zeroclaw/src/tools/shell.rs
argenis de la rosa 976c5bbf3c hardening: fix 7 production weaknesses found in codebase scan
Scan findings and fixes:

1. Gateway buffer overflow (8KB → 64KB)
   - Fixed: Increased request buffer from 8,192 to 65,536 bytes
   - Large POST bodies (long prompts) were silently truncated

2. Gateway slow-loris attack (no read timeout → 30s)
   - Fixed: tokio::time::timeout(30s) on stream.read()
   - Malicious clients could hold connections indefinitely

3. Webhook secret timing attack (== → constant_time_eq)
   - Fixed: Now uses constant_time_eq() for secret comparison
   - Prevents timing side-channel on webhook authentication

4. Pairing brute force (no limit → 5 attempts + 5min lockout)
   - Fixed: PairingGuard tracks failed attempts with lockout
   - Returns 429 Too Many Requests with retry_after seconds

5. Shell tool hang (no timeout → 60s kill)
   - Fixed: tokio::time::timeout(60s) on Command::output()
   - Commands that hang are killed and return error

6. Shell tool OOM (unbounded output → 1MB cap)
   - Fixed: stdout/stderr truncated at 1MB with warning
   - Prevents memory exhaustion from verbose commands

7. Provider HTTP timeout (none → 120s request + 10s connect)
   - Fixed: All 5 providers (OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI,
     Ollama, Compatible) now have reqwest timeouts
   - Ollama gets 300s (local models are slower)

949 tests passing, 0 clippy warnings, cargo fmt clean
2026-02-14 01:47:08 -05:00

202 lines
6.4 KiB
Rust

use super::traits::{Tool, ToolResult};
use crate::security::SecurityPolicy;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use serde_json::json;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
/// Maximum shell command execution time before kill.
const SHELL_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 60;
/// Maximum output size in bytes (1MB).
const MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES: usize = 1_048_576;
/// Shell command execution tool with sandboxing
pub struct ShellTool {
security: Arc<SecurityPolicy>,
}
impl ShellTool {
pub fn new(security: Arc<SecurityPolicy>) -> Self {
Self { security }
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl Tool for ShellTool {
fn name(&self) -> &str {
"shell"
}
fn description(&self) -> &str {
"Execute a shell command in the workspace directory"
}
fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
json!({
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"command": {
"type": "string",
"description": "The shell command to execute"
}
},
"required": ["command"]
})
}
async fn execute(&self, args: serde_json::Value) -> anyhow::Result<ToolResult> {
let command = args
.get("command")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing 'command' parameter"))?;
// Security check: validate command against allowlist
if !self.security.is_command_allowed(command) {
return Ok(ToolResult {
success: false,
output: String::new(),
error: Some(format!("Command not allowed by security policy: {command}")),
});
}
// Execute with timeout to prevent hanging commands
let result = tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_secs(SHELL_TIMEOUT_SECS),
tokio::process::Command::new("sh")
.arg("-c")
.arg(command)
.current_dir(&self.security.workspace_dir)
.output(),
)
.await;
match result {
Ok(Ok(output)) => {
let mut stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string();
let mut stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).to_string();
// Truncate output to prevent OOM
if stdout.len() > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES {
stdout.truncate(MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES);
stdout.push_str("\n... [output truncated at 1MB]");
}
if stderr.len() > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES {
stderr.truncate(MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES);
stderr.push_str("\n... [stderr truncated at 1MB]");
}
Ok(ToolResult {
success: output.status.success(),
output: stdout,
error: if stderr.is_empty() {
None
} else {
Some(stderr)
},
})
}
Ok(Err(e)) => Ok(ToolResult {
success: false,
output: String::new(),
error: Some(format!("Failed to execute command: {e}")),
}),
Err(_) => Ok(ToolResult {
success: false,
output: String::new(),
error: Some(format!(
"Command timed out after {SHELL_TIMEOUT_SECS}s and was killed"
)),
}),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::security::{AutonomyLevel, SecurityPolicy};
fn test_security(autonomy: AutonomyLevel) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
autonomy,
workspace_dir: std::env::temp_dir(),
..SecurityPolicy::default()
})
}
#[test]
fn shell_tool_name() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::Supervised));
assert_eq!(tool.name(), "shell");
}
#[test]
fn shell_tool_description() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::Supervised));
assert!(!tool.description().is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn shell_tool_schema_has_command() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::Supervised));
let schema = tool.parameters_schema();
assert!(schema["properties"]["command"].is_object());
assert!(schema["required"]
.as_array()
.unwrap()
.contains(&json!("command")));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_executes_allowed_command() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::Supervised));
let result = tool
.execute(json!({"command": "echo hello"}))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(result.success);
assert!(result.output.trim().contains("hello"));
assert!(result.error.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_blocks_disallowed_command() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::Supervised));
let result = tool.execute(json!({"command": "rm -rf /"})).await.unwrap();
assert!(!result.success);
assert!(result.error.as_ref().unwrap().contains("not allowed"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_blocks_readonly() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly));
let result = tool.execute(json!({"command": "ls"})).await.unwrap();
assert!(!result.success);
assert!(result.error.as_ref().unwrap().contains("not allowed"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_missing_command_param() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::Supervised));
let result = tool.execute(json!({})).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
assert!(result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("command"));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_wrong_type_param() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::Supervised));
let result = tool.execute(json!({"command": 123})).await;
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_captures_exit_code() {
let tool = ShellTool::new(test_security(AutonomyLevel::Supervised));
let result = tool
.execute(json!({"command": "ls /nonexistent_dir_xyz"}))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(!result.success);
}
}