is_none());
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn file_read_nonexistent_file() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join("zeroclaw_test_file_read_missing");
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await.unwrap();
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(dir.clone()));
let result = tool.execute(json!({"path": "nope.txt"})).await.unwrap();
assert!(!result.success);
assert!(result.error.as_ref().unwrap().contains("Failed to read"));
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn file_read_blocks_path_traversal() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join("zeroclaw_test_file_read_traversal");
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await.unwrap();
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(dir.clone()));
let result = tool
.execute(json!({"path": "../../../etc/passwd"}))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(!result.success);
assert!(result.error.as_ref().unwrap().contains("not allowed"));
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn file_read_blocks_absolute_path() {
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(std::env::temp_dir()));
let result = tool.execute(json!({"path": "/etc/passwd"})).await.unwrap();
assert!(!result.success);
assert!(result.error.as_ref().unwrap().contains("not allowed"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn file_read_missing_path_param() {
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(std::env::temp_dir()));
let result = tool.execute(json!({})).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn file_read_empty_file() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join("zeroclaw_test_file_read_empty");
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).await.unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(dir.join("empty.txt"), "").await.unwrap();
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(dir.clone()));
let result = tool.execute(json!({"path": "empty.txt"})).await.unwrap();
assert!(result.success);
assert_eq!(result.output, "");
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn file_read_nested_path() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join("zeroclaw_test_file_read_nested");
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("sub/dir"))
.await
.unwrap();
tokio::fs::write(dir.join("sub/dir/deep.txt"), "deep content")
.await
.unwrap();
let tool = FileReadTool::new(test_security(dir.clone()));
let result = tool
.execute(json!({"path": "sub/dir/deep.txt"}))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(result.success);
assert_eq!(result.output, "deep content");
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).await;
}
}