zeroclaw/SECURITY.md
argenis de la rosa 05cb353f7f feat: initial release — ZeroClaw v0.1.0
- 22 AI providers (OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI, Mistral, etc.)
- 7 channels (CLI, Telegram, Discord, Slack, iMessage, Matrix, Webhook)
- 5-step onboarding wizard with Project Context personalization
- OpenClaw-aligned system prompt (SOUL.md, IDENTITY.md, USER.md, AGENTS.md, etc.)
- SQLite memory backend with auto-save
- Skills system with on-demand loading
- Security: autonomy levels, command allowlists, cost limits
- 532 tests passing, 0 clippy warnings
2026-02-13 12:19:14 -05:00

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# Security Policy
## Supported Versions
| Version | Supported |
| ------- | ------------------ |
| 0.1.x | :white_check_mark: |
## Reporting a Vulnerability
**Please do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.**
Instead, please report them responsibly:
1. **Email**: Send details to the maintainers via GitHub private vulnerability reporting
2. **GitHub**: Use [GitHub Security Advisories](https://github.com/theonlyhennygod/zeroclaw/security/advisories/new)
### What to Include
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Impact assessment
- Suggested fix (if any)
### Response Timeline
- **Acknowledgment**: Within 48 hours
- **Assessment**: Within 1 week
- **Fix**: Within 2 weeks for critical issues
## Security Architecture
ZeroClaw implements defense-in-depth security:
### Autonomy Levels
- **ReadOnly** — Agent can only read, no shell or write access
- **Supervised** — Agent can act within allowlists (default)
- **Full** — Agent has full access within workspace sandbox
### Sandboxing Layers
1. **Workspace isolation** — All file operations confined to workspace directory
2. **Path traversal blocking**`..` sequences and absolute paths rejected
3. **Command allowlisting** — Only explicitly approved commands can execute
4. **Forbidden path list** — Critical system paths (`/etc`, `/root`, `~/.ssh`) always blocked
5. **Rate limiting** — Max actions per hour and cost per day caps
### What We Protect Against
- Path traversal attacks (`../../../etc/passwd`)
- Command injection (`rm -rf /`, `curl | sh`)
- Workspace escape via symlinks or absolute paths
- Runaway cost from LLM API calls
- Unauthorized shell command execution
## Security Testing
All security mechanisms are covered by automated tests (129 tests):
```bash
cargo test -- security
cargo test -- tools::shell
cargo test -- tools::file_read
cargo test -- tools::file_write
```