zeroclaw/tests/whatsapp_webhook_security.rs
Chummy b442a07530
fix(memory): prevent autosave key collisions across runtime flows
Fixes #221 - SQLite Memory Override bug.

This PR resolves memory overwrite behavior in autosave paths by replacing fixed memory keys with unique keys, and improves short-horizon recall quality in channel runtime.

**Root Cause**
SQLite memory uses a unique constraint on `memories.key` and writes with `ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE`.
Several autosave paths reused fixed keys (or sender-stable keys), so newer messages overwrote earlier conversation entries.

**Changes**
- Channel runtime: autosave key changed from `channel_sender` to `channel_sender_messageId`
- Added memory-context injection before provider calls (aligned with agent loop behavior)
- Agent loop: autosave keys changed from fixed `user_msg`/`assistant_resp` to UUID-suffixed keys
- Gateway: Webhook/WhatsApp autosave keys changed to UUID-suffixed keys

All CI checks passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-15 22:55:52 -05:00

133 lines
3.7 KiB
Rust

//! Integration tests for WhatsApp webhook signature verification.
//!
//! These tests validate that:
//! 1. Webhooks with valid signatures are accepted
//! 2. Webhooks with invalid signatures are rejected
//! 3. Webhooks with missing signatures are rejected
//! 4. Webhooks are rejected even if JSON is valid but signature is bad
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use sha2::Sha256;
/// Compute valid HMAC-SHA256 signature for a webhook payload
fn compute_signature(app_secret: &str, body: &[u8]) -> String {
let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_from_slice(app_secret.as_bytes()).unwrap();
mac.update(body);
let result = mac.finalize();
format!("sha256={}", hex::encode(result.into_bytes()))
}
#[test]
fn whatsapp_signature_rejects_missing_sha256_prefix() {
let secret = "test_app_secret";
let body = b"test payload";
let bad_sig = "abc123"; // Missing sha256= prefix
assert!(!zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret, body, bad_sig
));
}
#[test]
fn whatsapp_signature_rejects_invalid_hex() {
let secret = "test_app_secret";
let body = b"test payload";
let bad_sig = "sha256=not-valid-hex!!";
assert!(!zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret, body, bad_sig
));
}
#[test]
fn whatsapp_signature_rejects_wrong_signature() {
let secret = "test_app_secret";
let body = b"test payload";
let bad_sig = "sha256=00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff";
assert!(!zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret, body, bad_sig
));
}
#[test]
fn whatsapp_signature_accepts_valid_signature() {
let secret = "test_app_secret";
let body = b"test payload";
let valid_sig = compute_signature(secret, body);
assert!(zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret, body, &valid_sig
));
}
#[test]
fn whatsapp_signature_rejects_tampered_body() {
let secret = "test_app_secret";
let original_body = b"original message";
let tampered_body = b"tampered message";
// Compute signature for original body
let sig = compute_signature(secret, original_body);
// Tampered body should be rejected even with valid-looking signature
assert!(!zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret,
tampered_body,
&sig
));
}
#[test]
fn whatsapp_signature_rejects_wrong_secret() {
let correct_secret = "correct_secret";
let wrong_secret = "wrong_secret";
let body = b"test payload";
// Compute signature with correct secret
let sig = compute_signature(correct_secret, body);
// Wrong secret should reject the signature
assert!(!zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
wrong_secret,
body,
&sig
));
}
#[test]
fn whatsapp_signature_rejects_empty_signature() {
let secret = "test_app_secret";
let body = b"test payload";
assert!(!zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret, body, ""
));
}
#[test]
fn whatsapp_signature_different_secrets_produce_different_sigs() {
let secret1 = "secret_one";
let secret2 = "secret_two";
let body = b"same payload";
let sig1 = compute_signature(secret1, body);
let sig2 = compute_signature(secret2, body);
// Different secrets should produce different signatures
assert_ne!(sig1, sig2);
// Each signature should only verify with its own secret
assert!(zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret1, body, &sig1
));
assert!(!zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret2, body, &sig1
));
assert!(zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret2, body, &sig2
));
assert!(!zeroclaw::gateway::verify_whatsapp_signature(
secret1, body, &sig2
));
}